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Abstract 
 
Financial capability is a multifaceted concept that describes the skills and knowledge of 
managing one’s financial resources. This area has seen recent interest in identifying the 
underlying factors due to the increasing responsibility placed upon consumers. Policy 
makers typically use financial education to improve financial behaviours (based on 
economic assumptions), which has demonstrated mixed effects. To develop more reliable 
methods, the current thesis uses a comprehensive model of behaviour to understand the 
barriers and facilitators of financial capability, in addition to developing and testing 
interventions to improve financial capability. 
 The first chapter provides a conceptual review of financial capability through a 
behavioural science lens, to understand why greater financial literacy may not translate 
to optimal financial behaviours. The second chapter details the behavioural framework 
used in the thesis in greater depth, the third chapter details some of the issues why 
individuals fail to maintain their goals under the concept of cognitive control. 
 In the fourth chapter I present secondary analyses of previously conducted 
formative research identifying several key behavioural mechanisms affecting people’s 
financial capability. Firstly, individuals often fail to keep within their means due to 
automatic mechanisms to improve their social rank amongst peers. Secondly, individuals 
often struggle to save for the future due to deficits in more reflective mechanisms, e.g., 
goal-directedness. I provide a behavioural diagnosis from these findings in chapter five, 
from which I design and pilot three intervention. The pilot study’s findings are then used 
to inform the design of a randomized control trial. 
The sixth chapter details a multi-site randomised-controlled trial. This trial uses 
Goal-Setting and Habit-Based interventions to improve participants’ financial capability, 
measured via their consumption, account balances, and savings. The Goal-Setting group 
demonstrated significant improvements across all three measures. In contrast, the Habit-
Based group improved only in their account balances compared to the Control group. 
 The seventh chapter examines the moderating effects of individual differences 
which have been previously demonstrated to account for variations in consumption and 
savings. These results demonstrate that higher levels of goal-directedness can improve 
reductions in monetary consumption. 
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1 
 Aetiology of household financial behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
• Household and individual financial behaviour relate to how an individual 
consumes and retains their financial resources. 
• Sub-optimal consumption and savings are characterised as reduced financial 
capability, which is an umbrella term that denotes the behavioural and 
psychological requirements to making financially sound decisions.  
• Educational endorsements are still used as a method of interventional policy 
to promote financial capability, however, educational policies may not 
necessarily produce desired outcomes. This may be due to how behaviour is 
understood generally and the assumptions made by financial capability. 
• The COM-B model is a model to characterise and diagnose the components 
that lead to a given behaviour. The COM-B model is primarily utilised in 
healthcare but the principles hold for financial capability and provide a more 
overarching model of the underlying factors and causes behind sub-optimal 
financial capability. 
• Individual differences in financial capability can identify and characterise 
motivational and psychological underpinnings that can lead to and predict 
sub-optimal financial capability, and can identify at-risk individuals 
requiring intervention. 
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1.1 What is household financial and saving behaviour? 
Household financial behaviour describes how people, at the individual or familial level, 
use financial instruments and products to reach their objectives (Guiso & Sodini, 2013). 
Household financial behaviour relates to the consumption of financial resources and the 
extent to which financial resources can be retained. Understanding household financial 
behaviour is important because individuals are increasingly asked to take more direct 
responsibility for their financial future. For instance, people in the United Kingdom (UK) 
are now making more decisions about their retirement funds due to the shift from Direct 
Benefit pension schemes to Direct Contribution schemes (Lusardi, 2008). This shift in 
responsibility has meant that individuals are now required to reduce their financial 
consumption to set aside disposable income. 
 Much like how an individual’s physical and psychological well-being can 
fluctuate (becoming positive or negative), financial well-being can too, resulting in either 
excess or deficits in financial resources. One’s financial state can be captured by 
examining the difference between one’s income (wages, net property income, 
investments etc) and monetary consumption (expenditures on goods and services). Where 
monetary consumption exceeds income, an individual is spending more than they can 
afford to, and begin to incur debt. When income exceeds monetary consumption, an 
individual has more money than they can spend and therefore accumulate disposable 
income or more commonly referred to as ‘savings’. An individual’s savings amount 
captures the difference between their income and monetary consumption, where 
increasing savings can be driven by either increasing one’s income, or decreasing one’s 
monetary consumption. 
In the current financial state of the UK, households are suffering from increased 
financial pressure, with rising debt and stalling income (Aviva, 2017). As a result, those 
in the middle and lower income brackets are starting to feel financially squeezed. A recent 
report from The Money Advice Service reveals that around 25% of the UK population, 
i.e., approximately 12.7 million people, fall under this category (Money Advice Service, 
2016). The report also revealed that the mean amount of disposable income of financially-
squeezed individuals rests at around £600 at any point in time. Approximately 3.2 million 
people have no disposable income at all. Notably, managing finances is often more 
difficult for these individuals than wealthier people, as one unexpected bill can lead to 
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turmoil when there is insufficient disposable income at hand. For instance, financially 
squeezed individuals often accept payday loans to cope with their financial situations. 
These loans feature astronomical annual percentage rates of charge (Bertrand & Morse, 
2011; Bhutta, 2014; Stegman & Faris, 2003), which have been shown to leave consumers 
in a worse financial state (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015). 
 Individual and household saving behaviour (that is the behaviour of an individual 
or household trying to optimise the difference between their income and consumption) 
cannot be captured in raw values alone. Consider trying to compare the financial state of 
two individuals - it is difficult to take their savings at face value, as this does not account 
for differences in their income or monetary consumption. These two individuals could 
show identical savings, but one individual’s income may be twice that of the other’s; or 
one’s consumption may be half that of the other’s. Comparing raw, absolute savings gives 
a misleading picture and may distort the saving ability of households and individuals. 
The absolute values of savings must take into account income to portray a propensity to 
save, comparable across individuals. This is termed the ‘savings ratio’. The savings ratio 
is the ratio of disposable income as a fraction of total income. Savings ratio is calculated 
by expressing the amount of savings as a proportion of income, standardising this across 
individuals, making it possible to compare how well individuals save. Calculating 
‘savings’ and ‘savings ratio’ permits the analysis of an individual’s or the public’s 
financial well-being.  
We can exemplify the savings ratio by examining the current savings ratio across 
the UK, where the level of savings has fallen to their lowest level since 2005. In 2017 the 
savings ratio was 4.9% (Chu, 2018). This value denotes that the average household only 
saved 4.9% of the average household income.  
To help individuals move to a stable financial position, one must first understand 
and identify the determinants behind optimal financial behaviour. Over the last decade, 
there has been considerable interest on the determinants behind implementing and 
maintaining optimal financial behaviour (Atkinson, McKay, Collard, & Kempson, 2007; 
Dolan, Elliott, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2012; Drever et al., 2015; Elliott, Dolan, Vlaev, 
Adriaenssens, & Metcalfe, 2010; Gale & Levine, 2011; Mason & Wilson, 2000; Money 
Advice Service, 2014). Implementing and maintaining optimal financial behaviour is 
often referred to as being financially capable (Money Advice Service, 2014). The term 
‘financial capability’ is now commonly used and has gathered considerable interest in the 
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last few years. For instance, a Financial Capability week was established in the UK 
recently. 
1.2 Financial capability 
The term ‘financial capability’ describes the skills, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours 
underlying well-informed choices to manage financial resources (Arnold & Rhyne, 2016; 
Atkinson et al., 2007; Mader, 2018; Mason & Wilson, 2000). Financial capability 
conceptualises what people know and can do in relation to financial services available to 
them (Caplan & Sherraden, 2018). People who manage their money more effectively are 
more ‘financially capable’ (Drever et al., 2015). In recent times, people are likely to 
require greater financial capability than in the past, in part resulting from factors like 
higher life expectancy, the shift towards Direct Contribution pension schemes, as well as 
the higher cost of education. In this financial climate, those who feel financially squeezed, 
with a narrowly greater income than consumption, must be financially capable to live 
well.  By understanding what makes people financially capable, mechanisms can be 
identified and interventions can be designed and implemented to aid those in financial 
struggle. For this, we need to understand and explain financial capability. 
Financial capability is often conceptualised from three behavioural components 
(Arnold & Rhyne, 2016; Mader, 2018; Money Advice Service, 2014). The first 
component is ‘Keeping track’ which denotes the abilities and skills behind monitoring 
one’s accounts. This involves, understanding the flow of finances, knowing the available 
account balance and understanding available financial products. The second component 
is ‘Making-ends-meet’ which denotes the abilities and skills to remain within ones 
constraints of income. The third component is ‘Planning ahead’ which describes the skills 
and abilities required to consider future events and plan for them.  
 Will financial education improve financial capability? 
In order to produce interventions to increase people’s financial capability, 
interventionists need to understand the barriers and facilitators1 of optimal financial 
behaviours. Such barriers and facilitators are often called behavioural mechanisms.  
                                               
1 Faciliators and enablers are used interchangeably throughout the thesis to denote the behavioural 
mechanisms that lead to optimal behaviour. 
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From a rational perspective, individuals may not make the best choices or 
decisions because of incorrect assumptions or beliefs. Put simply, the information that 
individuals are using is biased or inaccurate. Therefore, common-sense approaches to 
behaviour change assume that individuals do not possess the adequate information to 
make the optimal choice. For instance, it is difficult for anyone to save optimally, if they 
do not understand the different financial products, or even how to invest. From this 
conceptual standpoint, the ideal intervention approach would be to disseminate financial 
information to educate individuals. 
Financial education2 is already a common intervention approach, that has even 
been applied as policy intervention (Brown, van der Klaauw, Wen, & Zafar, 2013; Bruhn, 
Legovini, Zia, Leão, & Marchetti, 2014; Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014). In this 
section we document the efficacy of educational approaches to increase financial 
knowledge to improve financial capability. Financial education can be assessed through 
comparison of financial literacy scores between individuals who attend financial courses 
and individuals who do not attend (through regression analysis). This can be done through 
experimental methods, either through randomised-controlled trials (where participants 
are randomly allocated to receive the educational training or not), or through quasi-
experimental methods in which the allocation is not random but self-selected. 
To determine if education increases financial capability, Gale and Levine (2011) 
reviewed previous evidence from financial education seminars and courses, and 
identified that improving financial education improves financial savings (Bernheim & 
Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 2002). The researchers identified spill-over effects across an 
agent’s social network and across society in general. Gale and Levine’s  finding is further 
supported by Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly (2003), who showed that better financial 
practices were associated with higher financial knowledge scores.  
 In another line of research, Gutter, Garrison and Copur (2010) sought to see if 
different United States (US) State-level legislation affected students’ financial 
behaviours differently. To do so, they conducted a quasi-experimental study, where they 
collected data on over 1500 college students’ financial literacy, dispositions and 
behaviours. The researchers noted that  states where there were more social-learning 
opportunities (i.e. learning from other people’s behaviour), were associated with higher 
                                               
2 Financial education is operationalised as financial literacy (Huston, 2010), in the literature these two 
terms are used interchangeably. 
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levels of financial capability. They found students who received education were more 
likely to save, budget their finances and avoid risky credit behaviour. This was 
corroborated by the National Council on Economic Education (2007), which found that 
US states that offered mandatory, assessed financial education courses in their high 
schools created more students that budgeted, saved and avoided risky credit. 
In a similar line of research, Brown, van der Klaauw, Wen and Zafar (2013) 
compared recent high school students’ credit scores and debt delinquency rates from US 
States with and without mandated high-school financial education over 10 years. States 
that mandated such education, showed improved credit scores and reduced default rates, 
whilst states without mandated education demonstrated  no significant change. 
 Further positive effects of lower cost educational interventions are demonstrated 
by Walstad, Rebeck and MacDonald (2010). This research found that a DVD-based 
financial education course led to significant improvements in financial knowledge; a 
finding further corroborated by Harter and Harter (2007).  
 Outside the US, Bruhn, Legovini, Zia, Leão and Marchetti (2014) conducted a 
large-scale assessment in 868 schools in Brazil, with approximately 20,000 students to 
examine the impact of financial education courses on financial capability. The study used 
a randomised-controlled trial to identify causal links between financial education and 
financial capability. The researchers noted that students who enrolled in the course went 
on to report an approximate 2.3% decrease in monetary consumption, and 1.4% increase 
in monetary savings, when compared to students who did not attend the course.  
The benefits of financial education extend from students to adult populations. For 
example, Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (2009) found that employer-offered retirement 
seminars promote pension participation and contribution rates. The effect is even greater 
for employees who are not at the higher-end of the salary range. This may be due to a 
larger proportion of employees at the lower end of the salary range attending the seminars 
compared to those at the higher end. 
In summary, the above studies show financial education can promote financial 
capability. These insights demonstrate the effects of limited financial education and its 
impact upon household behaviour. Financial knowledge can be considered a precursor to 
financial behaviour where knowledge structures offer a better behavioural policy to reach 
one’s financial goals.  
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 The limits of education  
Some leading experts disagree on the success of financial education programmes, 
with some research demonstrating little to no change in behaviour as a result of financial 
education. (Adams & Rau, 2011; Collins & O’Rourke, 2010; Hastings, Madrian, & 
Skimmyhorn, 2013; Hira, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Willis, 2009). These results 
raise concerns that educational approaches do not improve household financial 
behaviour. These concerns can be considered in two domains; methodological and 
conceptual or intellectual concerns. The following findings presented do not evaluate the 
previous studies given in section 1.2.1, but present general concerns. 
First, let us consider the methodological issues in examining financial education 
policies as a means to improve financial capability. One issue is the operationalisation of 
measuring financial behaviour. Measuring financial behaviour requires either the use 
objective measures of finances, such as bank account records or consumption-level data; 
or the use of self-report measures where participants declare their consumption, saving 
and financial behaviours. Objective measures offer high reliability and validity, but data 
is often expensive and time-consuming to collect; whilst data from self-report methods 
is quick and easy to collect, but can be questionable in its validity. 
Many of the studies that investigate financial behaviour are more inclined to use 
survey methods for respondents to self-report financial behaviour, usually due to the 
large-scale samples employed (Brown et al., 2013; Bruhn et al., 2014; Gutter et al., 2010; 
Walstad et al., 2010). Self-reported measures are highly susceptible to numerous biases, 
predominantly social desirability effects (Van de Mortel, 2008) or even demand 
characteristics (Nichols & Maner, 2008). A study by Collins (2013) highlighted 
differences between data collected from the same participants using objective methods 
versus self-report methods. This study used a pre/post randomised-controlled trial, in 
which clients were randomised to attend a financial education course for twelve months. 
Collins used objective measures of financial data (checking and saving account balances) 
as well as a purpose designed self-report measure, which used categorical responses to 
questions such as “How much would you estimate you and your spouse/partner have in 
combined total savings and investments?”. Collins found a greater effect of financial 
education for self-reported compared to objective measures, which highlights the social 
desirability issue, where people are more likely to declare a greater income when they do 
not have to prove them objectively.  A social desirability bias could inflate the efficacy 
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of financial education studies that use self-report methods to measure financial 
behaviours.  
A second limitation is that research is largely quasi-experimental in the sense that 
participants are not randomly allocated to groups (Hastings et al., 2013). Numerous 
quasi-experiments identify a positive association between financial education and 
financial capability (Bayer et al., 2009; Meier & Sprenger, 2008). The problem with using 
a quasi- vs truly randomised-experimental design is the potential for extraneous factors 
or the selection of participants to explain the findings independent of the intervention. As 
an example of an extraneous factor being a problem, research found financial education 
does improve financial savings, but when accounting for US state differences, the effects 
of education are diminished (Cole & Shastry, 2010). In other words, financial capability 
was not caused by the effects of state policy in financial education courses. For instance, 
examining the results of some of the research presented in the previous section (Bayer et 
al., 2009; Brown et al., 2013; Gutter et al., 2010), it is difficult to discriminate between 
the positive effects of financial education against any self-selection mechanisms that may 
lead more financially motivated individuals to sign up to such courses. Therefore one 
should be careful in drawing causal links between financial education and financial 
behaviour.  
Compared to quasi-experimental studies, truly randomised-experimental trials have 
shown limited benefits in financial education. For instance,  one study (Gartner & Todd, 
2005), randomized first year college students to receive credit education. They found no 
statistical difference in participants’ saving behaviour or timeliness of payments post 
intervention. Similar findings were demonstrated by Servon and Kaestner (2008) as well 
as Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2011). Quasi-experimental research does not provide 
causal links between financial education and financial capability, but does identify a 
relationship between the two concepts. Randomised-controlled trials identify small 
causal effects, suggesting that financial education is a causal factor but may not be the 
sole factor in financial capability. This is further epitomised in the research conducted by 
Fernandes et al. (2014) which found that studies that manipulated and randomised 
financial education attendance explained 0.06% to 0.12% of the variance for low income 
and general populations respectively. When measuring financial education there is a 
sharp rise to 1.27% and 1.80% of explained variance for low income and general 
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populations respectively. This difference highlights the concern of translating financial 
education into change in financial behaviours. 
Conceptual concerns identify that the evidence for financial education is not 
coherent, and research demonstrates mixed results. For instance, Choi, Laibson, Madrian 
and Metrick (2002) measured the effectiveness of employee seminars. The researchers 
found that 14% of those attending seminars joined the savings plan, compared to 7% of 
individuals who did not attend seminars, despite all employees stating an intention to 
save. Such empirical evidence identifies that although a diminished literacy can affect 
financial behaviour, much more needs to be done to improve financial capability (Drever 
et al., 2015). A meta-review was conducted by Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer (2014) 
included over 200 studies investigating the effects of financial education on financial 
behaviours. The researchers found that financial education only accounted for 0.1% of 
the variance in financial behaviour. This extremely small explanatory power does raise 
concerns over the assumed benefit of financial education. This finding was further 
corroborated by Mandell (2008) who examined the effects of different financial 
education courses between 1997 and 2006 and found that there was no difference 
between the financial capability of people after having taken the course to those who 
never took the course. These results suggest that financial education (measured through 
financial literacy) is a factor in financial capability, but the intervention approach of 
providing financial education does not produce a financially capable cohort. This would 
perhaps suggest that there is something wrong with the underlying factor(s) involved in 
the lack of financial capability. We can draw from similar findings by looking at the role 
of education approaches in public health, which demonstrates that education methods 
increase knowledge but do not actively change behaviour (McCluskey & Lovarini, 2005). 
These results highlight a lack of consensus in the effects of financial education, 
however, one should not completely discount financial education approaches. Some 
research has identified significant outcomes from financial education (Bayer et al., 2009; 
Brown et al., 2013; Bruhn et al., 2014; Gutter et al., 2010; Harter & Harter, 2007; Walstad 
et al., 2010), and we cannot discount the idea that people do require this information. 
These findings collated together identify a need for a more nuanced understanding of 
how financial education leads to financial capability. 
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 What does financial education miss? 
The mixed results from research exploring financial education as a means to improve 
financial behaviour, suggests that financial education is not the only factor and therefore 
its effects may be mitigated by one of multiple other factors required for behaviour 
change, the goal of policy implementation.   
Behaviour change is inherently a multi-factorial process (Michie et al., 2013). 
Financial education is an inherent factor in financial capability but is not the sole factor. 
The distinction here is to separate the capacity to conduct a behaviour or action from the 
knowledge processes behind the behaviour. Put succinctly, just because an individual has 
the capacity to be financially literate does not guarantee improving their financial literacy 
will enhance their financial capability. Conversely an individual who is financially 
capable is not necessarily always financially literate.  
Consider financial education like information in a computer. For the computer to 
produce any sort of output it must have the software and hardware capable of processing 
the information. Much like a computer, behaviour requires more than just information. 
The behaviour is an output of the individual. Therefore, to be capable of producing the 
desired behaviour, the individual must have all the necessary components required to 
produce the behaviour.  
First, it is important to understand what is meant by capability. ‘Capability’ is 
defined as 'the power or ability to do something” (Michie, Van Stralen, & West, 2011). 
This definition demonstrates that capability relates to every component of a specific 
behaviour: psychological, physiological, and environmental. Capability includes the 
relevant knowledge and skills behind an action, but also includes the physical resources 
giving a person or a collective the ability to undertake a particular kind of behaviour. In 
summary, ‘capability’, or what defines a ‘capable person’, includes all the necessary and 
sufficient attributes that make it possible for an agent to execute a given action. 
For instance, consider the example of catching a ball. It is not enough for an 
individual to understand how to catch the ball, or even be motivated to do so. The 
individual must be able to fulfil additional requirements, such as being able to view and 
identify the ball, and then pronate and contract their arms and cup their hands to catch it. 
These factors are physiological in nature and are mandatory to execute the behaviour. In 
addition, the individual must be able to compute the speed of the ball, its distance and 
trajectory. They must then move themselves to an approximate location that will intersect 
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with the ball’s trajectory. All of the above components are necessary to catch a ball. 
Whilst skill training and practice will assist, if the agent’s own physiology is unable to 
meet the demands of the task then they are incapable. This distinction is important for 
intervention and policy considerations. Similarly, within the financial setting, a consumer 
may possess great financial knowledge but lack the self-control and will power to avoid 
lavish expenditure. As such, this individual may end up living outside of their means, and 
would therefore not fit under the definition of being financially capable.  
 An additional issue with the financial education approach is the conceptual, 
underlying theoretical base that is being adopted, characterised by a lack of a 
psychological theory base. Behavioural economics and behavioural science can provide 
a unique insight into financial capability, by taking into account psychological constructs 
of behaviour and cognition, alongside economic theories of financial behaviour. In 
classical economics, economists are often concerned with the normative theory of how 
people should behave (McQuillin & Sugden, 2012), where sub-optimal behaviour is often 
regarded as irrational. However, a strongly grounded theoretical base can dramatically 
improve outcomes by utilising behavioural mechanisms to translate some theory of 
behaviour change into practice. For instance Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan and 
Zinman (2010) utilised a behavioural economic approach grounded in theories of sub-
optimal self-control. This allowed the researchers to integrate and suggest a model of 
behaviour that could codify interventional policies to be tested. The researchers ran a 
randomised-controlled trial in which individuals were randomised to a control or 
treatment group where they were sent SMS (short message service) messages through 
mobile phone channels to remind them to save. The researchers demonstrated the positive 
effects of SMS messages across three field experiments promoting savings behaviour in 
the Philippines. The results showed that those in the treatment arm produced a 6% 
improvement in savings, with a 3% increase in individuals reaching their savings goal, 
compared to the control group. In addition, account balances were shown to increase by 
47% for those in the treatment group compared to the control.  
In fact, empirical studies that utilise theoretically informed behavioural mechanisms, 
were more beneficial than financial education alone  (Doi, McKenzie, & Zia, 2013; 
Hershey, Jacobs-Lawson, McArdle, & Hamagami, 2007; Howlett, Kees, & Kemp, 2008; 
Stawski, Hershey, & Jacobs-Lawson, 2007). The skills and knowledge educational 
interventions alone can promote may be insufficient to change behaviour. Other factors, 
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such as internal motivations and external opportunities to change people’s behaviour 
should also be considered. (Dolan, Hallsworth, et al., 2012b; Dolan, Elliott, Metcalfe, & 
Vlaev, 2012a; Michie, Atkins, & West, 2014).  
Theoretically informed interventions and policies provide a more coherent 
framework to translate hypotheses about behaviour into action. The term to denote a non-
systematic, non-comprehensive approach to designing interventions is often referred to 
as  an ISLAGIATT or “It Seemed Like A Good Idea At The Time” (Atkins & Michie, 
2015). Here we should distinguish between conceptual and methodological dimensions. 
Within the conceptual sphere, ISLAGIATT’s refer to common-sense models as opposed 
to a theory-driven approach. In this sense interventionists do not systematically 
understand or examine the underlying concepts driving the behaviour. In the 
methodological sphere, interventionists use intervention approaches based on what they 
assume to work, rather than a systematic approach based on identified determinants. A 
systematic, comprehensive approach pushes for interventionists to understand and 
diagnose the behavioural problem and then devise approaches that best fit given certain 
parameters. 
Household finance policy can draw upon the health-care sector in their 
implementation of behavioural interventions and policy design. The health care sector is 
constantly pushing and setting the normative ideals of intervention design. For instance, 
take the Medical Research Council’s (MRC) guidance on intervention design which 
underwent successive reviews and changes (Campbell et al., 2000; Craig et al., 2008; 
Moore et al., 2015). The MRC approach identifies the necessity in drawing upon a solid 
theoretical and empirical evidence base to justify the behavioural mechanisms and 
treatment effects put in place within a policy or intervention. This MRC guidance has 
been cited over 8000 times, which further supports the usefulness of this approach. 
Policy-makers and researchers within the finance sector can learn from the MRC 
guidance to improve the outcomes of their intended treatment effects through solid basis 
of psychological and behaviourally grounded theories. 
A broader, more useful conceptual mapping of financial capability is required. This 
will provide a more valid understanding of financial capability, through a behavioural 
lens. This notion will put forward the idea that the way people manage their money, and 
their financial behaviour in general, are subject to the same wide range of influences, as 
other human behaviour. This presents a broader picture of the factors influencing 
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financial capability, based on a model of behaviour, which goes beyond skills and 
knowledge. As a result, financial advisory services, should be employing such 
interventions as new services for a greater benefit to its users. This can be captured by 
the UK financial capability week in the United Kingdom, which puts forward a 
behavioural approach to achieving financial capability. 
1.3 Understanding and changing behaviour 
An existing model of behaviour to help interventionists understand how to influence 
behaviour is called the COM-B model (Fishbein, Triandis, Kanfer, Becker, & 
Middlestadt, 2001; Michie, Van Stralen, et al., 2011), which is based upon scientific 
evidence stemming across multiple fields of human and animal behaviour (Michie et al., 
2014). The COM-B model is one of the most cited models used by interventionists and 
policy-makers, cited over 2000 times. COM-B is an acronym describing specific 
components that generate behaviour. The COM-B model consists of Capabilities, 
Opportunities and Motivations, which interact to generate Behaviour. The term 
‘behaviour’ refers to a specific behaviour one wishes to change. In the current manuscript 
the term ‘behaviour’ is meant to capture people’s financial capabilities (for more 
information on COM-B see Chapter 2). 
Before advancing, please note that the COM-B model was developed 
independently from the financial capability literature, and so some confusion may arise 
due to the overlapping use of the word ‘capability.’ Within the COM-B model, capability 
denotes people’s physical and psychological capacity related to a behaviour. In the 
following section, I present determinants of financial capability, specifically savings 
behaviour, modelled through the COM-B model. These examples are not exhaustive but 
sought to capture a sufficient number of determinants to illustrate the complexity in 
behaviour change for improving financial capability. 
 Capability 
The first factor of determinants for financial capability is ‘Capability’ which refers to the 
psychological and physical affordance of enacting the behaviour (Michie et al., 2014). 
Capability has multiple factors and it would be impossible to review all factors below. 
Some examples of different factors are provided to exemplify how multiple determinants 
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exist for household financial behaviour. This is not an exhaustive list and there are likely 
many other factors contributing to an individual’s capability. 
1.3.1.1 Physical Capability – Genetics and Intelligence Quotient (IQ) 
Genetics are likely to play a role in the variation of people’s savings. Genetic variation 
may play a large role in savings behaviour by modulating income and risk preferences 
(Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, & Wallace, 2009), which can account 
for approximately 25% of risky financial decision making. These genetic predispositions 
can have demonstrative effects on savings and therefore can influence individuals’ 
savings behaviour. A study which assessed the genetic component of savings behaviour 
in 14,930 twin pairs in Sweden found that 32-40% of the variance in savings was 
explained by genetic factors (Cronqvist & Siegel, 2015).  
 These genetic variations also play a role in income. One study by Taubman (1976) 
with a sample set of 4068 twins in the United States, found that genetic factors account 
for up to 50% of the income. As income is a prerequisite for savings, these genetic 
propensities have a knock-on effect in savings behaviour. 
Research into intelligence has demonstrated that IQ has influencing effects on 
savings (Zagorsky, 2007). Researchers found that IQ raised income and consequently 
savings rates by over $300 per year even with other factors remaining constant. However, 
the researchers also noted a non-linear relationship between IQ and financial stress, 
suggesting that though IQ can improve income and financial savings, it can also 
negatively impact financial health. 
1.3.1.2 Psychological Capability - Parental behaviour 
Parental behaviour may also play a role in financial behaviour, with people learning 
financial savings behaviour through modelling their parent’s behaviour (Cronqvist & 
Siegel, 2015). Anecdotal evidence identifies that parents do generate some form of 
influence in their children’s saving propensity, by providing weekly allowances, opening 
savings accounts and even providing tools such as piggy banks (Bisin & Verdier, 2005; 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981).   
Charles and Hurst (2003) examined a panel-dataset of over 1500 parent-child 
respondents. This demonstrated substantial parental-child intergeneration similarities in 
savings, where age controlled models revealed that parental influences account for 5-
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25% of the variance in savings behaviour.  One of the issues of social behaviours, 
especially when clustered at the familial level, is that separating genetic from 
environmental factors is often almost impossible to do. However, investigation by 
Taubman (1976) demonstrated that familial environment accounts for 4-18% of the 
variance in income whilst controlling for other variables such as age, gender and genetics. 
1.3.1.3 Psychological Capability - Knowledge  
Please see section 1.2.1 to see how financial education has been shown to improve 
financial behaviours. 
1.3.1.4 Psychological Capability - Literacy 
Research has shown that the numerical literacy, i.e. one’s numerical ability, is important 
in financial behaviours (Banks & Oldfield, 2007a; Gerardi, Goette, & Meier, 2013; 
Rowell & Bregant, 2012). For instance, one study identified that individuals with greater 
numerical ability are less likely to default on mortgage repayments (Gerardi et al., 2013). 
A second study identified that numeracy levels were strongly correlated with measures 
of retirement savings and investment portfolios, even when controlling for factors such 
as education (Banks & Oldfield, 2007a). 
 Motivational Factors 
The motivational component of people’s financial capabilities may be affected by their 
levels of extraversion, impulsivity, intentions, executive function, sense of control and 
opportunity. Each factor is reviewed below.  
1.3.2.1 Extraversion 
Extraversion, which is one of the big five personality traits (conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, neuroticism, extraversion and openness-to-experience), could be linked to 
savings behaviour. Extraversion is characterised as being associated with social potency 
and a heightened sensitivity for potential rewards (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Lucas, Diener, 
Grob, Suh, & Shao, 2000). This psychological underpinning could affect an individual 
mindset by motivating more rewarding purchases leading to over-consumption. This is 
what Hirsh (2014) found when examining extraversion at three levels. The individual 
 16 
 
over time level showed a decrease in savings for each unit of extraversion (r(21) = -.50). 
The state-level showed higher levels of extraversion were associated with lower savings 
(r(45) = -.29). Finally, the macro-level demonstrated again, a significant negative 
association of extraversion and savings amounts (r(48) = -.29).  
1.3.2.2 Impulsivity/Self-control 
Impulsivity is a multi-factorial construct, which is often characterised as the tendency to 
act without regard for consequences (Kulendran, Patel, Darzi, & Vlaev, 2016). There are 
multiple facets of impulsive behaviour that could potentially affect savings, where 
impulsive individuals find it difficult to inhibit automatic or dominant behaviours and 
intrusive thoughts (Claes, Nederkoorn, Vandereycken, Guerrieri, & Vertommen, 2006; 
Kulendran et al., 2016). For example, an individual in the checkout line at a supermarket 
may see a bar of chocolate and feel an impulse to buy it. An impulsive individual would 
struggle to overcome that impulse and would therefore be more likely to purchase the 
chocolate bar (Nederkoorn, Houben, Hofmann, Roefs, & Jansen, 2010a). Impulsive 
individuals also show a propensity for reward maximisation (Murray et al., 2014), which 
could reinforce impulsive behaviours further. 
  Impulsivity has been shown to influence savings through high levels of monetary 
consumption. Researchers have demonstrated that impulsivity is predictive of 
compulsive buying (Desarbo & Edwards, 1996; Lejoyeux, Arbaretaz, McLoughlin, & 
Ades, 2002) as measured through trait impulsivity scales such as Zuckerman’s sensation-
seeking scale. A result further demonstrated by Billieux, Rochat, Rebetez and Van der 
Linden (2008) who found that compulsive buying correlated with the UPPS’s subscales 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) of lack of urgency, lack of premeditation and lack of 
perseverance.  
One study examined self-control by examining consumption reduction techniques in 
a sample household panel survey (Rabinovich & Webley, 2007). The researchers found 
that techniques that sought to improve self-control, such as implementation intentions, as 
well as formulating goals and plans improved savings rates. A measure of self-control 
that is regularly used are temporal discounting tasks that assess preferences of immediate 
smaller rewards against delayed larger rewards. This discounting index has been used 
extensively in addiction and obesity studies (Bickel et al., 2007; Coskunpinar, Dir, & 
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Cyders, 2013; Kulendran et al., 2013, 2016; Zhu, Cortes, Mathur, Tomasi, & Momenan, 
2015).  
Temporal discounting could perhaps impede savings rates by moderating monetary 
consumption through the policy of maximising immediate rewards. Research by Ersner-
Hershfield, Tess Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin and Knutson (2009) showed a 
relationship between temporal discounting rates and savings rates. The researchers asked 
participants to complete a self-continuity task, to assess how they see themselves in the 
future vs now; participants also completed a temporal discounting task and a self-report 
packet of financial behaviour. The researchers found that self-continuity predicted a 
decrease in temporal discounting rates, and higher levels of savings, whilst controlling 
for age.  
This research was further corroborated by Ottaviani & Vandone (2011) who 
examined the effect of impulsivity on household financial behaviour in the context of 
debt. The researchers used the Iowa Gambling Task and the Barratt Impulsivity Scale to 
measure impulsivity. They found that impulsivity predicted unsecured debt, i.e. credit-
card transaction behaviour. This result suggests that impulsive behaviour improves the 
propensity for monetary consumption, which in turn reduces savings rates. 
1.3.2.3 Intentions and Goals 
Other factors influencing monetary savings are intentions and memory. ‘Intentions’ are 
goal-directed actions in which an agent expresses an interest in attending a given target. 
Intentions can be considered to be a predictor of behaviour (Fishbein, 1975), where an 
agent looks to express behaviour in a goal-directed manner.  
 One investigation into psychological determinants of a financial savings buffer 
revealed intentions were a significant predictor of savings (Magendans, Gutteling, & 
Zebel, 2017) across a sample of student and working age populations, demonstrating 
generalisable results.  
Goals have been shown to predict monetary savings in retirement (Stawski et al., 
2007). The researchers found that setting clearly defined goals was a significant predictor 
of increased retirement savings. These findings were further corroborated by Davis and 
Hustvedt (2012), who found that behavioural control and behavioural intention were the 
best predictors for optimal retirement savings, amongst a sample of 328 individuals who 
completed a personal finance course between 1982 and 2007. These results highlight how 
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goal-directed behaviour is imperative in savings, whereby intentions and goals are 
important in directing behaviour and in behavioural maintenance.  
1.3.2.4 Executive function 
One key psychological concept is the notion of executive function, the ability to integrate 
behaviour and motivation in light of goals and intentions. Executive function may play 
an important role in monetary savings and in diminishing monetary consumption as it is 
involved in self-control (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister & Vohs, 2003; Diamond & Lee, 
2011).  
 Karlsson, Gärling and Selart (1997) performed two experiments using Swedish 
undergraduates investigating if the propensity to consume varied with current income. 
The researchers found consumption rates were higher during an income increase than 
income decrease despite the same amount of money being available. This would suggest 
that cognitive control is diminished when opportunity costs are reduced.  
In a different study (Selart, Karlsson, & Gärling, 1997), researchers examined 
working-age and student populations and found that monetary consumption was higher 
for lump sums than for future monthly increments, despite the total increase being 
equivalent. Such findings describe how executive function in maintaining goal-directed 
behaviour can be undermined when opportunity for reward-seeking arrives.  
1.3.2.5 Sense of control 
A person’s locus of control is the extent to which an agent believes they have a direct 
effect on the outcome of events in their life. For instance,  some elevators contain a “close 
door” button despite them not actually having any impact of closing the doors at all. This 
still gives the user a perceived sense of control. A perceived sense of control is important 
in health and wellbeing – a greater perceived sense of control is associated with better 
health and well-being, even amongst individuals in lower-income brackets (Lachman & 
Weaver, 1998). The effects of a perceived sense of control is important in how we behave, 
which consequently has implications in the financial domain. Livingstone and Lunt 
(1992) investigated the role of psychological factors in savings performances. The 
researchers recruited over 250 participants to complete questionnaires regarding 
psychological characteristics as well as economic variables. The research demonstrated 
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that savings rates were associated with a sense of control, with those who felt less in 
control having demonstrably less savings than those with a higher sense of control.  
 Opportunity 
The opportunity component of financial capabilities may be affected by an individual’s 
social network (social opportunity) or through instances that occur spontaneously 
(physical opportunities). Examples of each factor are reviewed below.  
1.3.3.1 Social Factors 
In an exemplar study demonstrating the role of opportunistic factors (Parker, Michael, & 
Wilcox, 2003), researchers ran an experimental design of ‘families’. Individuals were 
placed in three-member families, in which second and third generations could observe 
and/or communicate with past generations. The results show that those who took 
advantage of the opportunity to learn performed significantly better in savings. These 
results stipulate how social opportunities improve performances and are an inherent 
factor in monetary savings.  
 Gutter, Garrison and Copur (2010) examined the effects of incidences of social 
learning within one’s network. The researchers collected data on over 1500 college 
students pertaining to their financial literacy, dispositions and behaviours. They also 
asked participants how frequently their friends and family had engaged in some financial 
behaviour and if they had observed their behaviour. The researchers found that higher 
incidences of social learning improved financial behaviours and that this was higher for 
parents than for friends.  
1.3.3.2 Physical opportunities 
Physical opportunity are characterised as the local opportunities and options that afford 
themselves to the individual. Opportunities can be both positive (affording enablers and 
facilitators) and negative (affording barriers). For instance, an individual who struggles 
with self-control would want to see themselves commit to reducing consumption; whilst 
opportunity to learn money-management skills may improve household savings 
behaviour. Researchers collaborated with a commercial bank in the Philippines and 
designed a savings account that did not permit users to withdraw any deposits (Ashraf, 
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Karlan, & Yin, 2006). In this study, 202 individuals were randomised to one of two 
conditions: to either receive the savings product or to a control group. The researchers 
found a 47% difference in average savings balance at six months, and 82% at twelve 
months between the two groups, respectively. By reducing the opportunity to spend, 
participants in the intervention group were able to improve their savings by a significant 
amount, in comparison to the control group. 
 Individual Differences 
It is important to note and consider that there is variation in household savings and 
consumption behaviour across the population and amongst individuals. These constructs 
can often have considerable explanatory power, but sometimes, less attention is paid due 
to the considerable statistical power often required to examine differences (Martin & 
Kraemer, 1987). An initial starting point is to examine behaviour that far exceeds the 
normative behaviour of the population. Compulsive shopping behaviour, for example is 
not a current psychiatric disorder registered in the current Diagnostic and Statistics 
Manual. However, it is currently receiving considerable interest and debate (Black, 
2007a; Black, Gabel, Hansen, & Schlosser, 2000; Desarbo & Edwards, 1996). 
Compulsive shopping behaviour is typically displayed as an overarching obsession and 
need to shop that is typically exacerbated in stressful states (Black, 2007b; Desarbo & 
Edwards, 1996; Filomensky & Tavares, 2015; Racine, Kahn, & Hollander, 2014). These 
individuals typically demonstrate high levels of impulsivity (Desarbo & Edwards, 1996; 
Lejoyeux et al., 2002). Compulsive shoppers commonly exhibit higher levels of sensation 
seeking, which depicts reward seeking behaviour.  
Compulsive shoppers also typically demonstrate a lack of perseverance, with a 
tendency to switch, rather than maintain their goal-directed behaviour. They also exhibit 
high levels of negative urgency, a tendency to act rashly when in a negative emotional 
state; and a lack of premeditation displaying a tendency to act before conscious thought 
(Billieux et al., 2008). Here, these individual isolate and identify extreme levels of hyper-
consumption, and are a result of underlying psychological characteristics.  
These psychological components are hugely important. For instance, the varying 
degrees with which individuals compute future reward has implications on savings 
(Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009). The researchers found that the degree 
of consistency in self, predicted a decrease in temporal discounting rates, and higher 
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levels of savings, even controlling for age. This suggests that self-control and individual’s 
computation  and processing of the future, are important not only in their behaviour but 
the outcome of those behaviours.  
Furthermore, an individual’s impulsivity has an effect not only on their health 
(Claes et al., 2006; Kulendran et al., 2013, 2016), but also on their financial state. 
Researchers found that higher levels of impulsivity predicted propensity for unsecure 
debt in credit-card use behaviour (Ottaviani & Vandone, 2011). In addition, impulsivity 
is also associated with reward maximisation (Murray et al., 2014) - the degree to which 
an individual pursues momentary reward in competition with goal-directed actions. 
Reward seeking behaviour has been identified in compulsive shopping as a result of 
dopaminergic neuropharmacological treatments in Parkinson’s (Ondo & Lai, 2008; 
Valerie Voon et al., 2006). 
Psychological processing of goals is important to overcome these behavioural 
predispositions. For instance, setting savings goals has been shown to significantly 
improve retirement savings (Davis & Hustvedt, 2012; Stawski et al., 2007). Setting 
outcome goals and behavioural goals, i.e. distinctive processes which refer to the 
outcome, whilst the behavioural goal dictates the action plan to ascertain the outcome, 
are important in persevering and maintaining goal-directed actions. By setting the 
intention and goal, the agent is then able to maintain some sense of trajectory and purpose 
behind their behaviour. This can help to overcome competitive motivational barriers. 
As such, variation in how individuals process their state and propensity for a given 
action has knock on consequences in their behavioural outcomes. These individual 
differences require further study as the field is still relatively in its infancy when applied 
to financial behaviours. However, by examining individual differences, one can ascertain 
those at-risk and in need of interventional efficacy.   
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 Theory and Frameworks 
 
  
SUMMARY 
• Designing interventions are a complex and in-depth process. 
• Policy-makers and researchers can utilise frameworks and guideline 
processes to build and specify simple and complex interventions. 
• The COM-B approach allows for multiple behaviours to be understood in 
aggregate and influencing effects to identify and target key parameters to 
leverage behaviour change.  
• Use of the MRC’s guidelines for complex interventions can help to structure 
a robust approach and provide a more likely success in intervention 
implementation.  
• Step-wise consideration of the interventional processes yields multiple 
checks and balances to authenticate, test and confirm interventional policies. 
• Behavioural diagnostics are an important start and provide high utility in 
constructing the intervention, through the selection of interventional policies 
and behavioural change techniques.  
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2.1 Understanding and changing behaviour 
To design effective interventions, one needs to fully understand the contextual behaviour 
in question (Atkins & Michie, 2015). This requires an overarching view of the problem 
behaviour in terms of its determinants, which can be conceptualised as the barriers to and 
facilitators of the behaviour. Here, the barriers denote determinants that decrease the 
likelihood of engaging in optimal behaviour and facilitators denote determinants that 
increase the likelihood of the behaviour occurring (Michie et al., 2014).   
In this aspect, we need a complete and overarching understanding of financial 
capability. The financial education approach is rooted in an assumption of information 
deficit, in line with rational agency. However this approach is a common mistake in 
policy and intervention design, which is based on a common-sense approach (Kelly & 
Barker, 2016), rather than a deeper understanding of behaviour.  
A similar approach was undertaken in the public health domain, which sought to 
change people’s behaviour to improve and maintain their own health (Kelly & Barker, 
2016). Public health efforts have found that educating the populace is necessary but not 
sufficient in changing behaviour (Corace & Garber, 2014; Feldman & Sills, 2013; 
Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; McCluskey & Lovarini, 2005; Mellanby, Phelps, & Tripp, 
1992; Nichols, 1994). Education-based approaches in public health efforts have 
demonstrated an improvement in knowledge, but little change in behaviour (McCluskey 
& Lovarini, 2005). Conceptually, knowledge structures are required for behaviour, but 
do not generate behaviour themselves. There are additional requirements to change 
behaviour. The financial education approach has not been designed sub-optimally. In 
fact, based on the underlying assumption of rational agency and information deficits, this 
approach is a valid intervention option. The issue is that the underlying assumptions and 
logic model of change do not fit with empirical evidence on behaviour change. In other 
words, the financial education approach has attempted to change behaviour but is not 
based on a behavioural perspective; there are additional requirements to satisfy the need 
for behaviour change (Atkins & Michie, 2015; Michie, Stralen, & West, 2011).  
These additional requirements can be understood through a grounded behavioural 
perspective based on empirical evidence from the behavioural sciences which constitute 
a range of disciplines, such as economics, neuroscience, psychology and cognitive 
science. Within behavioural science is the sub-specialty of behaviour change science, a 
growing field that aims to study and understand how to change behaviour. Through a 
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theoretical approach, grounded in empirical evidence-based theory, interventions can 
often lead to long-term effectiveness and sustainability of the proposed policies (Michie 
& Prestwich, 2010). We can improve our understanding of financial capability by taking 
a more behavioural perspective, which may afford additional intervention approaches.  
Interventions to change behaviour and improve behavioural capability work on 
several levels – structural or environmental, psychological, and behavioural (Abraham & 
Michie, 2008; Michie, Van Stralen, et al., 2011; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Interventions 
can be defined in one of two ways. ‘Simple interventions’ denote the employment of a 
single behavioural mechanism; whilst ‘complex interventions’ involve multiple 
behavioural mechanisms (and in some cases multiple intervention approaches) (Moore et 
al., 2015). In taking a complex intervention route, multiple determinants of sub-optimal 
financial capability can be targeted simultaneously as informed by recent comprehensive 
models of behaviour and behaviour change (see Vlaev & Dolan, 2015). 
We have already discussed the problem of ISLAGIATT’s (Atkins & Michie, 
2015), where interventions that are designed from an erroneous assumptions can lead to 
poor efficacy (Michie, Van Stralen, et al., 2011). Interventions that do not resolve the 
determinants of sub-optimal performances will not be effective in producing behaviour 
change.  
This chapter discusses a model of behaviour change to identify behavioural 
determinants of sub-optimal performance, in addition to introducing a framework for 
intervention design for the construction and implementation of the intervention. This 
chapter draws from the literature of behaviour change within the healthcare setting 
(Atkins & Michie, 2015; Insel, Einstein, Morrow, & Hepworth, 2013; Koshy, Car, & 
Majeed, 2008; Kulendran et al., 2013, 2016; Michie et al., 2014; Michie & Prestwich, 
2010; Pearson, 2012; Strandbygaard, Thomsen, & Backer, 2010; Vervloet et al., 2012; 
Zygmunt, Olfson, Boyer, & Mechanic, 2002), to denote practices and processes in 
behaviour change. 
2.2 Model of behaviour 
A recent and integrative model to understand behaviour and designing behaviour change 
intervention is the COM-B model (Michie et al., 2014; Michie, Van Stralen, et al., 2011). 
The COM-B model is based upon a consensus of behavioural theorists (Fishbein et al., 
2001) and a principle of common US law. The consensus identified the follow for any 
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behaviour to occur: the skills necessary to perform the action, the intention to enact the 
behaviour and no constraints that prevent the behaviour from occurring. A similar set of 
reasoning is also laid out in common US law, which dictates that in order to prove 
someone guilty of a crime, they must have the means to engage in the crime, the 
motivation to commit the crime and the opportunity to enact the crime. The COM-B 
model puts depicts human behaviour as an interaction of these three systems, termed as 
Capability, Motivation and Opportunities, which interact together to generate behaviour. 
Thus to implement effective financial capability, and to change behaviour, policy-makers 
must influence these components (see Figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The COM-B model utilises a bottom-up approach to behaviour, offering a more 
encompassing view of behaviour where individual facets acting as enablers or barriers to 
a given behaviour can be identified. This allows for more detailed and more effective 
intervention methods. The COM-B model was chosen due to a high citation count, over 
2000, and due to the diagnostic capability. By relating the model to defensible principles 
used within common US law, the COM-B model is therefore an extremely useful and 
parsimonious model of behaviour. There alternative models that could be used, such as 
EAST (Behavioural Insights Team, 2014) or even the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1985). However COM-B was chosen due to its relative simplicity whilst 
explaining and accounting for multiple factors; in addition to the ease with which it can 
Psychological 
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Figure 1; COM-B Framework (Michie et al., 2014) 
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be employed. EAST (Behavioural Insights Team, 2014) is a helpful toolkit, but is not 
comprehensive or detailed enough to assist in a comprehensive behavioural diagnosis, 
furthermore although models such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) are 
often used within health psychology, these types of models has seen much contention 
(Sniehotta, Presseau, & Araújo-Soares, 2014; Sniehotta, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2005). 
Capability is defined as an individual’s psychological and physical capacity to 
engage in the activity concerned. Psychological capability includes having the necessary 
knowledge and skills and also possessing the capacity to engage in the necessary thought 
processes such as comprehension, reasoning and so on (Michie et al., 2011). 
Psychological capability refers to the ability to perform – and subjective self-efficacy, 
i.e. whether an individual believe they can do things). For example, in order to help 
people living within their means (budgeting), interventions could involve using 
behavioural tools to aid budgeting – online or using a spreadsheet/diary, or perhaps 
earmarking money for different outgoings by separating them into different accounts or 
stacks.  
Physical capability can be denoted as the physical skill development, which is the 
focus of training. A key issue here is whether individuals are being limited by their 
physical ability, such as, those may have difficulty getting to banks in rural locations.  
Motivations are defined as cognitive processes that direct behaviour, which includes 
reflective motivation and automatic motivation. Recent evidence from the psychological 
and neuro-scientific disciplines have converged on a description of neurological 
functioning comprised as two distinct systems (or sets of systems)(Aunger & Curtis, 
2016; Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011a; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013, 2013; Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 2015; Kahneman, 2011; Rangel, 
Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015). Evolutionarily older ‘System 1’ 
processes described as automatic, uncontrolled, unconscious and affective (Daw, 
Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011a; Dolan, Hallsworth, et al., 2012; Dolan & 
Dayan, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015).  Whilst ‘System 2’ processes are 
described as reflective, controlled, effortful, conscious and rational (Evans, 2008; Rangel 
et al., 2008; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This thesis employs the dual-process paradigm as 
a unified framework for population behaviour change, with the additionally of a more 
nuanced account of how the automatic system controls behavior. Reflective motivations 
involve evaluations, goal-setting and planning. Evaluative mechanisms compares 
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positive and negative attributes of something. Goal-setting involves considering 
achievable outcomes (long or short-term). Planning denotes creating a structure and plan 
to achieve said outcome by specifying where, when, and how to execute an action. 
Automatic motivations are associative in nature and comprise a class of mental 
phenomena such as habits, impulses, heuristics and biases. Consumer behaviour has been 
empirically demonstrated to be highly influenced by automatic processes (Baca-Motes, 
Brown, Gneezy, Keenan, & Nelson, 2012; Bargh, 2002). Those processes are 
predominantly influenced by the context, in line with the behavioural economics 
approach embodied in the MINDSPACE toolkit (Dolan, Hallsworth, et al., 2012; Dolan, 
Elliott, et al., 2012). MINDSPACE is a mnemonic that reflects a comprehensive account 
of the most robust effects on behaviour that operate largely through the automatic 
psychological processes. Thus the automatic motivations can also be broken down into 
more basic motivations that drive human behavior. 
Table 1: MINDSPACE framework 
MINDSPACE 
influences 
Automatic Motivations and Behaviours 
Messenger  Individuals are heavily influenced by the source of communication, 
influencing whether to engage or reject the information purely 
because of who has said it. For example, it matters who told us to 
keep track of finances, invest or take out pension. 
Incentives   Consumers’ responses to incentives are shaped by predictable 
mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses and 
ignoring/discounting future benefits or losses. 
Norms   Individuals are strongly influenced by what others do – such an 
automatic conformity with social norms (desire to be like those 
around us) is a driver of behaviours across many domains. For 
example, people will budget if they have friends or family 
budgeting too. 
Defaults  Individuals often go with preset options (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). When offered with the choice of an 
active decision to do nothing, individuals often seem to remain in 
 28 
 
the default ‘do nothing’ category (Choi et al., 2002). For example, 
consumers could receive prompts and reminders to promote 
checking of their account more regularly. 
Salience  Consumers’ attention is drawn to what is novel (messages in 
flashing lights), accessible (items on sale next to checkouts) and 
simple (a snappy slogan). For example, a simple way to motivate 
people to keep track of finances is by making the reminders and 
statements salient and attractive. 
Priming Consumers are often influenced by sub-conscious cues (Wansink & 
Kim, 2005). These could be sounds, sights and smells that draw us 
in or repel us. For example, credit borrowers may only pay minimal 
payment on credit card bill as the amount has been suggested or 
primed (Stewart, 2009) 
Affect  People exhibit affective responses to words, images and events, 
which can impact their decision-making. These responses can 
motivate or inhibit behaviour change. 
Commitments  Individuals seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts. If people proclaim they will do something, they are 
more likely to execute the behaviour (Giné, Karlan, & Zinman, 
2010). For example, someone may check balance (keep track) 
regularly after telling others she will do so. 
Ego  People act in ways that make them feel better about themselves, 
maintaining the impression of a positive and consistent self-image 
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005). For example, individuals could be 
informed that keeping track of monetary consumption projects an 
impression of being on top of things.  
 
Opportunities are defined as all the factors, social and physical, that lie outside the 
individual that make the behaviour possible or prompt it. Social opportunity is afforded 
by the cultural milieu that dictates the way that people think, including the shared values 
and practices that characterize institutions and groups. This happens when our social 
network provides new instances of engaging in some behavior. For example, knowing 
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about sales and offers can reduce monetary consumption for necessary expenditures, and 
being informed of new financial products can help households reach their financial goals. 
Physical opportunity refers to the infrastructure or technology available for people, 
such as levels of access to financial services or products. For example, enabling 
individuals to keep track of their finances would require access to account information 
either through an ATM, smartphone or computer. 
One paper (De Meza, Irlenbusch, & Reyniers, 2008) investigated some of the 
psychological and behavioural factors of financial capability. The study uses a large-scale 
review of the current financial literature working under a behavioural economics 
framework to identify key underlying psychological factors. The researchers propose six 
key behavioural themes that fall into many of the MINDSPACE categories that underlie 
automatic motivation of financial capability.  
However one key limitation is that this study only examined automatic motivation, 
but did not approach other factors such as reflective motivation, opportunity and even 
psychological and physical capability. A second shortcoming is that the study only 
disseminates findings about barriers to financial capability, and ignores enablers of 
behaviour.  
It is important to understand which COM-B factors are the most influential of 
financial capability, to then be targeted in an intervention or policy. This theoretical 
framework ensures that the most appropriate intervention is implemented from a better 
understanding of the role of various determinants in financial behaviour. For example, 
some people may be motivated to budget and keep track of their finances, but lack the 
physical or social opportunity (i.e. structural and cultural barriers). Therefore, reflective 
motivational techniques such as ‘providing information on consequences’, ‘prompting 
specific goal setting’, and ‘prompting review of behavioural goals’ should be encouraged 
(Abraham & Michie, 2008). Influencing automatic motivations is another key lever to 
improve behavioural and financial capability. For example, information about ‘social 
norms’ have powerful, automatic influence on behaviour ; for instance, financial advisors 
could provide information about what other individuals in a similar situation are doing 
with their finances).  
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2.3 Intervention process 
To change behaviour in a long-term capacity requires what are termed as complex 
interventions, these utilise multiple BCT’s through mechanistically targeting multiple 
factors. There is a large literature on BCT’s (Abraham & Michie, 2008; Michie et al., 
2013, 2016; Michie, Johnston, Francis, Hardeman, & Eccles, 2008), of which Vlaev and 
colleagues have already put forward theoretical applications of such techniques (Dolan, 
Elliott, et al., 2012; Vlaev & Elliott, 2017). Financial capability can utilise emerging 
evidence and frameworks from all areas of behavioural change science. 
An excellent reference point to use is the framework processes for health care, 
where the utility for behaviour change is paramount both for the individual’s own 
wellbeing and for the state. The most commonly used approach within healthcare is the 
Medical Research Council’s (MRC) framework for complex interventions (Campbell et 
al., 2000). This process is closely resembled by an alternative framework recently put 
forward (Aunger & Curtis, 2016). Both frameworks identify a step-wise process, which 
starts from a literature review, followed by an identification of behavioural processes, to 
mechanistic assessments, pilot trials and finally large-scale randomised controlled trials.  
The MRC guideline (Campbell et al., 2000), was introduced as a formal process 
to design and characterise interventional processes in healthcare. The guideline was 
constructed to help clinical research in behaviour change to designing interventions as a 
procedural step-by-step manner in which to improve the success rate of interventions and 
to reduce waste across primarily  monetary and temporal dimensions.  
 The MRC process can be utilised as a sequential or iterative process, and is 
constructed of five phases. The first is the ‘pre-clinical phase’ which denotes the 
exploration of theoretical domains surrounding the behaviour, hypotheses of behavioural 
mechanisms, the prediction of major confounders and finally the strategic design of the 
intervention. This is followed by a behavioural modelling process in which it is important 
to diagnose the characteristics that define and cause sub-optimal behaviour. The 
modelling phase can be is often referred to as formative research, which assesses and 
evaluates the sub-optimal behaviour.  
The formative phase can be executed through qualitative or quantitative research. 
Such techniques can be utilised through observations or even through empirical datasets, 
experimental tasks, questionnaire methods and interviews. The purpose is to generate a 
contextual basis of evidence, which ascertains the barriers and enablers behind the 
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behaviour of interest. The notion of formative work is helpful in ascertaining the basic 
building blocks of behaviours to understand potential barriers and enablers to any 
behaviour. Behaviour in itself is multi-factorial, the reasons for why a consumer may 
spend their month’s income instead of saving could include factors such as, amount of 
pay, size of family, cost of rent, addictions, social rank motivation or even social norms. 
Therefore, understanding these base units of behaviours are paramount to designing 
effective interventions and policies. 
Qualitative research, uses in-depth investigation in the psychological 
underpinnings of the given behaviour in how individuals construct and make sense of the 
world. Peñaloza and Barnhart (2011) undertook a qualitative investigation to understand 
credit and debt behaviour in the United States amongst a white, middle-class population. 
The researchers used a thematic analysis to categorise and comprehend the experiences 
of their participants. Here the researchers find that debt was something most people do 
not typically understand until this was experienced, this is important for intervention and 
policy implementation as distributing information about the impact of debt to reduce 
consumer debt levels may not necessarily translate to positive effects.  
Quantitative research can offer a computational tool to discern the sub-optimal 
behaviour, this can be highly valuable where researchers can construct models to 
parameterise sub-optimal behaviour. This gives an objective method to identify the sub-
optimal behaviour. For instance Koehler, Langstaff and Liu (2015) ran a simulated 
savings task, the ‘Game of Life’ with individuals, where participants were asked to 
complete a behavioural simulated retirement savings game. Participants were allocated 
an income which they must budget to provide retirement savings. This method allowed 
Koehler and colleagues to identify key predictors of retirement saving behaviour which 
isolated barriers of individual differences of risk attitudes as well as temporal discounting 
levels. The researchers found that consumption was correlated with rates of temporal 
discounting (r = .21, p = .012). 
 Another example is in the use of big data, a term that denotes large-scale datasets, 
to understand behaviour. Gathergood, Mahoney, Stewart and Weber (2017) utilised 
credit-card data to understand how consumers paid off multiple credit-card balances. 
When examining the data, the researchers found sub-optimal repayment strategies with 
people accumulating debt by not removing the total amount due. These individuals were 
in essence accumulating debt despite being able to pay off the total amount. The 
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researchers examined the behaviour and showed that consumers match the payment to 
the share of balances across cards, described as a 1/N heuristic. Even with utilising 
machine-learning algorithms, the models attribute weighted the balances as the most 
important and interest rates as the least important. This sort of procedure allows the 
researchers to not only diagnose the sub-optimal behaviour, but also to come up with a 
targeted policy implementation.  
 After the behavioural diagnosis is complete and the causes of sub-optimal 
behaviour are identified, the MRC guidelines move towards an exploratory trial, which 
looks to operationalise the outcome variable for a feasible protocol that can be evaluated. 
This allows researchers to test the intervention or policy and examine the  implementation 
behaviour. This phase is incredibly important in identifying the pitfalls and areas that 
require improvement in the intervention or policy.  
 For instance, a pitot trial or feasibility study can allow researchers to assess the 
intervention through an acronym known as the APEASE criteria (Michie et al., 2014), 
which denotes Acceptability, Practicality, Effectiveness/cost-Effectiveness, 
Affordability, Safety/Side-effects and Equity. Each component provides a useful 
evaluation of the intervention, for instance the intervention may be incredibly acceptable 
and effectiveness but may not be practical or even remotely affordable. 
 After interventions have been assessed and these insights are addressed, a 
definitive randomised controlled trial is the next step, which is a fully defined, 
appropriately statistically powered and operationalised using a theoretically defensible 
outcome measure. However, sometimes a randomised controlled trial may not be 
feasible, as such, alternative methodological processes are advised such as natural 
experiments analysed through discontinuity regression or frequentist statistics for quasi-
experimental designs.  
 Finally the last MRC phase is the long-term implementation of these ideas into a 
sustainable practice. Both in the aspects of replication to ensure that the behavioural 
mechanisms in place is reliably instigating behaviour change. As well as sustainable 
practices in place that would then deliver the intervention without the requirement of 
researcher or policy-makers. 
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2.4 Future research: moving towards a unified strategy 
The healthcare industry has a head start on behaviour change particularly in the United 
Kingdom, where the UK’s National Health Service is under constant pressure with 
limited funding and staff shortages (Buchan, Charlesworth, Gershlick, & Seccombe, 
2017). From this pressure, the UK has seen many governmental departments, such as the 
Department of Health, Public Health England, set up Behavioural Insight teams that use 
behavioural change techniques in policy setting. Focus and pressure have shifted from 
the institution towards the consumers or service users themselves. This provides policy-
makers and researchers interested in improving financial capability, the groundwork to 
apply effective behaviour change within this domain.  
 With financial capability still growing, it is important to adequately understand 
the processes behind changing behaviour and techniques that can fast-track and provide 
unique insights, such as the use of big-data (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Raghupathi & 
Raghupathi, 2014; Rutledge & Adams, 2015). These insights are starting within 
household consumption, predominantly in credit-card repayment behaviour (Gathergood 
et al., 2017; Gathergood, Stewart, & Weber, 2018; Quispe-Torreblanca, Stewart, & 
Gathergood, 2017). With big-data on consumers banking activity and historical data, 
policy-makers can implement highly efficient predictive models to ascertain the key 
barriers behind consumer sub-optimal behaviour. These insights can then develop into 
targeted interventional policies to deal with such behaviours. 
 The future of improving financial capability should hopefully move towards a 
unified trend through behaviour change science as a framework to govern the field, 
through the use of evidence-based techniques. Where behaviour change techniques are 
understood and applied either jointly through complex interventions, or targeted in simple 
single-mechanism interventions in specific contexts. 
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 Cognitive Control 
 
 
  
SUMMARY 
• Cognitive control refers to competing motivational systems that seek to 
influence behaviour, usually from top-down against bottom-up activation. 
Behavioural output seems to align with system that finishes the signal first. 
• Cognitive control processes can be protected through stronger intentions 
and improving prospective memory through the use of implementation 
intentions. Implementation intentions seek to utilise if then rules to guide 
intentions and translate into behaviour change. 
• The degree to which an individual is goal-directed has a substantial effect 
on cognitive control, with levels at the extremes identifying hyper-
consumption (particularly in addicts). 
• Impulsivity should be considered as a causal role in diminished cognitive 
control, impulsive individuals are shown to exhibit poor cognitive control, 
which can often lead to negative outcomes, such as overconsumption. 
• Executive function can improve cognitive control, where working memory 
seems to protect goal-directedness, whilst attentional processes can often 
compete with cognitive control. 
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3.1 Introduction     
Why do people choose one behaviour or option over another? For example, why would 
an individual choose to purchase a car over saving for deposit for a house? A popular 
rational model of decision-making is a multi-attribute model (Zanakis, Solomon, 
Wishart, & Dublish, 1998), the multi-attribute model suggests that people compare the 
value of different attributes (such as colour, taste, shine, feel, power etc) of each choices, 
which are weighted by the subjective value to that person. This can be computed as the 
subjective utilities (!") of attributes (a#), weighted by the utility ($#) of that attribute, 
through the typical model: !" = 	'a#. $#)#*+  
Once computed and assessed the agent would then summate these values to compute an 
overall utility value from the first to the nth attribute, the model assumes that agent seeks 
to maximise their utility so the choices will align with attributes that have the greatest 
weighting. 
 A similar model of choice behaviour is the expected utility theory (Tversky, 
1975), which denotes that individuals seek to maximise their utility, which in most cases 
can be depicted as a diminishing marginal utility function of wealth (which denotes a risk 
averse preferences, whilst risk seeking is a convex function). Put simply, for someone 
living under the poverty line £100 holds significant increase in utility, yet for a 
millionaire, an additional £100 depicts a small increase in utility. 
 These models are provided to illustrate the subset of models that assume rational 
agency, in which an individual makes choices based on stable preferences that are 
dictated from computing the expected outcomes and associated utilities. There are 
countless other models that do not assume rationality, such as Decision by Sampling, 
Reinforcement Learning and even Range Frequency Theory (Huys, Guitart-Masip, 
Dolan, & Dayan, 2015; K. Miller, Shenhav, & Ludvig, 2016; Parducci, 1965; Stewart, 
Chater, & Brown, 2006). These models are based on empirical evidence of choice 
behaviour which illustrates that our decision-making is not always rational, rather our 
choices and behaviour are guided by internal drives and motivation (R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 
2013; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015).  
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Our drives and motivation can often override the optimal choice (R. J. Dolan & 
Dayan, 2013; Gillan et al., 2015; Gollwitzer, 1999; Vlaev & Darzi, 2012; Vlaev & Dolan, 
2015), where individuals make choices that go against their best interests. For example, 
consider an individual looking to put £50000 aside for a deposit on a mortgage, they walk 
40 minutes to work every day. One day on their way home they see a car on sale for 
£20000. They love the aesthetics, the engine and make and model of the car. Purchasing 
a mortgage for a property is a major priority, but the car would be useful too. How can 
this individual keep with their long term goals and maintain their top priorities? One 
explanation for this is ‘cognitive control’; which is a conceptual psychological 
description regarding multiple competing motivational processes whilst retaining 
intentions towards goal-orientated outcomes (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; Otto, 
Skatova, Seth Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2015; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). These concepts are important as these psychological processes in 
how we process information can impact and moderate our behaviour. For instance, note 
how impulsivity in obese populations can predict their body mass index (Kulendran et 
al., 2016), weight loss after surgery and even relapse rates (Kulendran et al., 2013; 
Kulendran, Borovoi, Purkayastha, Darzi, & Vlaev, 2017). In addition, levels of goal-
directedness has been shown to discriminate healthy from compulsive and addictive 
personality disorders (Doñamayor, Strelchuk, Baek, Banca, & Voon, 2018; Sebold et al., 
2014; Voon et al., 2014; Voon et al., 2006). These concepts as illustrated below can 
moderate our behaviour, and therefore can have implications in motivation for behaviour 
change; thereby impacting upon intervention efficacy, as a result of competing processes 
interacting. 
The Stop Signal Task (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997) is an excellent 
illustration of how two conflicting processes interact and produce differential outcomes 
based on the agent’s goal. In the Stop Signal Task participants are asked to identify a set 
of stimuli. For instance, identifying if an arrow displayed on the screen is pointing left or 
right, or distinguishing the shape of the stimuli (square or circle). A proportion of trials 
(typically set at 25%) carry an additional signal referred to as the ‘stop signal’, this is 
usually in the form of an auditory beep. On these trials the participants must inhibit their 
response. Therefore on these Stop trials, individuals are presented with a congruent vs 
incongruent dilemma. 
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The Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), is the computed parameter given to denote 
the stopping time needed to cancel a prepotent response in conflicting trials when 
participants are asked to inhibit their response after the Go signal initiates an action 
(Logan et al., 1997; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The SSRT parameter is generated from 
conflicting motivational processes called the horse race model (Logan, Zandt, Exeter, & 
Wagenmakers, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The conflicting systems comprise of 
one initiating in response to the prepotent actions of identifying the stimuli, the other in 
response to the stop signal processing. These competing signals create a cognitive control 
issue (Claes et al., 2006; Logan et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). When the goal 
is to identify the stimuli, participants exhibit almost similar reaction time and error rate 
performances across trials, however when the goal of the trial is to inhibit their prepotent 
actions, error rates are significantly higher as participants typically find it difficult to 
demonstrate response inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). 
 This result is due to competing motivational processes of Go and Stop behavioural 
activation; when these systems conflict, the winning action is a result of the agent’s 
computation of action values (i.e. the system that finishes the processing signal first 
generates the behavioural activation) (Logan et al., 2014). 
Cognitive control processes has been described recently by use of dual-process 
theories, stemming from an associative, fast-paced, habitual system, and an effortful, 
reflective, goal-directed system, which is a prominent idea across psychology, 
behavioural economics and cognitive neuroscience (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Daw, 
Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011; Otto et al., 2015; Skatova, Chan, & Daw, 2013; Wood & Rünger, 
2016). Many instance of irrational or sub-optimal behaviour is typically exemplified 
through cognitive control problems, where in competing motivational systems produce 
conflicting desires, such as above instance in which the desire to choose the car but still 
maintain intentions to save for the deposit.  
 Below are some of the most frequently cited factors that play a role in cognitive 
control, however, note that this is not an exhaustive list as there are many factors at play. 
3.2 Intentions 
A prominent idea of cognitive control and goal-orientated processes is the notion of 
intentions. Intentions and beliefs, can be regarded as programs of behaviour (Calnan & 
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Rutter, 1986; Calnan & Rutter, 1986; Fishbein, 1975, 1979). Intentions to act can 
sometimes be a necessary first step in behavioural activation (whilst associative and 
Pavlovian responses can also initiate actions) (Calnan & Rutter, 1986b, 1986a; Fishbein, 
1975). Intentions can be mapped onto internal and external needs and drives (West & 
Brown, 2013). For instance, walking into a dark room creates a need to provide light; 
whilst internal drives of hunger and thirst yield a drive that needs satiating. In behaviour 
change, intentions are often considered a required component to initiate the behaviour 
change process (Fishbein, 1975).  
 However, the link between intentions and actions is often very weak, for instance 
a major study reviewing the role of intentions in behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), the 
study found a large to moderate intention (cohen’s d = .66) translated only to little to 
moderate change in behaviour (cohen’s d = .36). This diminished effects of intentions 
would suggest that intentions in and of itself can often struggle to influence behaviour 
change, and additional influences can be added to promote behaviour change to make it 
more likely through cognitive and motivational factors.  
3.3 Goal-directed actions 
The ability to sustains one’s goal is also an integral aspect of cognitive control. For 
instance in one study, researchers found that proposing a savings goal and creating a plan 
by implementing a set of rules produced a 68% chance of predicted probability of savings, 
compared to 45% without any such plan (Rha, Montalto, & Hanna, 2006).  
One computational refinement of the dual-process theories of goals and habits, 
derived from computational neuroscience and animal behaviour is Reinforcement 
Learning which suggests that two modes of choice arise from distinct strategies of 
learning action values (Daw et al., 2005), a model-free system, that is computationally 
efficient, and a model-based system, which requires heavy resources and attention (Daw 
et al., 2005; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015). In this theory goal-directed actions stem from model-
based learning, which reasons prospectively about the value of actions using a learnt 
model of the environment and the agent’s goals. Whereas habitual choices stem from 
model-free learning which denotes learnt action values based on past utilisation, these 
values are then entrenched with those actions, often referred to as cached values (for more 
information please see Appendix E on the computational assays behind reinforcement 
learning). 
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Through these computational assays, a weighted computation of model-free and 
model-based reliance can be calculated; this produces a weighting parameter which 
describes deficits in goal-directedness (Gillan, Kosinski, Whelan, Phelps, & Daw, 2016; 
Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, & Ersche, 2012; Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming, 
2018; Sebold et al., 2014a). This weighting parameter has been shown to differentiate 
clinical populations from healthy subjects (Rouault et al., 2018; Voon et al., 2014). For 
instance, Voon and colleagues compared choice behaviour across a range of psychiatric 
disorders such as OCD, meth addiction, alcoholism and Binge Eating Disorder against a 
healthy control set. The results identified group differences in the degree of goal-
directedness, with binge eating disorder, OCD and meth addiction identifying poorer 
goal-directedness than healthy controls.  
A subsequent study by Sebold and colleagues (2014a) investigated the link 
between alcohol consumption in alcohol dependence and the weighting parameter for 
choice behaviour; the researchers found diminished effects of goal-directedness with 
increased consumption suggesting an underlying tendency to form strong habits or 
addictions when goal-activation is poor.  
These results suggest that cognitive control issues, i.e. instances of sub-optimal 
behaviour occur where goal-activation is poor and a reliance shifts to automated 
entrenched values derived from model-free learning. This is further corroborated from 
research that indicates goal-directedness protects against the formation of sub-optimal 
habits (Gillan et al., 2015).  
Research has demonstrated that higher levels of goal-directedness was in fact 
predictive of savings behaviour, (Lee & Hanna, 2015) where greater levels of goal-
directedness predicted higher savings rates. Furthermore, goal-directedness was shown 
to depreciate monetary consumption where individuals with stronger saving goals were 
able to reduce their consumption compared to individuals with weak goals (Peetz & 
Buehler, 2009). 
Future research is required to see if deficits in goal-directedness are the result of 
neurological pathways or are learnt responses to sub-optimal samples. If the former it 
may be difficult to influence goal-directedness, however this may be corrected from a 
pharmacological standpoint (Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012). If it is the latter, 
then this could be overcome through simple behavioural training, there is some evidence 
to suggest that this could be the case, where behavioural training does demonstrate greater 
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effects than pharmacological interventions in OCD (Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, 
Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005). 
3.4 Prospective memory 
Prospective memory is a factor of intentions and goal-directed behaviour and is defined 
as the ability to recall future intentions (Gordon, Shelton, & Bugg, 2011). Prospective 
memory is a necessary factor in cognitive control wherein the recollection of future 
intentions is important to initiate the behaviour (Insel, Einstein, Morrow, Koerner, & 
Hepworth, 2016). For example, consider an individual trying to remember to bring in a 
home-made lunch, the intention in and of itself is poor unless the individual recalls the 
intention to do so. In fact, research into prospective memory has identified it as a predictor 
of goal-directed actions (Gollwitzer, 1999; Judah, Gardner, & Aunger, 2013; McDaniel, 
Howard, & Butler, 2008). For instance in one study seeking to improve uptake in flossing 
behaviour, researchers attained measures of prospective memory from participants using 
the Prospective subscale from the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire 
(Smith, Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000), with flossing behaviour measured through self-
report via text-messaging. The researchers found that higher levels of prospective 
memory was predictive of increased flossing behaviour. This suggested that individuals 
with higher levels of prospective memory were more likely to recall future intentions 
which translated into an increased probability of behaviour change. 
 This finding is further reinforced from the use of implementation intentions. 
Implementation intentions depict conditional rules of behaviour based upon contextual 
cues (Prestwich, Paschal Sheeran, 1900; Braver et al., 2014; Gollwitzer, 1999; 
Rabinovich & Webley, 2007). These are frequently referred to as ‘if then’ rules, where, 
if  an agent finds themselves in the given context, ‘a’, then perform action ‘p’. For 
instance, one implementation intention to increase keeping track behaviour may be: if, I 
am on my computer using Facebook, then, I will check my bank account. Implementation 
intentions have been shown to increase the likelihood of goal-pursuit, where individuals 
who make implementation intentions were three times more likely to complete their goals 
(Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). This finding is corroborated by a meta-review of 94 
studies utilising implementation intentions (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006), the authors 
found a moderate to high effect size in completion of goal-directed actions when 
engaging in implementation intentions (cohen’s d = .96). Prospective memory can be 
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regarded as an integral factor in behaviour change, akin to intentions; however the link 
between prospective memory and behaviour is indirect and therefore requires additional 
components within the intervention or system to enable the intentions and engineer 
behaviour change.  
3.5 Impulsivity 
How individuals respond to choice is also an important factor in cognitive control, for 
instance consider the car vs. deposit example; one major aspect that could determine 
which option is chosen, is whether the individual acts before they can process the 
hypothetical outcomes, this is often referred to as impulsivity (Claes et al., 2006).  
 Impulsivity, has many domains but the most commonly observed or investigated 
in response inhibition (i.e. the ability to withdraw a prepotent response) (Adam R. Aron, 
Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Logan et al., 2014; A. Osman, 
Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986), the desire for rewards (idea of reward sensitivity) (Abler, 
Walter, Erk, Kammerer, & Spitzer, 2006; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Büchel 
et al., 2017; Ondo & Lai, 2008; Valerie Voon et al., 2006). Research into response 
inhibition has mostly been engaged in the clinical disorders where the translation of 
impulsivity to behaviour is easier to observe (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Kulendran et al., 
2013, 2016; Miller, Derefinko, Lynam, Milich, & Fillmore, 2010; Morein-Zamir et al., 
2012; Penades et al., 2007). For instance, obese individuals typically show lower rates of 
response inhibition (i.e. higher levels of impulsivity) than healthy individuals 
(Nederkoorn, Guerrieri, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 2009), in fact this relation is also 
explains differences in BMI scores (Kulendran et al., 2016). In one study examining 
response inhibition, researchers looked at weight over time (through BMI) and snacking 
preferences over a one year period. Participants were asked to complete the Stop Signal 
task at the start of the study. The researchers found that the interaction of response 
inhibition and high preference for snacks predicted weight gain (Nederkoorn, Houben, 
Hofmann, Roefs, & Jansen, 2010).  
Only one researcher documents assessments of impulsivity in compulsive 
shoppers through neurocognitive assessments using the Stop-Signal Task (Derbyshire, 
Chamberlain, Odlaug, Schreiber & Grant, 2014). The researchers compared twenty three 
compulsive shoppers against matched healthy control. Compulsive shoppers 
demonstrated higher rates of response inhibition than healthy controls. Compulsive 
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shoppers also made riskier gambling choices and demonstrated poorer working memory. 
These results are indicative of an impulsive behavioural pathway that seems to underlie 
impulse control disorders and addictions (Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Grant & 
Chamberlain, 2014; Racine et al., 2014; Robbins & Clark, 2015). Temporal discounting 
could also explain deficits in savings rates by moderating monetary consumption through 
the behavioural policy of maximising immediate rewards. in temporal discounting rates, 
and higher levels of savings, even controlling for age.  
 Furthermore, research has shown higher reward sensitivity predicts sub-optimal 
behaviour (Büchel et al., 2017; Ondo & Lai, 2008). A case often an observed 
phenomenon in cases of addiction (Bickel et al., 2007; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998). For 
instance, in one study examining differences in obese populations, a reward sensitivity 
parameter was able to differentiate populations based upon the BMI levels (Kulendran et 
al., 2016). In one meta-review, reward sensitivity coefficients were shown to exhibit a 
moderate differentiation parameter in stratifying addiction disorders from the healthy 
population (cohen’s d = .58) (MacKillop et al., 2011). Reward sensitivity could perhaps 
impede savings rates by moderating monetary consumption through the policy of 
maximising rewards. 
 These results suggest that when goal-activation occurs, there are competing 
motivational systems arising from neurological pathways that drive behaviour. If the 
competing impulsive system overpowers the level of goal-activation then cognitive 
control becomes diminished. This response is exacerbated by impulsive individuals, who 
seem to possess a prepotent response or predisposition for reward seeking behaviour. 
However, there is evidence that impulsivity can be reduced (Kulendran et al., 2013), 
which has translational impact on financial behaviour, particularly consumption (Black 
et al., 2000). 
3.6 Executive function 
Executive function here refers to the storage, processing and updating and attentional 
processes (Royall et al., 2002). Working memory, a factor of executive function, has been 
shown as an important component in goal-directedness. For example, in one study, 
researchers compared assessments of working memory in substance dependent disorders 
against healthy control participants, and found that greater consumption was 
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differentiated by measures of executive function such as working memory (Verdejo-
García, Bechara, Recknor, & Perez-Garcia, 2006).  
 In one further study, the researchers compared working memory with 
performance in a gambling task, they found sub-optimal decisions were more common 
amongst individuals with poorer working memory (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002). 
The impact of poor working memory is also found in day-to-day life, wherein a 
longitudinal study examined the frequency of mind wandering or day-dreaming as 
measured through a personal digital assistant was predicted through deficits in working 
memory, as measured by the complex memory-span task. As such, this describes a level 
of protection from working memory towards goal-activation. Put succinctly, the literature 
would suggest that working memory translates as resources towards a given behavioural 
process, those with greater working memory are able to spare working memory to protect 
goal-orientated actions against competing motivations.  
For instance, in one study examining executive function and savings behaviour, 
as measured through the ELSA (English Longitudinal Study of Aging), a British 
household panel survey. The researchers found that higher executive function predicted 
greater savings (Banks & Oldfield, 2007b). This finding is further supported by Cole and 
Shastry (2009), who examined cognitive ability through the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The researchers identified greater cognitive ability was 
predictive of higher financial capability, through the knowledge and use of specialised 
financial instruments.  
In a different study (Agarwal & Mazumder, 2010), researchers examined 
cognitive ability (again measured with the ASVAB) with household financial behaviour. 
The researchers find that cognitive ability protects from financial mistakes in credit-card 
behaviour, in addition to reducing error in property valuation for accurate loan and credit 
applications, resulting in lower annual percentage rates. The researchers highlight how 
cognitive ability protects from sub-optimal financial decisions.  
 Furthermore, the role of attention as a top-down process can influence which part 
of the world (or our visual environment) that we opt to process in more detail. For 
instance, in one study, researchers examined the attentional behaviour, through the use 
of eye-gaze detection, in adults with binge eating disorder. The researchers found a top-
down propensity for attenuating to food-related stimuli in real world scenes, patients with 
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binge-eating disorder also attenuated faster to the food-objects than did healthy control 
(Popien, Frayn, von Ranson, & Sears, 2015).  
 Further results in eye-gaze detection of consumer behaviour reveals how our 
attentional processes can drive our decisions. For example, research in attentional 
processes of shopping behaviour has identified how products that receive greater 
attention are more likely to be purchased (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Atalay, 
Bodur, & Rasolofoarison, 2013). Furthermore, in a binary choice task between familiar 
and novel products, individuals displayed an increased propensity to attend to and select 
the familiar option (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010).  
 These results can demonstrate how despite goal-activation may be directed 
towards a given output, alternative motivational inputs, competing behavioural systems 
can lead to cognitive control problems. This competition seems to be moderated by 
Executive functions such as working memory. 
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 Formative research 
  
SUMMARY 
• A qualitative investigation of financial capability was undertaken following 
a sample of 72 participants across the UK for three months. 
• This study uses secondary qualitative data, mapping this to the COM-B 
framework to offer a new take on how these factors influence and lead to 
sub-optimal behaviours and how these categorical systems identify the 
behavioural change techniques implemented in future policies and 
interventions. 
• For Keeping Track, the key factors was mental accounting and numeral 
literacy, people would separate funds into different physical accounts to 
limit their consumption; yet this will prevent them from optimising their 
financial management, as this ignores the principle that money is fungible. 
• Sub-optimal financial behaviour in making-ends-meet was characterised by 
automatic motivation, where most of the sample sought to purchase goods 
and products that would increase their social rank amongst their peers, this 
was reinforced through a dopamine response that is often observed in 
addiction behaviour. 
• Sub-optimal behaviour in planning ahead was mostly regarding the 
processing of future events, the typical problems were temporal 
discounting, poor planning, evaluation and goal-setting.  
• These issues ascribe a key set of behavioural mechanisms that explain sub-
optimal financial capability. This offers a more coherent picture of the 
causes of sub-optimal financial capability and also explains where 
educational interventions and policies may produce better results. 
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4.1 Introduction  
The current study employed a behavioural and ethnographic approach to understand and 
improve people’s financial capability. This study examined people’s naturally occurring 
household financial behaviours using observations and in-depth interviews. The insights 
provided by the observations and interviews were then fit into the COM-B framework to 
precipitate enablers and barriers of people’s financial capability. 
4.2 Method 
This current study’s method uses secondary data from qualitative observations and 
interviews of people’s financial capabilities (Money Advice Service, 2014). Qualitative 
data provides an in-depth view of behaviour and cognitions to understand the behaviour 
though the participants’ perspective. This provides a more detailed understanding of the 
processes involved in optimal and sub-optimal financial capability. This is an integral 
component in intervention design, to inform the intervention design and implementation 
(Gittelsohn et al., 1999, 2006). This formative work is conducted in line with the MRC 
approach for complex interventions (Craig et al., 2008). 
The frequency count of the thematic analysis is then fed through a statistical 
analysis to identify key barriers and enablers, by assessing the distribution of the 
frequency of barriers and enablers across the COM-B model against a flat, uniform 
distribution. This process allowed for an in-depth understanding of the behavioural, 
cognitive and environmental processes that enable or act as barriers to financial 
capability, whilst identifying which particular factors to intervene on. 
 Advantages 
It is noted that the following study uses secondary data collected by Ipsos MORI and the 
Money Advice Service (Money Advice Service, 2014). This was used as it provided an 
in-depth behavioural analysis of how individuals and household manage their finances, 
specifically in the context of financial capability. This therefore provided a unique dataset 
of in-depth understanding of financial capability, through a behavioural lens under the 
COM-B model. As a result, the dataset would allow a behavioural diagnosis to identify 
which behavioural factors contribute the most to optimal financial capability.  
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 The sample population recruited for the interviews were representative of the 
population, as recruited from across the UK across different income brackets and 
demographic strands.  
 Furthermore access to qualitative datasets that match in regards to theoretical 
approaches and methodology are incredibly difficult to gain access to and therefore was 
a unique opportunity to use this dataset. Therefore this opportunity meant I was able to 
analyse the dataset without spending the months to find participants, collect and 
thematically analyse the dataset. I was therefore able to save an abundance of time that 
to focus on implementing the interventions. 
 Thirdly, the dataset was collected by the Money Advice Service for the purpose 
for designing interventions to increase financial capability (Money Advice Service, 
2014). This meant that the function of the dataset aligned with the study research aims, 
providing me with a method to undertake formative research without the resource costs 
associated.  
 Disadvantages 
One major concern with using secondary data, is the lack of control in the measures and 
data provided. One is unable to ascertain new information or clarify any existing trends 
or findings. This meant I was unable to ask participants any further questions than were 
otherwise already provided, preventing me from going any further in-depth. 
 Secondly, another issue is the validation of the thematic analysis, as this was 
conducted previous to my statistical analysis, the thematic analysis could demonstrate 
different themes if conducted by myself or another researcher. This therefore may have 
modified the behavioural determinants identified and could feasibly alter the content of 
the interventions. However, Ipsos MORI had multiple researchers on the project who all 
contributed to the thematic analysis and therefore should reach a consensus; however 
parameters of inter-rater reliability was not provided, meaning the degree to which the 
research team reached a consensus is unknown.  
 Participant recruitment 
A total of 76 participants were recruited using opportunistic methods, through 
advertisements online, in newspapers and magazines as well as through telephone 
contact, across the United Kingdom’s four countries and to vary across ages and socio-
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economic classes. Of these 76 participants, 50 were located in England, 13 in Scotland, 
8 in Wales and 5 in Northern Ireland. A breakdown of the sample demographics are 
described in Table 2.  
Table 2; Demographic breakdown of participant families 
N Age Socio-economic Class 
18 45-64 Upper Middle class 
15 
Older group 
(more retirees) 
Non-working 
14 25-44 Lower Middle class 
13 Slightly older Working class 
9 Young Working class 
8 Young Skilled Working class 
 
 
 Materials 
Observations and interviews according to a discussion guide designed to understand three 
components of people’s financial capability: Keeping Track of Money, Making-ends-
meet, and Planning Ahead. Participants’ spending activities were monitored via spending 
diaries which were given to half of the sample (see 1.1.1.1.1Appendix A, 
1.1.1.1.1Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D) 
 Procedure 
A researcher from Ipsos MORI visited participants twice over a three-month period from 
August to October 2012. At each visit the researcher recorded observation notes and 
interview responses and transcribed. Each visit constituted one interview with the whole 
household (the duration ranged from three to eight hours). The first visit familiarised 
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participants with the structure and aim of the study, and captured participants’ attitudes 
and perceptions towards money. The second visit captured how households discuss 
financial issues and how money is associated with their current goals and ambitions that 
they would like to obtain in the future.  
 Thematic Analyses 
This study analyses the secondary data obtained from the interview transcripts and 
observations. The secondary data consists of the theme-level data, from which frequency 
counts were computed at each aspect of the COM-B framework (Table 3). The frequency 
count were analysed to identify and diagnose the barriers and enablers to financial 
capability.  
 As described above in Section 4.2.2, no validation checks were provided for the 
secondary data. This meant that the themes identified in the thematic analysis could be 
interpreted in another way if conducted by a different researcher. However, Ipsos MORI 
conducted the research with multiple researchers, all of whom contributed to the thematic 
analysis. However the inter-rater reliability parameters are not provided regarding the 
degree to which the researchers agreed with each other. 
 Therefore under a pragmatic approach, it is assumed that the validation checks of 
the coding have been conducted, with a reasonable ICC inter-rater agreement; 0.4 < k < 
0.6. The pragmatic approach is an attempt to make use of the dataset without requiring 
further constraints, where Ipsos MORI were unable to provide any additional information 
due to their governance policy on data protection and storage.  
 Secondary Data 
The interview transcripts and observations first went under a thematic analysis, coded 
onto three individual spreadsheets, for each component of financial capability: Keeping 
Track of Money, Making-ends-meet, and Planning Ahead. For each participant, coding 
was conducted on both enablers and barriers of financial capability. These codes were 
then fed into the COM-B framework (Capability-psychological, Capability-Physical, 
Opportunity-social, Opportunity-physical, Motivation-reflective, and Motivation-
Automatic). The automatic motivation concepts were further coded onto each 
MINDSPACE concept (Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, 
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Affect, Commitment, and Ego). Reflective motivation was comprised of three constructs: 
evaluation, goal-setting and planning. Evaluative mechanisms compares positive and 
negative attributes of something. Goal-setting involves considering achievable outcomes 
(long or short-term). Planning denotes creating a structure and plan to achieve said 
outcome by specifying where, when, and how to execute an action. The coding was 
conducted by Ipsos MORI and were provided as completed. It is noted that the interrater 
reliability is impossible to calculate or validate these methods, and there is likely to be 
subjective judgements that were involved in the thematic analysis. However this analysis 
took a pragmatic approach, and assumed that the coding was within reasonable inter-rater 
agreement, in order to understand and identify the key barriers and enablers to financial 
capability. 
The data contained in the spreadsheet were then analysed using descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Each count of the barriers and enablers were tabulated across the 
COM-B model, to produce a distribution of themes of enablers and barriers across the 
three domains of financial capability. The descriptive and inferential statistics was 
implemented using the frequency data for each of the barriers and enablers across the 
different themes. 
The inferential statistics are conducted using one-way chi-squared tests 
comparing the expected and observed frequencies in each theme. Here, expected 
frequencies carries a flat, uniform distribution with each element of the COM-B model 
being weighted equally. For each one-way chi-squared, significant variation from 
uniform expected distribution was then followed down the hierarchical structure of the 
COM-B framework, for instance if Capability was significantly more frequent that 
Motivation or Opportunity, then a further test would be conducted comparing physical 
and psychological capability. This was computed for each hierarchical stage of the COM-
B framework, comparing the highest three factors: Capability, Motivation and 
Opportunity, to individual components within each factor, i.e. Social and Physical 
Opportunity. This method isolated key behavioural barriers at a more specific level, as 
opposed to a general overview of behaviour. 
4.3 Results 
I highlight the findings of the interviews and observations in the Money Lives project 
(Money Advice Service, 2014), in addition to isolating and diagnosing the factors 
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underlying sub-optimal financial capability. This is achieved through examining the 
distribution of enablers and barriers, identifying key behavioural processes that 
contribute to sub-optimal behaviour. While many barriers and facilitators were identified, 
the results focuses on the most prominent barriers and facilitators.  
 Participants 
Throughout the study four participants dropped out, which provided a sample of 72 
participants.
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Table 3; Frequency of enablers and barriers in financial capability 
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10 
 
53 
Figure 2; D
istribution of barriers for K
eeping Track  
                     
 54 
 
Figure 3 D
istribution of barriers for K
eeping Trac
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 Keeping track: thematic analysis 
Participants identified more enablers (Total = 71) than barriers (Total = 50), where  
individuals were more likely to identify some of the key behaviours that help to remain 
in track of financial accounts. This would perhaps indicate that keeping track was easier 
to engage in than expected, that people found more affordances to engage in keeping 
track than there were difficulties in implementing this behaviour. This could also be a 
social desirability effect, where participants wanted to be seen as being on top of their 
finances (even if they were not) and wanted to avoid embarrassment of not knowing their 
own account activity.  
4.3.2.1 Barriers 
The initial analysis identified a significant difference between the observed and expected 
frequency distributions of barriers, χ2 (2) = 6.040, p = .047.  Capability (frequency = 23) 
and Motivation (frequency = 18) were shown be more frequent barriers than Opportunity 
(frequency = 9).   
This is illustrated in Figure 2 and 3, where the darker shade arrows demonstrate 
significant pathways. A secondary investigation to assess which capability factor was the 
most influential revealed an equal frequency of physical (frequency = 8) and 
psychological capability barriers (frequency = 15), χ2 (1) = 2.130, p = .144.  
The most frequent barrier was psychological capability (frequency = 15), 
typically exhibited as mental accounting. Previous research has linked mental accounting 
to consumer budgeting behaviour (Heath & Soll, 1996). Participants who resorted to sub-
optimal mental accounting practices distributed their financial resources across physical 
attributes. For example, dividing cash across envelopes or spare wallet, an approach 
common amongst participants on lower incomes or state benefits.  
 
“What we do is we work out what we are doing the next month on and then we go to 
the bank and take out all that money out as a lump sum and split it up into envelopes,  
so any money that is left in the bank is solely there for shopping. We find it more 
difficult when we are just working off the debit card, the debit card is very easy, where 
as if we have the cash there in our envelopes to use, we seem to live much better.” 
Male, 45, Female, 41, Bristol, married, full time employment 
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Mental accounting is a sub-optimal strategy as money is fungible (Thaler, 1985; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Richard Thaler, 1999), £200 of money can contribute towards 
£200 of electricity or £200 of groceries. In doing so, individuals and households separate 
funds for saving from credit cards or debt, preventing them from adjusting or being 
flexible to maintain their financial goals. 
Another example of psychological capability as a barrier is financial illiteracy; 
those who were struggling financially tended to not know or understand the different 
financial products available and lacked the skills to use these products to their advantage. 
To illustrate, one participant on a low income paid a monthly fee for a premium current 
account because he was unaware a free option was available. These individuals lacked 
an understanding about interest rates and the implications on future repayments, which 
led to some poor financial decisions. 
 
“I don’t understand anything to do with money. All I know is that it goes into your 
bank when you get paid. I don’t understand interest or anything like that.” 
Female, 21, Bangor, single, living with parents at home in full-time employment 
Physical capability barriers were distinguished as physical and mental barriers, 
where those with physical disability (such as mobility issues) and/or mental disabilities 
(such as agoraphobia) faced some very practical barriers to keeping track of their finances 
as simply getting to the bank or ATM could be problematic.  
To investigate which Motivation factor, automatic or reflective, a secondary 
investigation was ran, which demonstrated uneven distribution of barriers, χ2 (1) = 6.720, 
p = .010; where automatic barriers were more frequent (frequency = 15) than reflective 
(frequency = 3). However, further inquiry ascertained an approximately even distribution 
of barriers amongst automatic factors, χ2 (8) = 9.600, p = .294.  
The results demonstrated how an individual’s automatic motivation was heavily 
influenced in their financial decision-making. Automatic motivation is fallible to 
numerous heuristic process and cognitive biases. One example of a barrier in automatic 
motivation is avoidance behaviour, where individuals would seek to avoid negative 
outcomes (Hart et al., 2009; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010), being fearful 
of checking their accounts. Research into avoidance behaviour has shown that higher 
levels of fear for negative outcomes drives information avoidance (Sweeny et al., 2010). 
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In the context of the present study, participants demonstrated avoidance in checking their 
accounts when they were aware this would identify: negative account balances, low 
account balances, impulsive and large spending. Participants would often seek to 
preserve their positive self-image than confront their current financial situation, avoiding 
the act of checking. 
Such behaviour produced disastrous consequences when participants experience 
shortfalls. To illustrate, one participant confessed that he had previously not been 
concerned with keeping track of his finances; when his financial buffer was reduced he 
was forced to utilise his overdraft limit by two standing orders going out at the same time 
(car loan and insurance). He was made aware of the situation when his card was declined 
for petrol.  
4.3.2.2 Enablers 
A secondary analysis was conducted on the frequency of enablers across Capability, 
Opportunity and Motivation. The initial nested COM-B framework illustrated marginal 
differences in the distribution of the frequency of enablers across the COM-B factors, χ2 
(2)= 4.761, p = .093. Capability (frequency = 28) and Motivation (frequency = 28) were 
more frequent enablers than Opportunity (frequency = 15). As the results were only 
marginally significant no further analysis was conducted. 
Psychological capability, characterised here as organisational skills, was the 
greatest enabler (frequency = 25) to keeping track, with ‘physical opportunity’ following 
as the second largest enabler (frequency = 9). Those more financially comfortable had 
developed meticulous spreadsheets in which they logged all activity. These individuals 
paid bills by direct debit and made use of online groceries sites. Participants on higher 
income brackets were knowledgeable in the account activity. For instance, receipts would 
be cross-validated with bank statements to monitor any transactions made.  
 
“I spend £25 per week on food… I know because I record it…food can run away 
with you” 
25, female, London, single person working full time, financially comfortable 
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Ways in which participants kept track of money was also driven by both social 
and physical opportunities. For instance, ease of access to ATMs coupled with 
technological developments such as apps for smartphones meant an opportunity to 
monitor finances activity regularly.  
Automatic motivation can act as an enabler to promote keeping track of finances, 
one example is the illustration of priming; people could be actively persuaded towards a 
specific behaviour with a small prompt. Email reminders from respective banks or 
television adverts about fraud increased monitoring activity. This behaviour was seen 
predominantly for those with technological literacy, due likely to the increased physical 
opportunity to monitor.
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 Making-ends-meet: thematic analysis  
4.3.3.1 Barriers   
A chi-squared analysis revealed a significant skew in the distribution of the frequency of 
barriers for Making-ends-meet across the COM-B framework, χ2 (2) = 24.948, p = .000. 
The largest influence for Making-ends-meet was Motivation (frequency = 64), with 
Capability (frequency = 27) and Opportunity having roughly equal frequencies of barriers 
(frequency = 25). A more detailed breakdown of the prominence of these factors within 
affective motivation is illustrated by Figure 4, which details the most prominent barriers 
at the automatic level. A second chi-squared analysis was conducted to compare the 
frequencies of automatic and reflective motivation, revealed unequal distribution in 
frequencies, χ2 (1) = 33.063, p = .000. Automatic Motivation was a more frequent barrier  
(frequency = 55) to reflective Motivation (frequency = 9). A final chi squared analysis 
compared within affective motivation comparing across the MINDSPACE categories, 
revealing a skew in the distribution of frequencies, χ2 (8) = 33.200, p = .000, where 
Affective (frequency = 15) and Ego (frequency = 12) mechanisms are the largest factor 
of barriers to Making-ends-meet, with social norms following behind (frequency = 9), 
displayed more clearly on Figure 6.  
Analysis of ego-based mechanisms revealed that one major factor of household 
financial management was maintaining a positive self-image, or preserving their ego. 
Research into ego-based heuristics has demonstrated that people want to have a positive 
self-image (Dolan, Hallsworth, et al., 2012; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015). Participants attributed 
a large weighting to their social status, where materialistic possessions gave an increase 
in relative rank position within their social network, empirical research has demonstrated 
that people are often impacted by their rank rather than absolute wealth (Boyce, Brown, 
& Moore, 2010).  Social rank also influenced participants to demonstrate outward 
expressions of material wealth, regardless of their financial situation. Individuals who 
meticulously monitored their own finances were offset by the need to be of equal social 
rank to their friends and would strive to purchase similar things to their friends so as not 
to be outshined. People did not want to be seen as being too restrictive with their spending 
behaviours, an effect greater amongst younger participants. Investment into social rank 
was further reinforced by emotional gratification. Participants were spending because of 
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the affective reinforcement they received; spending the money made them feel good 
regardless of whether the item was necessary. Such rewards were reinforced by social 
gratification and through an emotional ‘hit’, acting as an operant conditioner . This 
emotional hit denoted a release of dopamine, a neurotransmitter linked to addicted 
behaviours and hyper-consumption (Blum et al., 2012; Daw & Tobler, 2013; Kim et al., 
2011; Lawrence & Brooks, 2014). 
Figure 6; Frequency of barriers in Automatic Motivation  
 
 
Capability was still an important factor (frequency = 27). This was expressed 
typically in Psychological Capability (frequency = 15). Participants on low income or 
with limited resources were more likely to lack the necessary skills and knowledge (e.g. 
numerical literacy) to live within their means. As such, they were often left overdrawn 
or unable to pay for everyday necessities. 
4.3.3.2 Enablers 
Investigating the distribution of frequencies for enablers across the COM-B factors 
identified an non-uniform distribution, χ 2 (2) = 12.168, p = .002. Motivation was the 
most frequent enabler (frequency = 57), followed by Opportunity (frequency = 35) and 
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then Capability (frequency = 27). Further assessment of motivational factors identified 
no significant difference in the prevalence of reflective (frequency = 26) and automatic 
mechanisms (frequency = 31), χ2 (1)= .439, p = .508. 
Automatic Motivation did act as an enabler where relatives had a major influence 
on financial behaviour, both with conforming and opposing outcomes, where some 
participants mimicked their parental attitudes, whilst others rebelled against it. To 
illustrate, one participant associated his father’s cautious approach to money management 
with being denied the things that he wanted and, as a result, was identified as a behaviour 
that should be avoided not emulated.  
Opportunity was the second prominent factor to Making-ends-meet. Social 
opportunity was more frequent (frequency = 26) than physical opportunity (frequency = 
9). Participants would seek advice and utilised their social network to make the most of 
purchases and benefits, with larger social networks issuing more social opportunities. For 
instance, participants would share buy one get one free offers with friends so as to reduce 
the cost of shopping. They would use their social network to improve knowledge of 
available benefits, by checking if they were eligible for the same benefits that their friends 
and colleagues were entitled to. 
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 Planning ahead: thematic analysis 
4.3.4.1 Barriers 
A chi-squared analysis revealed an significant, unequal distribution of frequency of 
barriers of the COM-B factors for Planning ahead, χ2 (2) = 18.658, p = .000. The most 
prominent was Motivation (frequency = 43), followed by Opportunity (frequency = 18), 
then Capability (frequency = 15). Further examination of motivational factors identified 
a non-significant difference between reflective (frequency = 17) and automatic factors 
(frequency = 26), χ2 (1) = 1.884, p = .170. This was exhibited in Figure 7, which 
identified motivation as the most prominent domain, but this did not differentiate between 
automatic and reflective mechanisms. 
The most prominently reported barrier to planning ahead was Motivation, 
although Reflective and Automatic Motivation contributed equally. Participants were 
highly influenced by future states, for instance those with higher income levels were more 
likely to take out insurance to protect their future states and goals.  One prominent barrier 
to planning ahead was inertia; many participants kept with their current default provider 
(insurance, mobile phone contracts, utilities) and choosing to auto-renewing, rather than 
comparing different quotes and shopping around which would reduce their monthly costs. 
The inertia bias prevents individuals and households from exerting some effort to reduce 
monetary consumption in the long-term. 
Individuals who struggled financially often failed to set goals or plan for their 
future, regardless of income. 
 
“We don’t invest anything longer than two years ahead” 
59, female, Glasgow, married, retired, financially struggling 
Participants demonstrated sub-optimality in their capability of future planning, 
participants demonstrated deficits in goal-directedness by not setting outcome goals. This 
meant individuals would often look for short-term desires (for example, end of the month 
payday spending), as opposed to saving goals. This meant individuals were pursuing 
short-term drives (purchasing goods to increase their social rank) rather than flexible 
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goals, which meant cutting back on expenses to be able to afford a new car or deposit on 
a house. 
 If a goal was set, participants would sometimes not plan effectively, often making 
an outcome goal (for instance put down a deposit for a mortgage) yet fail to specify an 
action plan of how to do so (for instance, set aside £2000 per month). This lack of 
planning meant that participants would often fail to reach their goal.  
These individuals would often struggle with unexpected bills or situations and 
found it difficult to cope. These same individuals would often fail to evaluate their 
financial situation over varying points of time. Individuals who evaluated their current 
state from their outcome goal or reference point would often fail to reach their saving 
goals, because they were unable to identify any progress (or lack thereof and adjust their 
behaviour accordingly. The deficits in goal-directedness was associated with a propensity 
to engage in automatic motivational mechanisms. For instance, people display a 
preference for immediate over delayed rewards influenced their financial behaviour. This 
tendency to prefer smaller immediate over larger delayed rewards, is known as temporal 
discounting (Bickel, Koffarnus, Moody, & Wilson, 2014). Many participants described 
themselves as wanting to ‘live for the day’, and did not seek a lifestyle where they planned 
ahead. Such disparity across participants could be a result of individually constructed 
happiness concepts (Lyubomirsky, 2001; Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998). Temporal 
discounting, in addition to ego mechanisms (e.g. unrealistic optimism), acted as a barrier 
for future social care and support. Participants found it difficult to conceive the possibility 
for the requirement of future support. This was typical from individuals whose parents 
were still alive and independent, as they would construe that their own future would be 
similar to their parents.  
4.3.4.2 Enablers 
The frequency of enablers across the COM-B framework revealed a significantly non-
uniform distribution of frequencies, with Motivation as the most prominent enabler 
(frequency = 68) than Capability (frequency = 29) or Opportunity (frequency = 19), χ2 
(2) = 34.672, p = .000. A second order analysis revealed that reflective mechanisms 
(frequency = 48) were more frequent than automatic mechanisms (frequency = 20), χ2 
(1) = 11.529, p = .001. Further investigation of reflective Motivation compared 
prevalence of enablers across evaluation, goal-setting and planning which revealed no 
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significant differences in the distribution of enablers across evaluation (frequency = 18), 
goal-setting (frequency = 20) and planning mechanisms (frequency = 10), χ2 (2) = 3.500, 
p = .174. 
Goal-directedness was the prime reflective mechanism that facilitated planning 
ahead, regardless of income. Individuals who set savings goals and planned appropriately 
displayed a greater sense of financial well-being and perceived sense of control. These 
individuals could also demonstrate flexibility when experiencing an unexpected bill or 
financial circumstance. Individuals who implemented action planning were also more 
commonly executing evaluative mechanisms, by actively evaluating these individuals 
were able to put in place appropriate mechanisms and sometimes identify circumstances 
ahead of time. For instance, some individuals put in place a financial buffer to protect 
themselves from unforeseen expenditure, or had savings for a specific goal. Risk aversion 
was demonstrated through these ‘account buffers’, brackets of savings to buffer against 
financial uncertainty. One participant stated that if she had less than £2,000 in her current 
account, she would be worried. The trade-off of interest against security identified a risk 
averse behaviour common amongst higher earning individuals to reduce financial 
uncertainty over increasing resources. This risk aversion meant that individuals would 
set aside funds for a financial buffer, rather than investing this sum and optimising their 
finances.  
Goal-directed behaviours were also shown in long-term outcomes, such as their 
children’s future. For example, participants were highly motivated to save for their 
children, stating this act was an investment in their children. 
Those with higher income demonstrated a better knowledge of the kinds of 
products available to help them save for the future. ISAs, for instance, were perceived as 
being accessible and low risk.  
Participants would routinely reduce physical opportunities to spend, by asking 
their family or social network to look after any spare money as a means of helping them 
to save. This behaviour was higher amongst lower income brackets. The person relied 
upon would be an authority figure meaning participants would more likely adhere to 
saving or reducing debt. Furthermore, one’s physical opportunity, as described by the 
environment in which they generally work, heavily influenced financial planning. 
Sporadic employment, for instance, led to a fluctuating income making it very hard for 
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people to plan ahead as they often wouldn’t know what they could expect to earn in the 
following weeks or months. 
4.4 Discussion 
The initial assessments detailed the major barriers and enablers to each of the components 
of financial capability. Keeping track of finances was highly reliant on Capability, 
predominantly Psychological Capability. Psychological capability was both a barrier and 
an enabler to keeping track of finances; psychological capability was characterized as a 
prominent barrier through mental accounting practices, which is sub-optimal as money 
is fungible, £100 towards clothes can still buy £100 of heating. However, Psychological 
Capability could promote people to keep track of their finances if they engaged in a highly 
organised approach. Participants who would actively manage their finances through 
meticulous spreadsheet often found any problems early, and due to the high frequency 
and regularity of monitoring could solve these problems with little difficulty. This was 
shown across income brackets. 
Ego-centric and affective mechanisms were the most featured barrier of Making-
ends-meet, whilst reflective and automatic motivations equally contributed as enablers of 
Making-ends-meet. Participants attributed a significant weight to their social rank and 
status, seeking to maintain and increase their social rank amongst their social network. 
Maintenance and improvement of one’s social rank position was reinforced from 
affective reward that increased the weighting of social rank. This resulted in individuals 
and households spending money (in addition to their usual monetary consumption such 
as grocery and bills) to maintain or increase their social rank. Motivation at the same time 
acted as an enabler of Making-ends-meet, participants could also utilise their social 
network to conform to other’s saving behaviour, or adopt their parental attitudes to 
purchasing and saving behaviour. 
One of the most important drivers of planning ahead, and being able to imagine 
what may lie in the future, is the attitude and motivation people take on from their friends, 
family and their workplace. The greatest barrier and enabler of planning ahead was most 
prominently Motivation, with no discernible difference between reflective and automatic 
mechanisms; although reflective motivation was the most frequent enabler of planning 
ahead. Interestingly, people also exhibited unrealistic optimism bias, where they tend to 
underweight the probability of negative future outcomes (McClure, Wills, Johnston, & 
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Recker, 2011). Inevitable events such as funerals are typically accounted for, but medical 
issues or the loss of a job are discounted as an ‘unforeseen event’ and one which is 
unlikely for a participant to anticipate themselves experiencing. People who were highly 
goal-orientated and evaluative had much more success in planning for their future 
financial well-being. Whilst those who exhibited deficits in goal-directedness were often 
influenced by extraneous circumstances, and would underweight future events.  
By using a frequency-based approach, this study was able to identify possible 
intervention designs based upon the most significant factors of the COM-B framework 
to each component of financial capability. As such the interventions could simultaneously 
reduce the impact of significant barriers and further accentuate the effect of enablers to 
each key component of financial capability. 
 Financial education 
This study identifies why financial education could have inefficient effects, educational 
interventions target psychological capability, but as illustrated in the results that 
Motivation and Capability both are the primary drivers, this dissociation means that 
educational policies do not effectively translate into behaviour change. Due to the 
assumptions of behaviour that the educational policies take, motivational factors will not 
be effectively targeted, as such, the use the of education may not translate into cost-
effectiveness policies. This has been illustrated from public health research in the 
dissemination of information to change behaviour (Corace & Garber, 2014; Kelly & 
Barker, 2016; McCluskey & Lovarini, 2005; J. Nichols, 1994). Educational policies do 
increase capability to implement a behaviour, but the additional requirements of 
opportunity and motivation to enact a behaviour are more important than the capability 
to do so. This does not mean that interventions should not focus on education, but that 
education is not the sole approach to be taken and increasing opportunity space and 
people’s motivations are usually more effective. 
 This study used a behavioural lens to offer a more coherent overview of the 
processes behind sub-optimal financial capability. This take uses grounded evidence-
based theory (Michie, Van Stralen, et al., 2011) to invoke and understand the underlying 
behavioural mechanisms. By gaining an accurate picture of the effects and mechanisms, 
more effective interventions can be developed to counter these behavioural factors. 
Whilst at the same time, utilising the behavioural enablers to promote the target 
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behaviour. Thereby identifying why certain people succeed, can be utilised to support 
those struggling.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The reported studies utilized a wide-scale assessment of financial capability within the 
general population, with a large sample of 72 participants each with in-depth observations 
and interviews to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how people think 
about money. This investigation employs a comprehensive and systematic theoretical 
model that offers a more coherent approach of human behaviour (Michie et al., 2014). 
The study used a substantial sample, which was evenly sampled across geographic 
regions within the UK, across age and even socio-economic class. These observations 
provided a detailed insight into the factors that comprise the barriers and enablers of 
financial capability. These were systematically examined under specific interventions 
designed to modify behaviour for particular components of financial capability.  
To the authors knowledge, this is to date the most large-scale in-depth assessment 
of financial capability behaviour within the UK through a qualitative investigation. The 
first study identified underlying mechanisms behind consumers poor financial decisions 
that left them struggling financially. The majority of consumers who struggle to monitor 
accounts are doing so due to an overreliance on mental accounting, although consumer’s 
reliance on mental accounting is well understood in the literature (Heath & Soll, 1996; 
Reinholtz, Bartels, & Parker, 2015; Thaler, 1985). A novel finding identified through the 
use of the mapping onto the COM-B framework, is the influence that the desire to 
maintain and increase ones perceived social rank on monetary consumption .  It is shown 
that shopping behaviour can reduce negative affect (Edwards, 1993; Rick, Pereira & 
Burson, 2014), however here the findings offer a mechanistic understanding behind 
debilitating spending. The findings suggest that consumers spend to increase/maintain 
their social rank amongst peers. Maintenance and improvement of one’s social rank 
position was reinforced from affective reward, an emotional ‘hit’ that increased the 
weighting of social rank. This emotional hit codes for a dopamine release, which is the 
neurotransmitter associated with addiction and reward-seeking behaviour (Blum et al., 
2012; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Lawrence & Brooks, 2014; Murray et al., 2014). This 
finding provides a psychological understanding of the plausible underlying mechanisms 
behind overspending.  
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The principle of purchasing into one’s social rank is not in itself sub-optimal, the 
sub-optimality is the extent to which the drive and cost to increase one’s social rank is 
greater than participants can afford (in both financial and other resources). This is also 
valid for goal-directedness, or lack thereof. Deficits in goal-directedness does not by itself 
constitute sub-optimal behaviour, this is the extent to which the lack of goal-directedness 
prevents individuals from reaching a stable financial position. 
The enablers of a given behaviour characterises the required training and 
behavioural change techniques to be employed in future interventions, by targeting 
automatic motivation or processes (habit-based interventions), or increasing goal-
directedness and self-control through reflective motivation (goal-setting interventions). 
The enablers to a given behaviour identify the types of reinforcements that promote such 
actions (i.e. reflective mechanisms for goal-setting behaviour), as well as the methods in 
which interventions should utilise, for instance providing feedback on outcome of 
behaviour.  
The barriers of a given behaviour, identify the reinforcement driving the sub-
optimal behaviour, the traps people fall into when attempting to shortcut financially 
sound behaviours; as well as the frequency with which they do so. These rewarding 
mechanisms enforce habit associations into memory (Wood & Rünger, 2016), leading to 
further execution of the behaviour. These rewards require little effort or contemplation 
from the individual, for instance affect has been shown to drive consumer purchase 
decisions (Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007).  
This investigation identified that financial capability is dependent upon 
behavioural processes, not just knowledge structures. Secondly, social networks and 
psychological processes play a big role in financial capability. And finally, that becoming 
financial capable is dependent upon using a clear tangible attribute, such as savings.  
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 Intervention design and function 
   
SUMMARY 
• A small pilot was run to examine in-depth assessment of the interventions. 
• Participants exhibited anxiety in the Substitution intervention, with even 
more reluctance for the Checking intervention because they are concerned 
with tangible results for savings. Checking intervention was dropped due to 
the lack of resources available to refine and employ the intervention. 
• Data collection techniques result in moderate levels of adherence (73.75%) 
but do show missing data and will require larger samples that would take a 
long time to procure. 
• Current intervention structure is too expensive to roll out and will require 
some other forms of retention and data collection strategies. 
• Retention strategies need to be readdressed for a new retention strategy 
given the larger sample of the randomised-controlled trial. 
• Behavioural tool needs to be redesigned for a more efficient data collection 
system. A web-based expense tracker was designed to replace the 
spreadsheet behavioural tool. This was to collect goal-setting data 
automatically. 
• Automated emails will be sent to participants in the re-designed trial, with a 
link to the behavioural tools for both intervention groups. 
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5.1 Background 
This chapter informs the reader how the findings from the study described in Chapter 
3, informed the design of interventions to be evaluated against a control condition in 
a randomised-controlled trial (RCT), secondly, this chapter assesses the feasibility and 
acceptability of the RCT. The RCT trial is described in the next chapter. 
5.2 Summary of formative research findings 
Recent work (see Chapter 3) captures the barriers and enablers to financial capability in 
the United Kingdom’s adult general population. As a reminder, within the study data 
from 72 participants were interviewed twice across three months to understand three key 
areas of their financial capability, including Keeping Track, Making-ends-meet and 
Planning Ahead. The obtained data was codified for each area separately. The coded 
factors included concepts described by the COM-B framework and the MINDSPACE 
toolkit, and each concept was sub-divided into enabling and facilitating aspects. The 
formative research results from the previous chapter are briefly reviewed below, as they 
pertain to each area of financial capability.  
For Keeping Track, people’s ability was highly reliant on their Capability, 
predominantly Psychological capability, in both the barrier and enabler aspects. As a 
barrier, Psychological capability was frequently identified as having a negative 
association of checking behaviour; where an individual learnt to associate negative 
reinforcer with the behaviour of checking their accounts. As an enabler, Psychological 
capability could facilitate people’s checking if they engage in highly organised 
management techniques, i.e., creating spreadsheets often detected any problems early, 
where regularity of monitoring could solve these problems quickly and efficiently. 
For Making-ends-meet, people’s motivations contributed in both the barrier and 
enabler aspects. As a barrier, people’s automatic motivation to make-ends-meet was the 
most prominent. This barrier materialised typically as people seeking to maintain and 
increase their social rank amongst their peers by purchasing items outside their financial 
means. These processes were exhibited in participants regardless of age. As an enabler, 
automatic motivation was characterised through the use of social norms, e.g., people 
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whose friends and parents had healthful financial attitudes and behaviours were able to 
take up those healthful attitudes and behaviours.  
For Planning Ahead, people’s motivations again contributed in both the barrier 
and enabler aspects. As a barrier, people exhibited an unrealistic optimism bias (McClure 
et al., 2011), where inevitable events such as funerals are typically accounted for, but 
unforeseen events medical issues or the loss of a job are discounted. As an enabler, 
people’s reflective motivation was the key factor. For example, people who were more 
goal-directed by setting goals and action planning, had much more success in saving and 
were less influenced by extraneous circumstance. 
5.3 Behavioural diagnosis of sub-optimal behaviours 
The typical behaviours underlying the three domains of financial capability can be 
understood in terms of psychological and behavioural mechanisms of motivation that 
reinforce sub-optimal financial behaviours. These can be understood in regards to the 
dual-process theories of motivation and behaviour (Daw et al., 2005; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Kahneman, 2011), this stems across reinforcement learning (Daw et al., 2005; 
Huys & Dayan, 2009; Otto et al., 2015), habit theory (Gardner, Lally, & Wardle, 2012; 
Lally & Gardner, 2013; Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010) and goal-theory 
(Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006). One system is automatic and 
efficient, which is referred to as System 1 in bounded rationality models, or model-free 
learning in reinforcement learning. The secondary system is a goal-directed, 
computationally heavy system that requires more resources but can process more 
information in line with intentions and behavioural targets, this is referred to as System 
2 in bounded rationality models, or model-based learning in reinforcement learning. 
 When examining Keeping Track, individuals demonstrate an aversion to 
checking their accounts, this aversion can be understood better as avoidance behaviour. 
Avoidance behaviour is the tendency to inhibit behaviour towards a given state. Here, 
individuals exhibit avoidance behaviour in checking their account balances, which can 
be understood as Pavlovian-instrumental-transfer (PIT). PIT is a model of learning, 
where a cue (conditioned stimulus) of spending (i.e. recalling past expenditure) is paired 
with a negative reinforcer (through affective responses of anxiety), which enhances the 
operant conditioning directed towards checking their accounts. This model explains how 
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individuals motivations can lead them to avoid checking their accounts due to the 
influence of negative affective responses. 
 Investigating the key factors promoting sub-optimal behaviour in Making-ends-
meet, the most prominent behavioural triggers were of a consumption of financial 
resources to increase their social rank amongst their peers. This consumption was 
reinforced through a positive reinforcement signal of a dopamine release. The release of 
the neurochemical dopamine is associated with the feel-good, pleasurable feeling one 
feels when one’s expectations are reached or surpassed (Blum et al., 2012; Kim et al., 
2011; Ondo & Lai, 2008). This acts as a reinforcer of behaviour making it more likely to 
repeat actions (Daw & Tobler, 2013) and even to lead to addictions (Bickel et al., 2007; 
Blum et al., 2012; Everitt & Robbins, 2005). In this case the states that afford actions to 
increase social rank position become positively reinforced through, operant conditioning 
(Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2009), or model-free reinforcement learning (W. Wood 
& Rünger, 2016; Zhu et al., 2015). 
Model-free learning, a habitual model of learning under reinforcement learning, 
suggests that individuals form cached values of actions through learnt associations of 
sequential state-action pairings when there is a positive reinforcer. Here individuals learn 
to associate the state, in which they can purchase products that would improve their social 
rank, with the positive reinforcement signal of dopamine release. This makes them more 
likely to consume into their social rank, and thereby in each instance produces a 
reinforcement signal of dopamine 
 In Planning ahead, the motivational mechanisms were much more diverse than in 
Keeping Track or Making-ends-meet, the results demonstrate the individuals display 
deficits in goal-directedness as a typical illustration of sub-optimal behaviour. Deficits in 
strategizing and executing plans, these issues fit within the realm of goal-theory (Locke 
& Latham, 2002, 2006); which dictate how the use of detailed specified outcomes, in 
addition to specified behavioural plans can significantly improve the chances of 
executing and reaching said goals. In addition these processes can also be understood 
through model-based reinforcement learning (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2011b; Wunderlich et al., 2012); which is a goal-directed reinforcement learning 
system. Model-based learning refers to the ability to use a learnt model of the 
environment and internal motivations to prospective action values to reach a given 
terminal point. Deficits in model-based learning given from a poorly constructed 
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cognitive model of the world, or from a poor policy, that is to say the selection of state-
action pairings, can result in sub-optimal outcomes (Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016).  
Secondly the results also show deficits in automatic mechanisms of temporal 
discounting in the desire for immediate gratification over optimal future endeavours, 
individuals are more likely to consume now for an immediate reward than delay 
gratification for more optimal outcomes. This is further exacerbated by the avoidance 
behaviour of debt, focusing primarily on purchases as gains. This system of processing 
meant individuals would often spend at will relying on their income to improve their 
reference point.  
5.4 Intervention design and purpose 
For each domain of financial capability, an intervention was designed to combat the 
barriers against and utilise the enablers to promote financial capability. Each 
intervention is described below.  
 Keeping Track - Checking Intervention 
Intervention name: Checking intervention 
 
Sequential list of actions: 
1. Identify activities with intrinsic motivation 
2. Rank them by frequency 
3. Pick the most frequently executed that affords account checking immediately 
after the behaviour (such as use of mobile phone, laptop or computer, or nearby 
to an ATM or branch) 
4. Pledge an implementation intention to check bank account after performing the 
activity 
 
To compete with the aversive internal mechanisms that motivate avoidance behaviour, a 
contrasting positive reinforcing signal was required. This is a form of operant 
conditioning to overwrite the effects of PIT, by introducing a positive reinforcer to 
overcome the negative reinforcer. This technique has been often referred to as a 
‘cognitive vaccine’ (Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012a).  
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 An example of this technique can be illustrated in a behavioural training 
intervention known as attention bias modification, a behavioural training paradigm which 
uses probabilistic rewarding of the valence stimuli on select trials to alter behaviour by 
changing the affective responses to the stimuli in question. This intervention technique 
has been shown significantly improve depressive responses on Beck’s depression scale 
and in cortisol levels compared to a control group (Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, 
& Harmer, 2012b).  
 In this case, the behaviour of checking is to be completed after some activity the 
individual enjoys engaging in. This allows intrinsic motivation by the internal values of 
the individual to translate into meaningful signals of positive reinforcement. As such, the 
initial action participants must execute is to identify a list of actions that carry intrinsic 
motivation. The intervention would be better suited if the checking behaviour was 
executed through technological means, as this provides more opportunity and easier 
access to checking one’s accounts, as well as, delivering multiple opportunities of 
rewarding signals. 
The intrinsic motivation of the action increases the likelihood that the agent will 
repeat the behaviour, and the individual will be frequently engaged in (such as checking 
Facebook accounts or playing mobile phones games). As such, this can promote 
individuals to check their accounts more regularly and reliably. This therefore requires 
participants to then rank these rewarding actions by frequency, where the aim is to 
promote sustainable behaviour of checking financial accounts, developing a habitual 
routine of checking behaviour. This is reinforced by an intrinsic motivation from a prior 
action executed before checking. As such, this would require that the pleasurable action, 
affords the activity of checking account through either a mobile phone, laptop or 
computer. Participants must therefore select the pleasurable behaviour that provides the 
greatest affordance to account checking. Habit formation becomes more likely if the 
behaviour pairing is more frequent, i.e. the more opportunity to associate the behaviours, 
the greater the chance and strength of the association. Once the pleasurable behaviour is 
identified, participants will then make an implementation intention: 
 
“Whenever I am [insert activity], I will check my account afterwards.” 
 
Behavioural change techniques utilised: Habit formation, self-reward, self-incentive. 
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 Making-Ends Meet - Substitution Intervention 
Intervention name: Substitution intervention 
Sequential list of actions: 
1. Participants identify one key problem spending area 
2. Identify a frequent consumption which is impulsive that feels good. 
3. If the participant is unable to identify an impulsive purchase, then identify 
frequent unnecessary purchases 
4. Break down the contextual cues (location and time) 
5. Generate a list of possible alternative options that use the same cue (i.e. location) 
but do not constitute such a high monetary cost 
6. Select one of the alternatives options that would provide the closest level of utility 
as from past purchase decisions.   
7. Pledge an implementation intention to substitute purchase behaviours 
 
To combat the consumption of financial resources to increase social rank, the key issues 
are the reinforcement signal associated with the actions and the drive to purchase into 
social rank. Subjective social rank is an important phenomenon, individuals have an 
inbuilt drive to compare themselves to others we see as similar (Stewart et al., 2006). For 
instance our perceived social rank explains how happy we are with our income (Boyce 
et al., 2010); it explains our belief of symptom severity in anxiety and depression 
(Melrose, Brown, & Wood, 2013), as well as our beliefs of alcohol consumption (Wood, 
Brown, & Maltby, 2012). There is an inbuilt tendency to compare ourselves to others, 
this drive is a powerful motivator where people are often driven to improve their social 
comparison (where a higher social rank means a better standing). As such, individuals 
will likely seek to improve their social rank and trying to subvert this would be a difficult 
phenomenon.  
 As such the intervention looks to utilise these rewarding mechanisms but to 
substitute the behaviours executed by the individual, this is termed as behavioural 
substitution. Here by retaining the given state, but modifying the action to maintain the 
outcome reward, participants can sustain their behaviour change whilst reducing their 
spending. The basis of this is to substitute purchase decisions for cheaper alternatives by 
reducing the associated costs. The rewarding signal from the dopamine release still 
ingrains a reinforcer on the behaviour. Therefore the initial action requires participants 
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to identify an area of overspending in which they can recognise a list of frequent 
impulsive consumptions that provides an affective ‘hit’ (dopaminergic response). Once 
this is identified, individuals must rank this list by trading-off the frequency of the 
purchase against the cost (i.e coffee purchases are more frequent than technological 
purchases). At this point, the contextual cues that prompt the behaviour can be identified, 
this is to help break down the action to specify the goal of behavioural substitution. 
 The intervention looks to sustain behaviour change in reducing the cost of 
consuming into social rank, for instance, the individual would choose a similar market 
alternative product at a lower cost. This intervention uses the signals the dopaminergic 
responses of social rank. The intervention uses the association that the individual builds 
between the given state they purchase the product with the dopaminergic response. 
Therefore by using the same context and responses, but modifying the action sets, one 
can reduce their monetary consumption, whilst within the parameters of their preferences 
and subjective utility. This process uses a bottom-up method of reducing monetary 
consumption, by reducing highly frequent small instances of consumption to form 
incremental amounts of savings. Once the frequent impulsive purchase is identified, the 
individual must then consider and generate a list of potential alternatives purchases, 
which are similar in as many aspects as possible, except for price (for instance, buying a 
hot chocolate over a luxury hot chocolate with whipped cream and marshmallows). Then 
from this substitution space, participants must select the most appropriate alternative, 
which trade-offs the choice-set from utility and price. This is a difficult process and, as 
such, the interventionists should be available to assist in this task. 
For example, consider one individual purchasing household furnishings every 
week when with their friends, this could include: throws, photograph frames, ornaments 
and so forth. Instead of purchasing such goods the individual can instead look to change 
the option set within that given store, i.e. purchasing coffee for everyone at the café. 
There may be instances in which individuals do not purchase into their social 
rank, or that the purchase itself does not afford a substitution; however a highly frequent 
purchase choice could be substituted that uses social mechanisms such as the social norm 
mechanisms. For instance, many individuals would be more inclined to purchase coffee 
whilst at work with friends than if they were alone. If an individual was to buy take-away 
as lunch every day from a café, for instance a burger, chips and drink, which may cost 
around £7, this could be substituted for a sandwich snack and drink at around half the 
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price. This produces an hypothetical saving of £3.50 for each instance. Suppose this is 
five days a week, this would calculate as £15.50 a week, £70 a month. These instances 
could therefore improve savings through small frequent substitutions. 
To bolster the effects, prompts should be required as the given state is still the 
same. This may lead individuals to utilise the cached values of the sub-optimal previous, 
frequent purchase decision. As such, a prompt can be utilised to remind the participant 
about their substitution. In this instance a credit-card sleeve or wallet (with which a single 
card can be inserted, similar to that of given by the Transport for London’s Oyster card 
wallet) is a viable option, as this would be on their persons when making the consumption 
decision. In addition, the sleeve may also allow individuals to record instances of 
substitution, giving them a sense of control and pursuit of this behaviour.  
 
Figure 9; Credit-card sleeve provided as behavioural tool to participants 
 
Once the substitution is identified, participants will then make an implementation 
intention: 
 
“Whenever I am [insert context], if I have an urge to...[insert problem behaviour], I 
will [insert substitute behaviour] instead.” 
 
Behavioural change techniques utilised: Self-monitoring of behaviour, feedback on 
behaviour, behaviour substitution, action planning, problem solving, habit reversal, self-
reward 
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 Planning ahead- Planning Intervention 
Intervention name: Planning intervention 
Sequential list of actions: 
1. Participants set a savings goal to purchase at the end of the intervention period 
2. Specify the name and cost of the goal 
3. Select an image to solidify the goal as a concrete outcome 
4. Set an action plan of how much to save per month 
5. Specify monthly income 
6. Monitor and record expenditure using the expense tracker  
7. Use feedback information to update savings towards the goal from the potential 
saving calculated 
8. Engage flexible behaviour by identify overspending and reduce consumption to 
reach savings goal 
 
In the Planning ahead the key factors are typically how people who struggled financially 
often failed to think about future events, mostly discounting the likelihood of occurring, 
and deficits in planning and accounting for these issues. Furthermore, individuals were 
also more concerned with immediate rewards as opposed to delaying gratification for 
sometimes more optimal outcomes. As such, the function of the intervention is to train 
individuals to process future outcomes and to plan accordingly. Here a financial goal is 
to be set so participants can look forward to something at the end of the intervention, 
purchasing the goal is not mandatory but merely a motivational commitment device to 
drive behaviour with a reinforcer. The individual must then specify the financial goal (an 
outcome goal) in regards the type of product (i.e. laptop) and the cost of the product. 
Having specified goals provides a more effective route to completion that unspecified 
goals (Locke & Latham, 2006), as such the individual should specify the actual product 
itself, rather than the notion of a purchase. For example, “a Holiday to Greece with my 
girlfriend in October”, as opposed to, “Holiday”.  
 Once the individual has set their goal set, participants must then create an action 
plan, how will they seek to pay for the goal given their current financial situation and to 
predict their future state. To do this, participants must monitor their current financial state 
by tracking expenditure, and looking to reduce consumption from a top-down 
perspective. Here individuals may have an a-priori belief of their consumption across 
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categories (such as subscription, utilities, transport, food and so forth). Where the 
observed consumption exceed their prior expected beliefs, they should cut back, looking 
to optimise their consumption and contemplate how to reduce spending. To plan the 
behavioural goal, i.e. to set the action-plan of how to accomplish the outcome goal, by 
specifying the amount of money required in various time intervals, as well as strategizing 
how to identify the areas of overspending.  
  To assist in behaviour change, participants will be provided with a spreadsheet-
based expense tracker, the tool will detail the outcome goal and associated costs, where 
participants can include a photograph or picture of the goal to make it more concrete and 
proximally visible (Locke & Latham, 2002). Furthermore, the spreadsheet will contain 
common spending categories to help participants track consumption and provide 
feedback of overconsumption.  
 The tool should also provide feedback by helping to reduce unrealistic 
expectations, by calculating an accurate depiction of potential savings given income and 
consumption levels. This can be fed back to the participant to provide a reference point 
so that the participant can evaluate their consumption and plan accordingly.  
 
Figure 10; Spreadsheet based expense tracker tool given to participants
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Behavioural change techniques utilised: Goal-setting (behaviour), goal-setting 
(outcome),  action planning, problem solving, feedback on behaviour, discrepancy of 
behaviour and goal, self-monitoring of behaviour, feedback on behaviour, self-incentive, 
self-reward 
The relationship between the COM-B model, diagnosed mechanisms and the 
behavioural change techniques used are described further in Table 4. 
 
Error! Reference source not found.. Behavioural change techniques, behavioural 
diagnosis and COM-B factors 
 
Interventions Identified Mechanisms BCT 
COM-B 
components 
Checking 
Avoidance behaviour, 
negative affect 
Habit formation, self-
reward, self-incentive 
Capability, 
Motivation 
Substitution 
Hyper-consumption, 
behavioural repetition, 
social rank, ego, social 
reward, social incentive, 
cue signalling reward, 
diminished self-control 
Self-monitoring of 
behaviour, feedback on 
behaviour, behaviour 
substitution, action 
planning, problem 
solving, habit reversal, 
self-reward 
Motivation 
(automatic) 
Planning  
Deficits in goal-setting, 
deficits in action planning, 
lack of discrepancy 
between behaviour and 
goal, lack of problem 
solving 
Goal-setting (behaviour), 
goal-setting (outcome),  
action planning, problem 
solving, feedback on 
behaviour, discrepancy 
of behaviour and goal, 
self-monitoring of 
behaviour, feedback on 
behaviour, self-
incentive, self-reward 
Motivation  
(reflective, 
automatic) 
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5.5 Pilot study 
 Introduction 
The present small-scale, low-cost pilot study was conducted in collaboration with 
Kindred Media, a London-based public relations company. The pilot study aimed to 
identify the difficulties participants experienced in implementing the interventions 
according to several elements of the APEASE framework (Michie et al., 2014). The 
APEASE framework is an acronym in which each letter describing elements of an 
intervention that may affect successful uptake of an intervention: Acceptability, 
Practicality, Effectiveness, Affordability, Safety/side-effects, and Equity (Michie et al., 
2014). The present pilot study assessed the interventions’: Acceptability, Practicality, 
(likely) Effectiveness and Affordability. Equity was not assessed because the costs of 
recruiting a sample of participants representative of the general population consisting 
only those who felt financially squeezed was too high. Side-effects were also unable to 
be assessed, this was because only financial data collected was self-reported using pre-
defined financial diaries. Participants were apprehensive to given any additional 
objective measures (like bank account records), therefore knowledge of spill-over effects, 
negative or positive was too difficult to obtain.  
 Method 
5.5.2.1 Sample 
Participants were recruited through media campaign run through magazines, local 
newspapers, an online advertisement and telephone calls. Participants were recruited as 
a representative sample of England across age, income bracket, education and geography. 
At the end of this process, thirteen participants had been recruited (M = 41.69 years, SD 
= 15.11 years, 7 Males). Of the thirteen participants, five worked full-time, two worked 
part-time, three set their own work-schedule (i.e., were self-employed), two were 
students, one was retired. All participants expressed a desire to improve their current 
financial situation. 
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5.5.2.2 Primary Outcome Measure 
The primary outcome measure was participants’ savings. Savings were measured through 
financial diaries designed as part of the formative research (see Appendix A and B). 
Participants were asked to submit the diaries on a fortnightly basis through e-mail to the 
experimenter, over four consecutive months, i.e., a total of eight submissions. As savings 
is self-reported there is likely for participants to inflate savings rates  
For the analysis it was assumed that all expenditures during the trial were reported, 
and thereby the deficit between participants’ incoming and outgoing money indicated 
their savings. Savings at baseline was subtracted from these amounts to calculate the 
change from baseline. 
 
Savingsi,t = incomei,t – consumptioni,t 
 
Savings at baseline was subtracted from these amounts to calculate the change from 
baseline. These amounts were then averaged to compute an average savings from 
baseline.  
5.5.2.3 Secondary Outcome Measures 
5.5.2.4 Savings 
The secondary outcome measures included took accomplished two aims. The first aim 
was to assess features of the interventions’ acceptability, practicality, effectiveness and 
affordability. The second aim was to assess features of the data quality. The specification 
of such is identified below. 
5.5.2.5 Distance travelled to Savings goal 
The spreadsheets that were submitted with the financial diaries were analysed to calculate 
distance to savings goal during the pilot study, which saw the amount previously saved 
that fortnight, t, as a fraction of the total cost of the goal, for each individual, i, which 
was calculated as: 
 
Distancei,t = Previous Savedi,t / Goal Costi,t 
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In addition to, the intention-to-save, depicting the desire to save as a proportion of 
the total amount to potentially save. This is understood as the percentage participants who 
were invested in reaching their goal, the weekly values denote how strong a participant’s 
intention is, whilst the average denotes their overall intention. This is used as a proxy of 
the implementation of the intervention with regards to participants’ intentions to save, 
calculated as: 
 
Intentioni,t = Amount pledgedi,t/(Incomei,t-Outgoingi,t) 
5.5.2.6 Intervention’s assessment. 
To assess the intervention through the APEASE criteria, data analysis was conducted 
through a variety of means. To analyse acceptability, participants’ responsiveness to the 
interventions were analysed through their performance as well as any subverted 
allocations. To assess intervention practicality, the tool usage and participants’ overall 
reactions to the tool were used, in addition to diary submission and completion rates. 
Affordability was highlighted by examining the intervention process and the costings 
associated for the return in effectiveness. Overall effectiveness was examined by 
analysing the financial diaries to note change in financial circumstances since baseline. 
Intervention equity and safety were unable to be assessed, due to low sample size and the 
lack of fine grain data.  
5.5.2.7 Data quality 
Data quality was assessed by recording aspects of whether and when participants 
submitted their dairies, including the date the dairy was submitted and the completion of 
those submissions. Participants were required to complete as much of the diary as 
possible by stipulating any and all income (benefits, savings, taxes, salary), any and all 
expenditure (such as food, clothes, entertainment, house, transport, mortgage, services, 
utilities, credit-card payments and savings). Participants were also asked to declare any 
changes in circumstances that could have implications of their finances. Participants were 
also asked to declare their current life satisfaction score, as well as happiness levels. 
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Those in the Planning ahead group (described below) were also asked to also submit a 
spreadsheet via email at the same time as they submitted their diary entries. 
5.5.2.8 Design 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three intervention groups, such that  four 
were in the Keeping Track group, five were in the Making-ends-meet group and four 
were in the Planning Ahead group. No control group was utilised as the purpose of the 
pilot was to understand user experiences with the intervention. 
Participants were given an overview of the intervention and any questions they had 
were answered to make sure they fully understood what they were being asked to do. All 
participants completed diary submission over the same four months, from the start of 
September till the end of December. Participants received fortnightly calls from the 
experimenter to remind participants to submit their data and discuss any issues or 
problems, as well as to motivate them to maintain their implementation of the 
intervention.  
5.5.2.9 Interventions 
The three interventions included the Checking, Substitution and Planning interventions 
respectively. The Checking and Substitution interventions were designed primarily using 
Habit Theory (Gardner et al., 2012; Gillan, Robbins, Sahakian, van den Heuvel, & van 
Wingen, 2016; Judah et al., 2013; Wood & Rünger, 2016), while the Planning ahead 
intervention was designed primarily using Goal Theory (Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006, 
Michie et al., 2013, 2014). The three interventions are described below.  
Keeping Track. Participants in the Checking intervention were asked to write a plan 
(problem solving, action planning) to check their accounts every day (habit formation), 
after performing an action they found rewarding (self-reward, self-incentive) (e.g., 
playing on their phone).  Theoretically, after repeated pairings this rewarding action may 
become a ‘rewarding signal’ that helps reminded participants to check their accounts. 
Individuals then use the contexts and prompts that drive the impulses to execute the 
rewarding signal, to prompt account checking.  
Making-ends-meet. Participants in the Substitution intervention were asked to write 
down a plan to change an expensive spending habit to a cheaper one on a small piece of 
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paper. First, participants needed to complete a reflective exercise (problem solving) about 
their monetary consumption. Participants were asked to reflect on spending behaviour 
and a frequent, impulsive purchase (e.g. purchasing household furnishings), characterised 
as a frequent purchase that they felt enjoyable and did automatically, without thinking. 
Once identified, participants  needed to break down the context in which they execute 
this habitual purchase, context in this case was simplified in three dimensions, location 
and time. Participants needed to describe the location they tend to enact the expensive 
habit (e.g. at John Lewis) and when they tended to execute the behaviour (e.g. when with 
friends after yoga). Once participants had contemplated these particular components, they 
needed to identify a market alternative that would be less expensive (e.g. buying a coffee 
instead) (behavioural substitution, habit reversal) 
 These particulars were then entered onto a behavioural tool designed for use in 
this intervention, the tool is a credit-card sleeve (see Figure 11). Participants write down 
the expensive habit on one side and the alternative on the other. When participants enact 
a successful substitution, they are to mark this on the sleeve itself (self-monitoring of 
behaviour) 
The piece of paper then folded to fit into a plastic card sleeve in which participants 
were asked to keep the debit/credit card they used more frequently. Theoretically, the 
card sleeve may become a cue that help participants self-monitored their behavioural 
substitutions, by providing themselves with feedback on their frequency of substituting. 
 
 
Figure 11: Behavioural tool for the Substitution intervention 
 
Planning Ahead. Participants in the Planning intervention were asked to set a 
savings goal they wish to work towards to purchase a concrete object in the future (for 
example a new laptop) (goal-setting outcome). A concrete product is much more 
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attainable than an idealistic concept, i.e. saving for a new car is easier to do than saving 
for a rainy day. Then to help participants achieve their goal they were given an excel 
spreadsheet (see  
Figure 12) directing them to breaks down their income, spending, and goals by 
months. The spreadsheet also displayed information related to their goal, such as the cost 
of the goal, and how much money they had already saved to achieving their goal. 
Theoretically, the processes of putting together all this information (i.e., their income, 
spending, and goals) and seeing changes over time should be informative and motivating.  
 
Figure 12; Behavioural tool for the Planning intervention. 
 
 
5.5.2.10 Results 
Of the thirteen participants, one participant withdrew from the Planning intervention 
(leaving three participants in the group) and a second from the Substitution intervention 
(leaving four participants in the group), and four participants in the Checking group. This 
resulted in a sample of eleven participants,  mean age of 43.91 years (SD = 11.31 years), 
with 6 females and 5 males.  Participants identified their financial goal was towards 
savings as opposed to reducing monetary consumption, checking accounts or even better 
financial planning.  
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The results section first examines the primary outcome, effectiveness determined 
through self-reported savings. The secondary outcomes including the acceptability and 
practicality affordability. 
5.5.2.11 Primary Outcome Savings 
Participants improved their savings, however there was large variation in the average 
change from baseline (M = £372.45, SD = £597.79). The distribution of the results fit 
with a pareto distribution, a diminishing function in which most of the wealth is 
handlesdby a minority of cases (Mandelbrot, 1960; Singh & Maddala, 2008). Participants 
were mostly pleased with their increased savings, however as illustrated in the 
distribution of savings rates, some individuals showed negative savings rates. The highest 
participants’ average change from baseline savings was AI, and the lowest (i.e., highest 
deficits in savings) was RW.   
Table 4; Savings during trial from financial diaries 
ID Group Baseline Savings 
Average Change 
from Baseline 
AA Making-ends-meet £222.00 £250.50 
AM Planning Ahead £191.00 £340.38 
AI Planning Ahead £44.12 £1,548.11 
BP Planning Ahead -£89.14 -£225.95 
MS Making-ends-meet £211.00 £187.00 
PR Planning Ahead £1,137.88 £292.91 
RW Keeping Track £410.68 -£422.54 
SB Planning Ahead £585.04 £319.08 
ST Planning Ahead £163.00 £84.29 
SM Planning Ahead £1,346.65 £1,400.22 
WT Planning Ahead £1,850.00 £323.00 
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5.5.2.12 Acceptability 
Those who were allocated to Checking intervention exhibited mixed perspectives. Some 
participants were very interested in improving their ability in keeping track, whilst others 
were more focused on improving their savings. Those in the Checking intervention did 
not have any tangible outcomes as a result of checking which made it difficult to motivate 
them to enact the checking. These implications are important for future considerations, 
where individuals are more interested in savings than other financial behaviours. 
Participants showed marked anxiety towards the Substitution intervention, with 
two participants expressing intent to change interventions, and those in the Keeping 
Track intervention also showed marked avoidance towards such behaviours, with three 
participants subverting allocation and moving to the Planning intervention. Participants 
who were allocated to the Substitution intervention were unwilling to participate in the 
reflexive exercise to identify areas of over spending. This may be due to attribution errors 
where people wish to hold themselves in high regard and not admit to any mistakes, often 
referred to as a self-serving bias (Sherrill, 2007). The exercise suggests that the 
overspending is the fault of the participant and puts them in position to accept such 
behaviours. As such, it may be hard for individuals to bruise their ego in this given 
exercise, especially if they have the financial responsibility of the household. It may also 
be likely that some participants are not inherently overspending on any particular 
rewarding purchases and thus are not likely to see much improvement in the Substitution 
intervention.  
Participants were often stating that they were already making lots of decisions to 
cut back on spending, such as “driving around town for the cheapest bargains” or “buying 
things we only need”. They did however express a disbelief in the mechanics of the 
Substitution intervention. Participants were unwilling to believe that bottom-up processes 
of highly frequent, small substitutions were comparable to top-down time consuming 
fortnightly tasks. When participants did discuss some routine behaviours, they were 
usually defensive about substituting any options stating these were small things they 
looked forward, misunderstanding the intervention design.  
It is noted that the researcher is an important factor in the employment of the habit-
based intervention, where researchers must assist participants in the intervention and this 
time constraint makes it difficult for execute the intervention. This is a factor in the 
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acceptability of the intervention as many participants would struggle to identify a 
substitution, and this may be a result of interactions with the researcher. 
Those in the Planning intervention remarked the intervention design as much more 
of a common savings method, participants were more relaxed with the mechanisms of 
the intervention. However, the idea of using a spreadsheet to document monetary 
consumption was something participants seemed a little uneasy with. Participants 
questioned what level of accuracy was required, some participants wanted to skip the 
details of documenting their consumption, as they felt they already knew what to do. 
Participants’ familiarity with this intervention may be what largely drew people to it. 
Those in the Planning intervention were happy with the details and completion of the 
spreadsheets; some participants lacked Microsoft Office and thus required some 
alternative software. However, participants were adamant that they willing to engage in 
the intervention and demonstrated enthusiasm. Note that participants were lost to attrition 
which is denoted in Table 6 below and explains from how the final allocation count below 
differs from the allocations shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Intended and subverted allocation 
Intervention 
Intended 
Allocation 
Final 
allocation 
Making-ends-meet 5 3 
Planning Ahead 4 9 
Keeping Track 4 1 
 
5.5.2.13 Practicality 
An additional investigation was conducted to assess participants’ implantation of the 
intervention, the intention-to-save was a key starting point to identify how users of the 
Planning and Substitution interventions were completing the intervention in the real-
world. Understanding how participants use their tools and participate in the intervention 
can help to redesign key aspects to further motivate and maintain behavioural integrity.  
First the Planning intervention was analysed as the majority of participants had 
been allocated to this, producing the majority of the implementation data. Participants 
who don’t invest in their behavioural goals demonstrate some level of reluctance can be 
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illustrated. These individuals mentally accounted these funds pledging the money only to 
be used for the goal. The average intention-to-save was 46.41% (SD = 30.65%), 
identifying that participants on average only pledge less than half of their available funds. 
This is likely due to mental accounting (Thaler, 1999). Mental accounting was shown in 
the formative research to be a big factor in financial decision-making, where those who 
resorted to mental accounting processes failed to save appropriately. 
 Through this, AI demonstrated the highest savings through the diary form, despite 
still withholding from contributing towards his savings goal. AM exhibited the highest 
motivation towards their goal. SB on the other hand made no indication towards their 
savings goal, as shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6; Intentions to save as percentage of available assets 
ID 
Proportion of used savings (% of available) for each fortnight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Average 
AM 46.90 200.00 69.90 94.70 51.50 89.30 97.10 88.00 100.00 93.10 
AI 3.30 8.00 6.80 9.80 6.30 9.00 5.90 11.20 12.60 8.10 
BP - 51.90 82.80 65.50 59.30 - - - - 64.90 
PR 78.40 122.70 3.30 32.10 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 - 67.10 
ST 107.70 10.40 100.00 31.60 10.40 20.20 - - - 46.70 
SB - - - - - - 0.00 - - 0.00 
SM 14.00 40.10 - - - - - 87.40 - 47.10 
WT 30.70 - - 48.60 50.80 65.90 45.10 24.80 - 44.30 
*Note: ‘-’ indicates no submission was made 
This table provides the percentage of resources allocated towards the savings goal for 
each fortnight, 100% indicates that an individual put all of their disposable income 
towards their goal, 50% denotes half of their displosable income went to their goal, and 
so forth. 
 
One major concern is that individuals may have pledged funds towards their goal 
but not necessarily included this on the planning tool itself, this is almost impossible to 
identify without utilising bank records and setting up a separate savings account. This 
would require an association with a commercial bank with which is difficult to set up 
such an relationship. 
 An additional investigation was ran for the degree to which participants achieved 
their savings goal. The amount already saved for each time window (t) allowed a 
construction of cumulative distance towards the participants’ goal. As visible through 
Figure 13, most participants made progression towards their goal, the greatest cumulative 
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success was by AM, whilst AI came close second. ST had set a goal and returned 
information for one out of eight possible submissions. This may be due to biased 
reporting from ST to cover up loss of data or where ST is perhaps forgetting to submit 
the data. SB failed to submit any usable data, where the only data point was 0.00%. 
 
Figure 13: Cumulative distance to savings goal 
 
 
Out of the six participants assigned to the Substitution intervention, three subverted 
the allocation, one dropped out and another failed to submit any data. The individual 
chose to substitute pints from the pub for soft drinks. The individual recorded only 11 
opportunities to substitute, but was successful on two of them.  
 
“If I'm honest it's catch 22 with trying to save cash through watching Liverpool. I 
get very nervous watching my team, and pint or 2 settles my nerves a bit. I'm very 
committed to saving money but I have struggled, and I actually think the stress of being 
well behind in my financial goals has often let me slip in to ‘****  it' mode. “ 
-MS on the conflict of habit reversal/behavioural substitution 
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Figure 14: Substitution tool usage 
 
There is a trade-off between frequency of purchase and price difference in market 
products, which  has a very small margin of error. If the frequency is too low, there is no 
tangible outcomes in savings, and if the difference between the market products are too 
small then participants can feel like the substitutions are not worth executing. However 
MS did demonstrate an intent to save and to adhere to the intervention when describing 
their opinion of the Substitution intervention they said there was a spill-over effect. 
 
“I've alluded to this in my diary entries, but it's  been a struggle saving for the 
wedding, having my tax bill looming, and having work cancelled. I may have come 
across as irresponsible in the spending on beers when it potentially could save money 
and help the long term situation. However this financial health challenge has opened up 
bigger conversations with regards to our spending and we have a had success when 
reviewing (and often taking action) credit cards, bank accounts, TV provider, Car 
insurance and other areas where we can save.  The health challenge has helped get the 
saving mode in to my conscience, but the area I was looking to tackle wasn't quite the 
success I hoped for!” 
-MS on the acceptability of the Substitution intervention 
 
Those in the Checking intervention did not wish to take part in any conversation 
about their financial performance as they felt there was a disconnect between the 
intervention and financial savings. The lack of tangible outcomes is a large barrier to 
behaviour change (Lally & Gardner, 2013). This may have played a big factor in why 
participants did not wish to remain in this intervention, and why they would not want to 
discuss their financial status under avoidance of negative affective responses. Participants 
 97 
 
can sometimes wish to avoid information that is negative. As such it is difficult to 
ascertain the implementations and practicalities of this intervention, however of note is 
to untangle the Checking intervention from improving savings, as individuals do sense a 
large disconnect between the two.  
5.5.2.14 Adherence 
To understand the practicalities in the implementation of the intervention regarding data 
collection methods, it was important to analyse and investigate the extent to which data 
could be requested and submitted. 
 Adherence firstly must be clarified into the processes and concepts it represents, 
firstly adherence can be defined simply as the manner to which an individual or agent 
acts in concordance with some specified plan or course of action (Vrijens, Urquhart, & 
White, 2014). Adherence contains three major areas: initiation, execution and 
discontinuation (Vrijens et al., 2012). Initiation referring to an agent starting the process, 
implementation or execution refers to the implantation of the behaviour, i.e. whether an 
individual takes their medication at the right time, or whether they forget to take their 
medications, whilst discontinuation refers to when an agent stops executing the behaviour 
altogether.  
 With regard to the pilot study, all participants demonstrated initiation of the 
behaviour. When examining the execution of the intervention, there was moderate levels 
of adherence across the sample (M = 73.75% SD = 20.65%), however the execution of 
these submission were still poor with an average of 65.66% (SD = 26.51%) of data being 
missed on each diary submission. This suggests inherent practical issues in implementing 
the current intervention infrastructure as means of data collection. It would not only be 
impractical but unethical given the volume of recruitment required to satisfy the loss from 
poor adherence. No participants demonstrated discontinuation. 
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Table 7; Adherence rates for submissions and missing data 
ID Submissions Proportion of missing data 
AA 33.3% 22.2% 
AM 100.0% 100.0% 
AI 100.0% 100.0% 
BP 55.6% 55.6% 
MS 66.7% 33.3% 
PR 88.9% 88.9% 
RW 77.8% 55.6% 
SB 66.7% 66.7% 
ST 88.9% 88.9% 
SM 77.8% 66.7% 
WT 55.6% 44.4% 
 
Retention strategies consisted predominantly of fortnightly telephone conversation 
in which the experimenter would discuss the financial behaviours since last submission, 
the experimenter would also remind the participant for the diary (and/or tool) submission. 
This was seemly for the pilot but in a scaled-up fully powered randomised-controlled 
trial, is unmanageable, and will likely require secondary and tertiary researchers to be 
costed in. Furthermore the cost of each phone call would be an addition purchase to be 
made which would require a set script.  
5.5.2.15 Affordability  
The largest costs incurred from the current intervention design stipulates that researcher 
and tool access are the greatest costs, the costs for the retention strategies as currently in-
play would require costings for: 
• Phone line/mobile 
• Phone call duration 
• Researcher time 
This would require a script to constrain the durations and standardize across 
participants, but to implement on the scale of a powered randomised-controlled trial 
would require multiple researchers which would be very expensive. 
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Furthermore the intervention requirements make a spreadsheet based software 
essential, which could make technological issues regarding software access. If 
participants do not have access to such software, providing access may prove difficult as 
licenses need to be purchased which will incur additional costs. Especially at the scaled-
up level this could likely  be inconceivable to implement. The software usage mandates 
that files are stored locally on the participants computer or laptop, and as such make 
demands that participants are then responsible to submit the data. As seen above in 
adherence, loss of data is likely and therefore a better data collected system is required. 
5.5.2.16 Safety/Side-effects 
The data reported on the diaries was the only financial data collected, when conversing 
with participants in regards to any additional pieces of data, participants were extremely 
reluctant to provide any additional data through screenshots or bank statements. As such 
it is difficult to state any issues regarding side-effects of safety of the interventions. 
5.5.2.17 Equity 
As the sample size is small it is impossible to partition this into smaller populations to 
make comments pertaining to differential effects across populations. As such there are 
no comments to be made regarding equity. 
5.6 Modifications to Interventions 
These results were fed back into the intervention to inform the intervention process to 
deliver a more acceptable and practical intervention and translate these modifications into 
the intervention. 
5.6.1.1 Problem solving in Habit-Based intervention 
To diminish the feelings of responsibility, the intervention process took to separating 
purchases made in the last 30 days. Once a list was constructed participants were then 
asked to rate them by frequency and how pleasurable the purchase felt. If the participants 
were unable to identify pleasurableness, then they selected the most frequent purchase 
decision.  
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5.6.1.2 Interventions used in RCT 
Many participants were put off by the Checking intervention and did not see the value of 
the intervention, placing a much higher weight on reducing consumption or generating 
savings. As such there was much disinterest regarding the Checking intervention and 
participants were not overly motivated to continue further in this group, nor recommend 
this to others. As such, the Checking intervention was dropped, leaving two intervention 
groups, the Substitution and the Planning intervention.  
This provided an interesting case in which two interventions were used that 
opposed from distinct structural processes; one using a top-down goal-directed manner 
(Planning intervention), whilst the other used a bottom-up habit-based system 
(Substitution intervention). As such, these were renamed to the Goal-Setting intervention 
and Habit-Based intervention respectively. This was done to represent how these 
interventions map onto an axis of goal-directed to habitual actions, where these 
interventions sought the same outcome through opposing processes.  
5.6.1.3 Use and submission of the behavioural tools 
The submission and use of the credit-card sleeve did not produce any difficulties and the 
sleeves were retained till the end of the study, however to ensure constant access, an 
electronic copy of the sleeve will be uploaded online to a study website and sent to each 
participants in the Habit-Based intervention once per week. 
 Those in the Goal-Setting group needed to send each saved file every month to 
the experimenter. This would diminish the data collection as participants would likely 
not submit due to forgetting or the required effort, therefore, an automated version was 
required. This was placed on the Warwick Business School’s servers. The web-based 
expense tracker (see Figure 15) was designed in a similar way as the original with a few 
modifications. Firstly, the online version used an autosave feature which saved any 
changes onto the Warwick Business School servers. Secondly, by using an online 
platform, participants could create their own accounts and passwords, which gave them 
ownership of the tool and provided secure storage and confidentiality. Thirdly, only select 
boxes would require input, reducing the chances of participants interfering with the tool. 
Finally, by making the tool online, this generates a web address, which can be sent out to 
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all participants in the Goal-Setting group and provides direct access to the tool by one 
click through an automated email. 
Figure 15; Updated version of the web-based expense tracker. 
 
 
5.6.1.4 Frequency of contacting participants 
Contacting participant by telephone call was an sub-optimal solution, and was wholly 
impractical in terms of time and monetary considerations. This would require at least 
another two additional researchers which would far too costly to budget for. Therefore 
more automated processes should be considered. 
 The trial uses automatically generated e-mail system to generate and send emails 
as behavioural prompts and retention devices. This was done to minimise participants 
time demands in the intervention, and to provide a tool in which direct contact was 
accessible. 
 Emails were sent every Wednesday at 16:00 (local time), this was because this 
period was free for all participants as dictated by University scheduling. The Control 
group were sent an email to ask if they had any issues or concerns and to contact the 
research team. The Habit-Based intervention and Goal-Setting intervention groups were 
sent prompts to remind participants to use their behavioural tools.  
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Those in the Habit-Based intervention were provided with a link to the credit-card 
sleeve to print off, in addition to a reminder to use the tool. This was to ensure that 
participants had access to the credit-card sleeve to document and tally substitutions.  
Those in the Goal-Setting intervention were given a direct link to the web-based 
expense tracker. The direct link provided in the email reduced the time and effort required 
to navigate to the behavioural tool, this increases the probability of participants utilising 
the tool and increasing the effects of the intervention. 
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 SAVINGS Trial  
 
SUMMARY 
• Pre-post differences were calculated through a fixed-effects linear regression. 
• Differences in monthly savings were conducted controlling for income as a 
predictor, in addition to using savings ratios or propensity scores which divided 
total monthly savings by income.  
• Significant intervention effects were exhibited in all but one financial domain 
of Account Balances.  
• Treatment effects significantly reduced monetary consumption whilst 
controlling for income in both groups. 
• Treatment effects significantly improved monetary savings whilst controlling 
for income in Goal-Setting group in monetary savings. 
• Treatment effects significantly improved account balances whilst controlling 
for income in both groups. 
• Tool usage did not exhibit significant effects a main-effect in consumption or 
monetary savings, but does in Account Balances.  
• Goal-Setting groups outperformed Habit-Based treatment effects in all but one 
domain of savings ratios in account balances. 
• Fidelity results for the Goal-Setting group were favourable, but the goals were 
usually set too high for the participants and many struggled to attain their goals, 
despite saving considerable amounts. 
• Those in the Habit-Based group exhibited a tendency to substitute behaviours 
rather than purchase choices within a defined context. This conceptual 
difference is likely to be one of the major factors why this group did not exhibit 
significantly different results from the Control group. 
• The intervention was reasonable well received, and many participants 
identified the intervention did make them reconsider their purchase decisions, 
however several participants noted the effort sometimes would demotivate 
them to implement the intervention.  
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6.1 Background 
This RCT, “The SAVINGS Trial”, uses two opposing interventions through distinctive 
behavioural processes to help motivate individuals to reduce their monetary consumption 
and improve savings. This was designed through formative research and feasibility work 
that led to the interventions (described below) being executed in a multi-site randomised-
controlled trial.  
6.2 Aims 
1. Test the efficacy of behavioural interventions to improve financial capability 
2. Reduce monetary consumption 
3. Improve monetary savings and propensity to save 
6.3 Design 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions; a Habit-Based 
intervention, a Goal-Setting intervention or a Control condition. Randomisation occurred 
based on a blocking protocol, randomly allocating participants within each block to 
reduce allocation bias. Participants were randomly allocated in a 1:1:1 ratio. 
6.4 Duration 
The intervention period lasted 12 weeks for each participant. This duration was based 
upon research in habit formation, which demonstrated that a median time of 66-90 days 
was required to form automaticity of complex behaviours (Lally et al., 2010). In addition, 
the Habit-Based intervention required a high frequency of substitution consumption to 
generate savings. The additional 24 days was utilized to provide a temporal buffer to help 
generate significant differences. 
6.5 Power calculation 
The study was powered based upon a comparison of habit and goal-setting conditions. 
To estimate an effect size, a review of literature on studies of habit formation yielded an 
expected effect size of d = .45 after four weeks, and d = .54 after eight months (Judah et 
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al., 2013; Phillipa Lally et al., 2010; Lally & Gardner, 2013). This effect size is 
comparable to effect sizes construed from implementation intentions and goal-setting. 
For example, one meta-analysis demonstrated an effect size of d = .36 (Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006); whilst meta-analyses of goal-setting research with feedback has 
exhibited an effect size of d = .63 (Neubert, 1998). Therefore the following parameters 
were fed into the power calculation: a = .05, b = .80; an estimated effect size of d = .52. 
This demonstrated a requirement of a minimum of 180 participants in a 1:1:1 allocation 
ratio. Assumptions of attrition were yielded at 25% based upon past research of 
randomised-controlled trials (Dumville, Torgerson, & Hewitt, 2006; Wood, White, & 
Thompson, 2004). This increased the sample size required to 225 participants in total. 
Power calculations were run using G*Power, a statistical power analysis software (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
6.6 Method 
The randomised-controlled trial was run based on the MRC Complex intervention 
framework (Campbell et al., 2000; Craig et al., 2008).  The trial was ran using university 
students from the University of Warwick (UK) and Monash University. Participants were 
recruited using the SONA system, an online platform to recruit individuals for 
participation in research. 
 Sample 
The sample consisted of University students, the main reasons for this are that university 
students are very easy to recruit into the trial, given the use of recruitment platforms 
already present at most universities. Secondly, the costs of running a student-based study 
is much cheaper than a field-experiment with adult population as the student study would 
only require costs of recruitment, whilst the adult population would require a secondary 
facet of collaborating with and training service providers to administer the intervention. 
This would require further time and expenses. 
 The student population although seemingly may appear to differentiate 
financially from the general population of the UK, do illustrate barriers in financial 
capability, as identified by a recent study by the Money Advice Service (Money Advice 
Service, 2018). Specifically, the Money Advice Service Study found that 20% of students 
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find themselves frequently overdrawn, and 40% have gone past their overdraft limit or 
into an unplanned overdraft. The study further found that while 77% of students had at 
least a saving account, many no savings at all (31%). These insights demonstrate that the 
student populations do exhibit the same issues as in the general population in regards to 
making-ends-meet and planning ahead, as such, this creates a platform to run the trial 
through a more efficient route.  
 It is difficult to establish how generalisable to sample population is to the wider 
world, as the make-up of financial resources as distributed within the student population 
may indeed be different to that of the working-age population. However, the effects of 
the intervention should still hold as students are more likely to have no savings, 31% 
(Money Advice Service, 2018) than the general working age population,  6.29% (Money 
Advice Service, 2016). It is likely that the effects may differ for the general population 
than what is presented in this thesis, due to the difference of prevalence of sub-optimal 
financial capability amongst the student and general populations. This would likely mean 
that the effects may still be generalisable but the effects will reduce as one moves towards 
a population with greater prevalence of optimal financial capability. 
 Inclusion and Exclusion criteria 
The students included in the trial had to fulfil the following criteria: 
• Full-time student 
• Proficient in English 
• Own a credit or debit card 
• No neurological disabilities 
• No learning difficulties 
• Normal/corrected-to-normal vision 
 Control Condition  
A separate control condition was utilized as a reference for the comparison of the Habit-
Based and Goal-Setting intervention. The Control group did not take part in any active 
behaviour change techniques, and instead continued their behaviour as normal. They 
submitted their transaction histories at the end of their pathway, at the same time as the 
intervention groups. 
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It is, expected that the simple inclusion of participants within the intervention is 
sufficient for some behaviour change to be observed, as suggested by the Hawthorne 
effect (McCarney et al., 2007), however, such outcomes are impossible to mitigate. The 
analysis accounts for this by estimating the effects of the intervention groups against the 
performance of reference Control group.  
 Habit-Based Intervention 
The Habit-Based intervention follows the implementation of the Substitution/Habit-
Based intervention previously described in Section 5.4.2. This intervention uses a 
bottom-up process to substitute impulsive, pleasurable consumptions for equivalent 
options at a reduced cost (for example, substitution of coffee for tea). Participants were 
given a credit-card sleeve as a behavioural tool to assist them in their substitution. This 
served as a reminder (when making the purchasing decision) and enabled the participant 
to record substitutions through self-monitoring. 
 Goal-Setting Intervention 
The Goal-Setting intervention follows the implementation of the Planning/Goal-Setting 
intervention previously described in Section 5.4.3. Participants set a savings goal 
(outcome goal) for the end of the intervention. This had to be a specific goal such as a 
product they wanted to purchase (i.e. Macbook pro, instead of “laptop”) or an activity 
(“Trip to New York” instead of “Holiday”) and the total costs involved. The participants 
then set an action goal, outlining the monthly amounts and the behavioural execution 
required to reach this outcome goal. Participants were provided access to a web-based 
expense tracker which was a behavioural tool, to document consumption and identify 
areas of overspending. The tool also displayed potential savings through the calculated 
difference of income and total expenses that participants used to update their action goals.  
 Participants 
397 participants were recruited through a multi-site RCT, with 210 participants recruited 
at the University of Warwick (UK), and 187 recruited from Monash University 
(Australia). Monash University were interested in collaborating in the trial and offered a 
platform to bolster the sample population, acting only as an additional site and 
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experimenter to recruit participants. The sample collected consisted of 260 female 
participants, 130 male participants and 7 of which preferred not to disclose their gender. 
The sample had a mean age of 21.03 years (SD = 2.64 years). Additional participants 
were recruited beyond the 225 mark (as per the a-priori power calculations) to account 
for the diminished statistical power of running a multi-site study. The breakdown of the 
sample population is given below in Table 8. 
Table 8; Sample breakdown at population and site levels. 
Variable Total 
Site 
Warwick Monash 
Mean Age (years) 21.03 20.51 21.48 
Age Standard Deviation (years) 2.64 1.41 3.31 
Female (n) 260 123 137 
Male (n) 130 85 45 
Undisclosed (n) 7 2 5 
 
 Measures 
There is a three-way trade-off between three issues: objectiveness, level of detail, as well 
as the time and complexities in collecting and analysing financial behaviour. For instance, 
one can use self-report measures, and ask participants to report their account balances or 
savings; but this can often be biased by problems such as social desirability and demand 
characteristics (Collins, 2013). An alternative therefore is to utilise transaction histories 
or bank statements, which offer a finer level of detail. However, it is likely participants 
have more than one account (for example, a separate current and savings account). This 
would require participants to submit multiple statements, however as identified in the 
feasibility study (see Section 5.5), participants’ submission rates were poor (M = 73.75% 
SD = 20.65%). In addition, the time required to tabulate and analyse multiple statements 
for each participant (for example this could translate into a  minimum of 794 statements 
if all participants had two accounts). This would take too long to analyse and detail, where 
many participants may only provide statements as downloaded in PDF formats. This 
would require all documents to be hand typed and tabulated. A much more efficient 
strategy, as employed in this study, is to utilise the most commonly used account, their 
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current account. This would then only require participants to only submit one single 
documentation, and would reduce the time taken to tabulate results. Of note, is that 
participants again still have more than one account and the current account may not truly 
reflect their savings. However, by examining changes in consumption, where in the 
intervention has participants seek to reduce monetary expenditure, monetary savings can 
be identified as the remaining disposable income. Furthermore account balances can also 
be used to monitor for stagnated savings.  
 Participants may move funds out of their accounts into a savings account, but as 
defined by the imposed definitions of credited (money into the account) and debited 
transactions (money leaving the account), any savings would be classified as a debit 
transactions, i.e. money going out of the account. This is of course, untrue, standing order 
and manual transfer do not denote monetary consumption, however by making this hard 
rule, participants transaction histories are codified into simple rules in which to analyse 
the accounts. By using a single transaction history, this is potentially the best three-way 
trade-off between objective data, level of detail and the time and complexities in 
collecting and analysing the data.  
6.6.7.1 Outcome measures definitions and specifications 
The main aim of the trial was the change in financial behaviours. This was examined in 
two ways, firstly examined through the raw differences of an outcome measure over time. 
Secondly, looking at the savings ratio, which denote propensity to save. Calculation of 
the savings ratio (also referred to as a propensity score) serves as an alternative 
specification which indicates the propensity to save as a function of income which was 
taken as the function below, from the 1st to nth month: 
 Savings	Ratio = 	∑ Savings./.01 ∑ Income./.016  
 
For each area, raw differences and savings ratio, there are three domains of interest: 
monetary consumption, savings and account balances. Monetary consumption is of 
interest as the aim of the intervention was to reduce consumption through the use of 
behavioural change techniques. This reduction of consumption would therefore cause an 
increase in the amount of disposable income, which are termed here as monetary savings. 
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As monetary savings may be stagnated within the accounts, account balances were also 
subject to inquiry to ascertain if any trickledown effect is exhibited into account balances. 
The analysis was conducted using pre-post differences between the first month and the 
last month (Month3 – Month1). Looking at the raw differences and savings ratios in 
consumption, savings and account balances respectively. A month consisted of 28 days, 
starting from their enrolment day. This offset was to ensure that there was an equal 
amount of data from all participants, where a high proportion were not recruited into the 
trial at the start of a month. 
 Consumption was measured through the analysis of monetary expenditure leaving 
the account (defined here as debited transactions). Of note, however, is the likelihood 
that consumption is tied to income, where a larger income is likely to lead to higher 
consumption and a reduction in income over time could account for the reduction in 
consumption. Therefore, to account for any variation in consumption, income was 
included as an additional predictor. Consumption was calculated as the total expenditure 
from the account in each month. Here, decreases in consumption over time would be 
denoted through a negative sign, i.e. a decrease in consumption. 
Monetary savings was defined as the monthly savings yielded from the account 
transactions, from the 1st to nth month, specifically: 
 
Saving = 	7Income./.01 −7Consumption./.01  
 
Monetary savings was denoted as the difference in total income and total consumption of 
that month. Thereby, negative savings describe over-consumption or debt, whilst positive 
values indicate a surplus. Here, increased savings over time would be denoted through a 
positive sign, i.e. an increase in savings. Account balances were taken as their financial 
values, averaged over monthly windows. Positive values of account balances describe 
over-consumption or debt, whilst positive values indicate a surplus or savings. Here, 
increased savings over time would be denoted through a positive sign, i.e. an increase in 
savings. 
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6.7 Hypotheses 
[i] Group effect 
The treatment should cause a greater reduction in monetary consumption with increased 
savings and account balances, in comparison to the Control group. 
 
[ii] Tool usage  
Tool usage should predict a decrease in consumption, and show significant improvements 
in savings and account balances. 
 
[iv] Group:Tool interaction  
The interaction effect (group allocation in combination with tool usage) should predict 
reduced consumption, with significant improvements in savings and account balances.  
6.8 Procedure 
1. Participants were recruited through the University’s online recruitment platform at 
both Monash and Warwick University respectively. 
2. Participants were asked to read through the Participant Information Sheet, which 
detailed the structure, and gave a brief overview of the interventions. Once finished, 
participants were asked to sign and date a consent form.  
3. Participants completed a demographics questionnaire to provide details about the 
sample population, through the Qualtrics platform, a web-based survey system. 
Participants were requested to provide their email addresses (this was mandatory as 
all future contact was through emails from the research team to participants). 
Participants could contact the researchers directly via email or mobile, however all 
contact from the research team to participants was through email. 
4. Once participants had completed the questionnaire, they were put through a 
randomisation protocol with blocking (where block sizes varied between 3 to 12), in 
a 1:1:1 allocation ratio. 
5. Participants were then given a break-down of the group they were assigned to and its 
requirements. 
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6. Those in the Control group were not asked to change their behaviour.  
7. Those in the Habit-Based group were asked to complete a five minute task to help 
generate the behavioural substitution. 
a) Participants were asked to identify recent purchases and rank them by 
pleasurableness and frequency.   
b) The system then selected the highest ranking cases in both domains, and asked 
participants to select one of these options. 
c) Once selected, participants were asked to identify an alternative product to 
substitute this with. All participants were required to check this with the 
experimenter before continuing. Those having difficulty identifying a 
substitution were asked to generate options with the experimenter. 
d) Once participants had set their substitution, they were provided with a credit 
card sleeve (along with a spare), a plastic clear wallet and a sharpie. The 
plastic wallet was given to protect the card, and the sharpie to ensure 
participants could mark the wallet or sleeve. Participants were asked to tally 
for each successful substitution. 
e) Participants would then complete the credit-card sleeve by specifying the 
context, the pleasurable previous purchase and the substitution.  
f) Once completed, participants then made an implementation intention to 
execute their behavioural substitution in the specified contexts.  
g) Finally, participants informed that they would be sent a weekly email 
reminder and a link to print a new copy of the credit-card sleeve. 
8. Those in the Goal-Setting group were asked to complete a five minute task to set up 
their goal-setting tool. 
a) Participants were asked to use their university ID numbers as their login keys. 
This was put through a SHA256-HASH algorithm to compute a 64 character 
string, which was stored on the Warwick Business School servers. The raw 
 113 
 
university ID numbers were immediately deleted from memory. This was to 
ensure maximum security and confidentiality. 
b) Participants were first asked to set up a password. On completion of the 
demographic questionnaire, the participants received an automated email with 
a password token link. The password token would then store the selected 
password through another SHA256-HASH to produce a converted 64-
character string. Only the 64-length string converted password was stored 
with the corresponding converted ID on the Warwick Business School 
servers. 
c) Participants were then able to log onto their account. They were then asked to 
set up their detailed outcome goal by identifying a purchase to make at the 
end of the 84 days. They were required to input details (name and price) of 
the goal, being as specific as possible.  
d) Participants then found an image of the goal to store on the expense tracker 
online. 
e) Participants were then asked to input their income amounts. For those on 
student loans in the UK, or receiving financial support from guardians or 
parents, income was calculated as their monthly budgeted amount across that 
term. 
f) Participants were then asked to input their last month’s expenses to gain an 
understanding of how the tool works and information was provided.  
g) Finally, participants were asked to sign into the goal-setting tool at least once 
a week, and were informed that they would be sent a weekly email reminder 
with a link to the web-based expense tracker. 
9. Once participants completed the breakdown of their allocated group, they were asked 
to sign a behavioural contract to submit their transaction histories of the intervention 
period, including account balances before and after the intervention. The participants 
were asked to provide two signed and dated copies with their mobile phone numbers 
written on each one. One of the copies was retained by the research team, and the 
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second by the participant. Only anonymised transaction histories were accepted and 
participants were told that if any personal information was present, the email copy 
was destroyed and the participant would be asked to re-submit with these details 
removed. 
10. Participants at the University of Warwick were paid £5 for being part of the study, 
whilst  participants at Monash University were provided with one course credit.  
11. Participants in the intervention groups were sent weekly reminder emails with a link 
to the web-based goal-setting tool (Goal-Setting group), or to a printable copy of the 
credit-card sleeves (Habit-Based group). 
12. At the end of the intervention period, each participant received an email with detailed 
guides on how to download transaction histories for their required time period. These 
guides highlighted how to obtain the above information for the most common high-
street banks in the United Kingdom and Australia.  
13. Participants at the University of Warwick who remained until the end of the study 
and submitted their transaction histories as required, were entered into 15 lotteries 
with a chance to win £25, whilst those at Monash University were provided with an 
additional course credit.  
14. Once participants had finished the study and provided their transaction histories, they 
were individually thanked by the research team for their efforts. They were each given 
the opportunity to ask any further questions or request any details about their own 
performance. 
15. Those who failed to provide transaction histories were given a reminder email one 
week later. This was escalated to a text message the following week, and 
subsequently to a phone call. Following this, no further contact was made. 
6.9 Results 
 Summary 
The SAVINGS Trial used two interventions in an aim to reduce monetary consumption, 
increase monthly savings and account balances across participants. This was calculated 
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through raw difference scores as well as savings ratio. As expected, the control group 
performed the worst when comparing all results, with little to no change in monetary 
consumption over time, and a significant decrease in savings and account balances. When 
comparing raw differences, the Goal-Setting group showed a significant decrease in 
consumption, with a significant increase in savings and account balances. The Habit-
Based group also showed a significant increase in account balances, however, there was 
no statistically significant change in consumption or savings when compared to the 
Control group. This may be due to account balances will carry reduce variability due to 
this measure reflecting net changes, whilst consumption and savings level data is more 
variable and therefore requires greater statistical power to detect an effect.   
When comparing savings ratios, the Goal-Setting group showed an increase in 
savings and no significant difference in account balances. The Habit-Based group showed 
no significant differences in any of these values. These results highlight how behavioural 
insights can be utilised to promote goal-directed outcomes to improve financial 
behaviours. 
 Attrition 
Attrition rates were unequal between sites, with the Monash site experiencing better 
retention than Warwick. At Monash, 47 participants were lost to attrition at a rate of 
25.13%, whilst at Warwick, 126 participants were lost to attrition at a rate of 58%. This 
unequal attrition rate can be attributed to various factors:  
1. Participants at Monash were recruited in exchange for course credit and were 
given an additional course credit to finish the trial and submit their anonymised 
transaction history. The participants received one extra course credit in this study, 
when compared to other studies typically run at Monash, making the study more 
desirable to participate in. This could have contributed to the lower attrition rate.  
2. The experimenter at Monash was also the course co-ordinator, ascribing a known 
relationship for participants which could have translated into trust. In contrast, 
there was no prior relationship or knowledge with the experimenter at Warwick. 
This could also partly account for the higher attrition rate at Warwick compared 
to Monash.  
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3. Those at Warwick were paid for their time (max pay-out £27), and the high pay-
out may have alluded to a high degree of work (Promberger & Marteau, 2013) 
resulting in a ’crowding out effect’ of intrinsic motivation. It is likely that the 
intrinsic motivation to continue with the study diminished despite the retention 
strategies put in place.  
4. It is also likely that those at Warwick were not used to long studies that occurred 
over months and as such found it difficult to keep up with the requirements of the 
study.  
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Figure 16; Trial flow of the SAVINGS Trial 
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The remaining sample consists of a majority of Monash participants with a smaller 
representation of Warwick students (Table 9). The full flow of the trial is illustrated in 
Figure 16, which details the randomization, attrition and exclusion of participants in the 
study. The attrition was equal across groups suggesting there was no bias in drop-out 
caused by the intervention effects at Monash, c2 (2) = .280, p = .869; or at Warwick, c2 
(2) = 2.850, p = .241. 
Table 9: Retained sample size in sites across sites 
Site Group N 
Monash 
Control 50 
Goal-Setting 46 
Habit-Based 44 
Warwick 
Control 35 
Goal-Setting 21 
Habit-Based 28 
6.9.2.1 Conversion of currency  
To collate the results into one comprehensive dataset, participant transaction amounts 
and account balances from Monash were converted from Australian dollars (AUD) to 
British sterling pounds (GBP). This was conducted using daily historical exchange rates 
archived on the Bank of England website.  
6.9.2.2 Model Specification 
To depict the impact of the policy on monetary variables, a fixed-effects OLS model was 
used to predict monetary outcomes as specified below: 
<. = 	=> +	=1@. +	=AB. + =CD. +	=E	B ∗ D. + G. 
Where Yi is the outcome variable, Ci is a vector of control variables (such as age, sex, 
statement length and income), Ii denotes the frequency of usage of behavioural tools 
provided to those in the intervention groups. For the Goal-Setting group this denotes the 
number of log-ins into the web-based expense tracker; whilst for the Habit-Based group, 
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this represents each recorded substitution. Some participants did not return the tools and 
as such were left as missing. To produce more robust estimators, missing data in tool 
count was left intentionally blank. The prime reason is that by denoting missing tool 
counts as 0, whilst there a high probability that this missing value may should take a value 
other than 0, thereby biasing the regression coefficient. In other words, missing tool use 
data coded as 0 would bias the regression coefficient as the participant would have used 
the tool but this usage cannot be identified or proven.  
The regression analysis follow a hierarchical regression, where the first model 
examines control variables, the second investigates tool use, the third examines the 
treatment effect of intervention allocation, and finally a fourth model investigates the 
interaction effect of tool use and intervention allocation. A result of the model 
specification due to tools only being provided to those in the intervention conditions, 
means that the main effects cannot be included in the fourth model. 
Ai is a vector of factor identifiers that signify intervention allocation across sites. 
The model seeks to predict changes in monetary consumption, savings and account 
balances across groups controlling for site and income effects. To control for income, 
income was controlled in two ways. The first, as a predictor of differences between month 
three and month one; and secondly by using income within the dependent variable with 
savings as a fraction of income. This method is to reduce the bias from any omitted 
variance explained by income, where reduction in income would lead to reduction in 
consumption or savings.  
Tool usage was only recorded by those who submitted records of usage. As such, 
individuals who were randomized to the intervention groups but did not provide usage 
data were excluded from the analysis completely, owing to a high degree of uncertainty. 
Not knowing if the participant had used the tool made the prediction of missing cases 
unreliable.  
Regressions were ran using R, with the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2018), to control for heterogeneity, White’s estimates of robust standard errors 
(White, 1980) were calculated using the ‘HC1’ command in the vcovHC function under 
the sandwich package (Zeileis & Lumley, 2017). 
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6.10 Exploratory analysis  
 Descriptive Statistics  
The sample population (after attrition) consisted of an average age of 20.594 years (SD 
= 3.84), 67 males and 146 females (4 reported did not disclose their gender). Age was 
equally split across groups, F(2,214) = .60, p =.550, gender, F(2,214) =.60, p =0.55 and 
site, F(16,200) = .69, p = .80. 
 Transaction Histories  
Across the 84 days, a total of 29,842 transactions (credit and debit) were completed, with 
an average of 95.57 (SD = 84.04) transactions per participant. The average transaction 
costed £1.40 (SD = £552.50). The average debit (consumption) from the accounts was 
£63.12 (SD = £415.64), with 23,170 debit transactions (77.64%), with a median 
transaction of £9.68. The average credit (income) into the accounts was £199.22 (SD = 
£847.36), with 6,672 credit transactions (22.36%), with a median transaction of £29.12. 
 Assumptions  
To explore the effects of the intervention, monetary consumption, savings and account 
balances have been analysed. These measures were analysed in two key ways: firstly, as 
raw difference scores, and secondly, in propensity, as a relative factor of income.   
 Account balances were analysed in the same manner, but by using the end of 
month amounts. The monthly amounts were constructed as 30-day intervals from 
enrolment. This was to maintain consistency across participants, as recruitment was 
spread out across 2017 in the Warwick site, but was compacted within 15 days at the 
Monash site. Difference scores across all three outcome measures (consumption, savings 
and account balances) were calculated for each participant based upon the length of their 
statements as bounded by the dates of enrolment, such that n ≤ 84. This was because 
some participants only submitted financial data for dates within the intervention. 
Outliers were identified through z-scores, with any outliers being winsorized at 
the 95% level (Tukey & McLaughlin, 1963). This was conducted using the psych 
package on R (Revelle, 2018) . The assumption of homogeneity of variance was tested 
using Levene’s test through the car package on R (Fox, Weisberg, & Price, 2018).  
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 Income over time 
A major assumption of the intervention is that income does not vary. The interventions 
work by reducing consumption and thereby increasing levels of savings. Fluctuations in 
income could also drive consumption behaviour and consequently, savings behaviour. 
The intervention therefore, requires income to remain equal across groups and across 
time. This was tested through a repeated-measures ANOVA using SPSS v24, with total 
income as a dependent variable across the three months, with group and site as between-
subject effects and age, sex and statement length as covariates. Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity demonstrated an unequal covariance matrix, W(2) = .91, p = .000, as such 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used. The model demonstrated no significant 
differences over time, F(1.83, 380.19) = .15, p = .85, or time*group interaction, F(3.66, 
380.19) = .98, p = .41; or time*site interaction, F(1.828, 380.19) = .25, p = .76; or the 
three way interaction of time*group*site, F(3.66, 380.19) = .914, p = .45. These results 
support the assumptions of income remaining relatively stable over time and between 
groups. However there were significant differences in income between sites, F(1, 208) = 
14.92, p = .000, with the Monash site demonstrating a higher income on average (M = 
£2484.72, SE = £197.80) than the Warwick site (M = £1146.77, SE = £271.678). As such, 
site effects were controlled for to remove the effects of such income inequality.  
 Outcome measures 
When comparing outcome variables across groups, the inspection revealed homogeneity 
of variance across groups, for differences between month 3 and month 1 in monetary 
consumption, F(2,214) = 1.29, p = .28; as well as for the change in propensity to consume 
for month 3 to month 1, F(2, 214) = 1.67, p = .19. Homogeneity of variance was observed 
across groups for change in monetary savings between month 3 and month 1, F(2,214) = 
1.34, p = .26; as well as for propensity to save, F(2,187) = .45, p = .64. Change in income 
was also examined, which demonstrated homogeneity of variance across groups, 
F(2,214) = 2.66, p = .07. Variance in account balances were shown to be homogenous 
across groups, F(2,160) = 1.04, p = .35; as well as for the propensity to save, F(2,147) = 
1.28, p = .88. 
When comparing outcome variables across sites, the inspection revealed 
homogeneity of variance for differences between month 3 and month 1 in monetary 
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savings, F(1,215) = 1.08, p = .30; but not for monetary consumption, F(1,215) = 6.18, p 
= .014. There was however significant heterogeneity of variance in propensity to save for 
monthly savings, F(2,188) = 7.67, p = .006; and for propensity to save as exhibited in 
account balances, F(2,148) = 34.84, p < .0001. 
Inspection of the distribution of outcome measures across participants identified 
a symmetrical, leptokurtic distribution for all measures (Table 10). This observation is an 
expected artefact in distributions of performance and income (Mandelbrot, 1960). This 
symmetrical but leptokurtic distribution is explained by a model often seen in financial 
datasets described as the pareto distribution (Drăgulescu & Yakovenko, 2001; 
Mandelbrot, 1960; Singh & Maddala, 2008). The pareto distribution refers to the 
distribution of production/performance across a population, where there is large 
inequality in a given measure or performance/production (in this case consumption and 
savings). In this study, a large proportion of participants held onto small amounts of 
savings and consumption, whilst a small minority hold onto most of the wealth or 
consumption rates. 
Table 10: Distribution characteristics by measure 
 Month Difference 
 
Consumption Balance Saving 
3-1 3-2 2-1 3-1 3-2 2-1 3-1 3-2 2-1 
Kurtosis 4.518 4.12 5.57 3.37 3.854 2.562 3.354 4.235 3.745 
 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Skewness -0.458 0.292 -1.631 -0.764 1.196 -0.243 0.372 1.195 -0.388 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
 
6.11 Model Results 
Of all the 224 participants that had finished the study, only 217 submitted sufficient 
financial data that could be used within the analysis, as these seven participants provided 
incomplete statements that did not meet all twelve weeks of the intervention duration. 
Tool use was recorded as a frequency count, with any participants who had failed to 
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return a tool recorded as missing data, and therefore left as missing. This was to avoid 
assumptions in regard of any tool use that would be otherwise erroneous. This reduced 
the sample space of the regression models when including tool use. 
 Raw Differences 
6.11.1.1 Monetary Consumption 
The multi-site behavioural change intervention demonstrated significant reduction in 
total monthly monetary consumption between month three and month one. 
Result 1. (a) No effect of tool-usage on change in monetary consumption 
For the intervention groups, tool-use was not a significant predictor of change in 
monetary consumption (b = -.5486, p (one-tailed) = .317).  
Result 1. (b) Goal-Setting group showed significant reduction in change of monetary 
consumption compared to the Control group, but Habit-Based group did not 
Compared to the Control group, the Goal-Setting group showed a significant mean 
reduction (albeit at the 10%) in monetary consumption of £460.66 (b = -460.65, p (one-
tailed) = .053), and the Habit-based group showed a mean reduction (albeit insignificant) 
in monetary consumption at £348.60 (b = -384.59, p (one-tailed) = .13). These results 
were obtained whilst controlling for change in income, change in transactions age, sex 
and the number of days included in the statement.  
 Comparing the coefficients for Goal-Setting and Habit-Based allocation under a 
two-tailed test, the analysis demonstrated no significant difference between the groups, 
t(129) = .17, p (two-tailed) = 0.86. As such, there is insignificant difference between the 
interventions for reduction in monetary consumption.  
 The results may have been worse for the Habit-Based group due to poor fidelity 
and implementation, where the parameters of the intervention were not executed properly 
by participants. It is possible that the way in which they executed their substitution was 
not what the intervention was actually designed for. For example, they may have sought 
to change between options that differ in contexts (i.e. bringing in lunch instead of buying 
lunch) rather than substituting options within a context (i.e. instead of a coffee, purchase 
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a tea). This distinction is important; substitution of behaviours as opposed to substitution 
of choices may have resulted in diminished effects, however, further examination would 
be required to investigate further.  
Result 1. (c) The interaction of intervention allocation and tool usage did not demonstrate 
significant reduction in change in monetary consumption 
An interaction of intervention allocation and tool usage demonstrated a reduction in 
monetary consumption for those in Habit-based group (b = -0.880, p (one-tailed) = .470) 
and the Goal-setting group (b = -22.52, p (one-tailed) = .22), however, this was not 
statistically significant. 
Mean tool use was significantly higher for the habit group (M = 12.25, SD = 9.08) 
than the Goal-Setting group (M = 7.33, SD = 5.83), as expressed through an independent 
t-test, t(44.984) = 2.77, p (one-tailed) = .008, d = .65. Considering the Habit-based tool 
(credit card sleeve) was more likely to be retained by the individual at any given point in 
time, this may have provided them a greater opportunity to utilise it. In comparison, the 
web-based expense tracker provided for the Goal-Setting group required access to a 
computer or mobile phone, and there is a chance participants only accessed this tool when 
prompted to do so via email. The standard error surrounding tool use in the Habit-Based 
group does signify a very high degree of variance. This may be the result of insufficient 
submissions from the Habit-Based group, in addition to the confounding effect of 
substituting behaviours. Due to the substitution of behaviours, the credit card tool may 
have been unable to act as a prompt or feedback device, as the substitution may not have 
involved an alternative (cheaper) purchase. 
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Table 11: Regression results on monetary consumption differences 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age 41.53 -30.60 43.19 -27.90 
 (59.61) (25.21) (58.92) (23.31) 
Sex 237.22 185.51 212.38 184.32 
 (296.36) (272.18) (297.82) (268.99) 
Days -33.85 -31.79 -32.53 -24.08 
 (21.42) (27.27) (21.32) (30.47) 
Income 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Transactions 17.591** 18.83 17.86* 19.20 
 (7.53) (12.06) (7.48) (11.92) 
Site 419.03 531.03* 387.71 509.11* 
 (260.15) (284.58) (256.14) (295.73) 
Tool  -5.49   
 
 (11.50)   
Goal   -460.65**  
 
  (284.09)  
Habit   -384.59  
 
  (341.51)  
Goal:Tool    -22.52 
 
   (29.27) 
Habit:Tool    0.88 
 
   (11.51) 
Intercept 1342.63 2675.77 1510.87 2053.16 
 (2117.35) (2396.72) (2052.35) (2606.55) 
R2 0.73 0.80 0.73 0.80 
N 217 92 217 92 
Robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* ,**,***, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
6.11.1.2 Monetary Savings (i.e. income – consumption) 
The multi-site behavioural change intervention demonstrated mixed effects in total 
monthly monetary savings between month three and month one. 
Result 2. (a) No effect of tool-usage in change in savings 
There was no effect of tool usage on monetary savings (b = 7.96, p (one-tailed)  =0.34). 
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Result 2. (b) Only one intervention group demonstrated improvement in change in 
savings 
Only the Goal-Setting group demonstrated a significant improvement in savings 
compared to the Control group (b = 521.43, p (one-tailed)  = .005). The Goal-Setting 
group generated an increase in £521.43 compared to the Control group over the three-
month intervention period. The Habit-Based group showed an increase of £251.32 over 
the three months, however this was not statistically significant (b = 251.33, p (one-tailed) 
= .11).  
 Comparing the coefficients for Goal-Setting and Habit-Based allocation under a 
two-tailed test, the results demonstrated no significant difference between the groups, 
t(129) =1.05, p (one-tailed)  = .30. This showed no significant difference between the 
treatment effects for improvement in savings. 
 Again, the Habit-Based group demonstrated weaker effects than the Goal-Setting 
group. This may have been due to poor implementation of the Habit-Based intervention. 
If participants were attempting to substitute behaviours entirely, it is likely that it would 
have been difficult to prompt or remind the behaviour, as they would not see their sleeve 
at the moment when at its most effective.  
Result 2. (c) The interaction of in intervention group allocation and tool usage 
demonstrated improvement in change in savings in only one intervention group 
Compared to the Control group there was a marginally significant effect of allocation and 
tool use in the interaction term for Goal-Setting but not for Habit-Based participants. 
Each tool usage in the Goal-Setting group generated an additional £36.18 savings with 
marginal significance (b = 36.18, p (one-tailed) = .09). However, the Habit-Based group 
demonstrated an insignificant decrease in savings for each increment of tool usage, (b = 
-2.58, p (one-tailed) = .39). This is likely a result of a diminished sample size, which 
further restricts statistical power, or potentially due to the use of substituting behaviour, 
limiting the use of the tools.  
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Table 12: Regression results on savings rates over time 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -15.39 37.24 -19.11 32.76 
 (-32.22) (22.91) (31.92) (20.66) 
Sex -151.75 -219.88 -124.93 -217.90 
 (194.52) (234.80) (191.82) (228.61) 
Days 20.84 28.44 16.83 15.67 
 (14.51) (21.74) (14.11) (21.96) 
Income 0.17*** 0.18** 0.17*** 0.19** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Transactions -13.07*** -13.52** -13.27*** -14.13* 
 (4.97) (7.12) (4.89) (7.16) 
Site -247.80 -521.43* -212.96 -485.13** 
 (183.98) (234.20) (179.27) (236.33) 
Tool  7.96   
  (9.71)   
Goal   550.93***  
   (213.12)  
Habit   251.33  
   (202.42)  
Goal:Tool    36.18* 
    (26.23) 
Habit:Tool    -2.58 
    (9.46) 
Intercept -1028.10 -2462.40 -923.49 -1431.10 
 (1368.40) (1918.10) (1307.67) (1893.10) 
R2 0.181 0.231 0.206 0.258 
N 217 92 217 92 
 
Robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* ,**,***, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
6.11.1.3 Account Balances 
The multi-site behavioural change intervention demonstrated significant effects in 
account balances over the trial period. Of the 217 participants, only 146 had sufficient 
account balance data to be utilised across the three months. 
Result 3. (a) No effect of tool-usage in change in account balances 
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There was a positive albeit insignificant main effect of tool usage on account balances 
(b = 7.12, p (one-tailed) = .15). 
Result 3. (b) Intervention groups showed significant reduction in change in account 
balance compared to the Control group. 
Compared to the Control group, there was a significant effect of intervention, with the 
Goal-Setting group showing a mean improvement in their account balances of £402.07 
(b = 402.07, p (one-tailed) = .004). The Habit-based group showed a significant mean 
improvement (at the 10% level) in their account balances of £217.11 compared to the 
Control group balances (b = 217.11, p (one-tailed) = .07) with control variables included 
in the model. This result is of interest, given the significance of only one intervention 
group at the consumption and savings level. This result is likely due to group variations 
in income and less variation across account balances. This also could be due to the fact 
that the sample size was reduced (to 146 participants) when compared to the total 
population of the study (n = 217) as a result of excluding participants who provided 
inadequate transaction histories.  
Comparing the coefficients for Goal-Setting and Habit-Based allocation under a 
two-tailed test, the resulting analysis demonstrated no significant difference between the 
groups, t(101) = .86, p (one-tailed) = .38. As such there is no significant difference 
between the treatment effects for change in account balances. 
Result 3. (c) The interaction of Goal-Setting group allocation and tool usage 
demonstrated improvement in change in account balances 
Compared to the Control group there was a  significant interaction between intervention 
group and tool use in the Goal-Setting group, which indicates a savings of £18.99 for 
each time Goal-Setting individuals accessed their tool (b = 18.99, p (one-tailed) = .045). 
There was no significance in the interaction between tool-use and Habit-based group 
allocation (b = -3.35, p (one-tailed) = .35).  This is likely a result of the use of substituting 
behaviour which has reduced the effects of the credit card sleeve as a prompt, thereby 
limiting the use of the tools. 
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Table 13: Regression results on account balances over time 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age 17.70 7.76 10.34 8.93 
 (26.72) (15.92) (26.33) (16.28) 
Sex -163.23 -208.46 -164.47 -206.17 
 (126.15) (171.55) (119.27) (168.44) 
Days -19.11 -55.43 -24.09 -59.71 
 (21.89) (39.32) (20.61) (38.58) 
Income 0.66*** 0.67* 0.71*** 0.64* 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.23) (0.38) 
Transactions -3.18 -2.38 -3.42 -2.45 
 (4.45) (4.14) (4.28) (4.14) 
Site 92.93 127.68 117.14 134.26 
 (139.59) (147.55) (136.79) (143.40) 
Tool  7.12   
 
 (6.91)   
Goal   402.07***  
 
  (151.51)  
Habit   217.11*  
 
  (147.34)  
Goal:Tool    18.99** 
 
   (11.04) 
Habit:Tool    -3.35 
 
   (8.65) 
Intercept 1344.20 4651.76 1694.67 4948.75 
 (1863.60) (3260.38) (1748.34) (3197.52) 
R2 0.136 0.122 0.180 0.161 
n 146 64 146 64 
 
Robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* ,**,***, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 Savings Ratio 
To account for income, an alternative specification is to use monetary savings as a 
fraction of income. This is also referred to as a propensity score, denoting the propensity 
to save or spend conditional on income (Leff, 1969). 
 This analysis was conducted only on two of the three domains; savings and 
account balances. The reason for this is because of the mathematical calculation of the 
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outcome variable where consumption and income produce reverse effects, as 
demonstrated below. 
 HIJKLMNKLOPQR = 	 KLOPQR − OPLNSQTUKPLKLOPQR = 1 −	OPLNSQTUKPLKLOPQR  
 
Savings rates were calculated as specified above in Section 6.6.7.1. The construction of 
the variable yielded extreme values, and these were caused by large negative monthly 
savings divided over extremely small monthly income. These calculations yielded 
extremely large values with a large variance (M = - 16.13, SD = 228.51). The values have 
a substantial range of 3524.11 (Min = -3099.07, Max = 425.04). Savings ratios for each 
month should predominantly lie between 0 and 1, however,  overspending leads to large 
negative values (as these values can exceed income). These cases of overspending can 
then lead to large difference scores (as such the mean score = -16.13). 
 To reduce the large variability in savings ratio, a cube root transformation is used 
to transform the data to reduce variance and construct robust estimators. Cube root 
transformations have been used in literature for income transformations (Cox, 2011; 
Mirowsky & Hu, 1996), where research has demonstrated that this method offers one of 
the best transformation of monetary data, particularly income (Schwartz, 1985). The cube 
root transformation was executed on both savings and account balances. 
6.11.2.1 Monetary Savings 
Propensity to save demonstrated a diminished effect that showed improvement but mixed 
differences. 27 participants were excluded from this analyses as their income was 0 for 
at least one month, creating incalculable savings ratios. 
Result 4. (a) Tool use was not a significant predictor on savings ratio 
Frequency of tool use was not significant, (b = - .01, p (one-tailed)  = . 56). This may be 
a result of the low submission rates, which caused lots of missing values, reducing the 
sample size. 
Result 4. (b) Goal-Setting group showed increased propensity to save, but not Habit-
Based group 
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Treatment effects of the Goal-Setting and Habit-based intervention demonstrated 
improvement in savings. The Goal-Setting group showing a significant improvement in 
savings in comparison to the Control group (b = .35, p (one-tailed)  = .048). The Habit-
based intervention also exhibited an positive difference in savings in comparison to the 
Control group (b = .017, p (one-tailed)  = .47), but this was insignificant. This is likely a 
result of poor implementation and does raise suspicions that participants enacted 
substitution of behaviour rather than substitution of options. This would diminish the 
results of the Habit-Based intervention as the likelihood of enacting an entirely different 
behaviour was not the design or purpose of the intervention. 
Result 4. (c) The interaction of treatment effect and tool usage demonstrated no 
significant improvement in savings 
There was no significant effect of an interaction between allocation to the Goal-Setting 
group and tool usage (b = .004, p (one-tailed)  = . 43); or for allocation to the Habit-Based 
intervention and tool usage (b = - .017, p (one-tailed)  = . 38).  
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Table 14: Regression results of monetary saving propensity differences 
  1 2 3 4 
Age 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.024) 
Sex -0.23 -0.42 -0.22 -0.419 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.17) (0.26) 
Days 0.04* 0.07 0.03 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Income 0.00008*** 0.00008** 0.00009*** 0.00008** 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) 
Transactions 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.01) (0.006) (0.001) 
Site 0.002 0.11 0.02 0.13 
 (0.228) (0.40) (0.23) (0.01) 
Tool  -0.01   
 
 (0.02)   
Goal   0.35**  
 
  (0.212)  
Habit   0.017  
 
  (0.214)  
Goal:Tool    0.004 
 
   (0.02) 
Habit:Tool    -0.02 
 
   (0.02) 
Intercept -2.92* -5.92 -2.68 -5.54 
  (0.02) (4.18) (1.71) (4.04) 
R2 0.072 0.120 0.088 0.128 
n 190 80 190 80 
Robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* ,**,***, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
6.11.2.2 Account Balance 
Propensity to save as given in account balances demonstrated little to no differences 
between groups. 
Result 4. (a) Tool use was a significant predictor on savings ratio  
Frequency of tool demonstrated a significant improvement in savings, (b = .051, p (one-
tailed)  = .016), consistent with the hypothesis of the effects of the behavioural tool. 
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Result 4. (b) Intervention groups showed no increased propensity to save in account 
balances 
Treatment effects of the Goal-Setting and Habit-based interventions showed insignificant 
findings. The Goal-Setting group showed a loss of the propensity to save in comparison 
to the Control group (b = - .21, p (one-tailed)  = .52), as well as the Habit-based 
intervention (b = .21, p (one-tailed)  = .25). This effect may be due to variance of account 
balances between individuals at the start of the intervention. For example, if one 
participant started with £2000 of savings in their account, and another started with £200 
of savings in their account, the differences may influence their tendency to spend or save. 
In addition, there was a significant effect across groups, when comparing raw differences 
in account balance. However, when income was taken into account, the treatment effects 
disappeared.  
Result 4. (c) The interaction of treatment effect and tool usage demonstrated 
improvement in savings. 
There was a positive effect on the interaction between the Goal-Setting group and tool 
usage, however, this was not significant (b = .04, p (one-tailed)  = .12). The Habit-Based 
intervention group and tool usage demonstrated a significant interaction effect (b = .06, 
p (one-tailed)  = .02), stipulating that higher counts of tool usage indicated higher savings 
ratios in the Habit-Based group. 
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Table 15: Propensity to save in account balances from month three to one 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
Sex 0.28 -0.39 0.28 -0.38 
 (0.28) (0.45) (0.27) (0.46) 
Days -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) 
Income -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transactions -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Site -0.83** -1.17 -0.81* -1.14 
 (0.41) (0.71) (0.41) (0.69) 
Tool  0.01   
 
 (0.04)   
Goal   0.36  
 
  (0.38)  
Habit   -0.09  
 
  (0.36)  
Goal:Tool    0.06** 
 
   (0.03) 
Habit:Tool    -0.03 
 
   (0.04) 
Intercept 0.86 2.78 1.38 3.90 
 (3.61) (8.93) (3.60) (8.60) 
R2 0.163 0.213 0.173 0.259 
n 146 64 146 64 
Robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses.  
* ,**,***, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
6.12 Overall Results & Trends 
To understand the effects of the intervention, including the secondary analysis, a holistic 
discussion is presented. Firstly, the trends are consistent with the hypotheses for one of 
the intervention groups across both savings and consumption, for raw differences and 
saving ratios (save for change of savings ratios in account balances). In raw differences, 
those in the treatment groups typically demonstrate success within their respective 
domains (monetary consumption, savings and account balances); however only Goal-
Setting group demonstrated consistent significance across most domains. 
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 Increased tool usage did not predict significant change in outcome measures 
(except in predicting savings ratio of account balances), suggesting that tool usage does 
not directly produce effects upon savings behaviour. This may be a likely result of lack 
of data. Of the full 217 participants, 133 participants were randomised to the treatment 
groups. Of this, only 93 participants returned their tools. The mean tool use was 9.04 
times (SD = 7.46 times) over the 84 days, which would suggest tools were used onces 
every  nine days; and this was unequally split between groups. There was a significant 
difference in tool usage, as described in Section 6.11.1.2. Mean tool use was significantly 
higher for the Habit-Based group (M = 12.25, SD = 9.08, i.e. once every seven days) than 
the Goal-Setting group (M = 7.33, SD = 5.83, i.e. once ever twelve days),  as expressed 
through an independent t-test, t(44.98) = 2.77, p (one-tailed) = .008, d = .65.  
 The lack of data back from participants and diminished frequency to which 
participants had used their tools suggest that it is likely there is a tool effect, but the study 
may just be underpowered to determine whether such an effect exists. These effects 
aggregated at the overall level in determining treatment effects, but the incremental 
differences were too small. It is possible that the design may not necessarily have fitted 
best with behavioural practices. This would perhaps suggest that “just-in-time” tools 
could prove to be more useful.  
 It is feasible that the frequency of tool-use required from the Habit-Based group 
is  larger than obtained under the parameters of this study. As the Habit-Based 
intervention uses a bottom-up approach of savings through reducing monetary 
consumption, the frequency with which one substitutes purchases, produces only small 
incremental effects. For instance suppose a cup of coffee costs £3.30, and a tea costs 
£1.20; the marginal reduction in substitution is £1.10. If this was a daily purchase, a week 
would produce a savings of £5.50; a month would yield £55, and the intervention period 
would yield £165. But this would require 84 tallies to produce such an effect. As such it 
is possible that the tallies represent only a partial number of the actual substitutions made. 
Furthermore it is plausible that participants were put off by recording each tally, not 
considering the intervention as incremental effects, but rather the total required usage. 
This expectation may have diminished the interest and thereby execution of the 
implementation in the Habit-Based group. 
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Figure 17: Raw difference in consumption, error bars represent s.e.m. 
 
*s.e.m denotes standard error of the mean 
 
 When evaluating treatment effects, estimated marginal means calculated using 
the average values for the control variables were used. Monetary consumption was shown 
to decrease for those in the treatment groups in comparison to the Control, however only 
the Goal-Setting intervention displayed significance over time compared to Control, as 
shown in Figure 17, which shows the reduction in consumption (i.e. the larger the bar, 
the greater the reduction in consumption). The Control group (M = -£156.06, SE = 
£208.80) exhibited a reduction in consumption over time, and this may be a due to a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, individuals who are generally more inclined to save, are more 
likely to volunteer for studies to increase monetary savings. As such, these individuals 
are already saving without further behaviour support. Secondly, it may be a result of 
demand characteristics, where individuals enrolled in a study to improve monetary 
savings then alter their behaviour to demonstrate improvements. 
 The Goal-Setting group and Habit-Based group both demonstrated a greater 
reduction in consumption than the Control group. The Goal-setting intervention exhibited 
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the greatest differences in consumption (M = -£663.64, SE = £262.79), and this was 
significantly greater than the difference for the Control group (p = .004). The Habit-based 
group also demonstrated a reduction in consumption (M = -£557.32, SE = £236.12), 
however such effects were not significantly greater than the Control group. This may be 
a result of a slightly underpowered study, considering the heavy attrition rates. This may 
also be as suggested earlier, the effects of substituting behaviours rather than substituting 
options.  
Figure 18: Raw difference in savings, error bars represent s.e.m. 
 
*s.e.m denotes standard error of the mean 
 
 In raw differences in savings, the group means demonstrate an identical trend as 
seen above. The Control group identified an overall loss (M = -£217.40, SE = £141.18), 
suggesting that typical saving techniques employed by the average student are not 
efficient in aiding saving behaviour. An additional factor may also be variance in monthly 
income. The deficit seen in the Control group and positive effects observed in both 
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treatment groups are illustrated in Figure 18 above. The Goal-setting group demonstrated 
the greatest change in savings (M = £286.10, SE = £177.70), which was statistically 
significant. The Habit-based group also demonstrated a positive change (M = £53.49, SE 
= £159.66), however, this was insignificant.  This could be due to the nature in which 
participants implemented the Habit-Based intervention, where many participants wanted 
to substitute behaviours entirely as opposed to swapping purchases bound within a given 
context. 
 
Figure 19: Raw difference in account balances, error bars represent s.e.m. 
 
*s.e.m denotes standard error of the mean 
 
When examining account balances, the Control group again exhibited a negative 
change (M = -£167.21, SE = £101.74), which aligns with the results seen across the other 
variables. The Goal-setting group (M = £93.05, SE = £120.36) and Habit-based group 
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both showed improvements in account balances (M = £44.48, SE = £107.71), with both 
groups demonstrating significantly greater change in comparison to the Control group. 
These differences can be seen in Figure 19 above. 
 The trends in raw differences describe uniformity between groups. The Goal-
Setting group performed the best across all domains, with the highest pre-post 
differences. The Habit-Based group performed better than the Control group, but not 
significantly across all three domains. Finally, the Control group performed the worst, 
with participants even showing a depreciation in their savings.  
 However, when examining the savings ratios, or the propensity to save, mixed 
effects are seen. Here, estimated marginal effects are calculated on the transformed 
dependent variable. This makes a direct interpretation of the coefficients difficult to 
make. As such, the main focus is on the significance and sign (i.e. direction) of the values. 
Treatment effects as a whole, demonstrated an increase in the propensity to save 
compared to the Control group. This difference was significant only within monthly 
savings for the Goal-Setting group. The savings ratios identify a loss in the propensity to 
save for the Control group (M = -17.6%, SE = 14.2%), and the Habit-Based group (M = 
-15.9%, SE = 15.2%). The Goal-Setting group, however, demonstrated a significant 
improvement in their saving ratios, increasing their propensity to save (M = 17.8%, SE = 
16.1%). These differences are shown in Figure 20. At the raw level, this would describe 
an improvement of 4.44 percentage points for the Goal-setting group compared to the 
Control group. These results are somewhat consistent with the results in savings rates. 
However, the trend in savings ratios demonstrate how income accounts for a large 
proportion of the explained variance in change in spending and saving behaviour. 
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Figure 20; Difference in saving ratios of savings, error bars represent s.e.m. 
 
 
*s.e.m denotes standard error of the mean 
 
The examination of the savings ratio expressed in account balances identifies null 
effects. All three groups exhibited reduction in savings ratios, suggesting the propensity 
to save expressed in their account balances reduced over time, i.e people in all three 
groups were saving less in proportion to their income. The Habit-Based group saw the 
highest levels of reduction (M = -70.2%, SE = 26.8%), followed closely by the Control 
group (M = 61.1%, SE = 25.9%); with the Goal-Setting intervention showing to moderate 
this reduction with the lowest depreciation scores (M = -25.0%, SE = 27.6%). 
 Both monetary savings and account balances were calculated through the same 
rolling window size of 30 days from enrolment. This effect may be due to the fact that 
the account balances vary for each individual already, in addition to the amount saved 
(calculated as the difference between income and consumption). These two scores added 
together produces the account balances; and this adds increased variance onto the already 
observed variance in raw differences in savings. This increased variance may have 
reduced the sensitivity to detect a group difference.  
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 The sample size for the analysis of savings ratio in account balances dropped to 
146 individuals. This reflected a drop of around twenty participants per group, and this 
reduction in sample size leads to a reduction in statistical power, which may explain the 
results. There is also an additional extraneous factor to consider - the commercial banks 
participants bank with, and whether certain individuals ascribe to specific companies. It 
is possible that the branding of a particular commercial bank coincides with a particular 
market audience, and this audience may be perhaps more or less financially stable. For 
example, international students may have opted more towards banks such as HSBC and 
Barclays in the UK. This self-selection process may cluster particular traits of financial 
behaviour to particular banks. For example, individuals who are more meticulous and 
check their account more regularly may align themselves with a perceptually similar 
branding. This is of particular interest, considering only certain banks provide customers 
with both their transaction histories and account balance data.  These effects may be small 
in nature, but additively can accumulate and contribute to such group differences.  
6.13 Intervention fidelity 
 Habit-Based group 
When examining the results in the habit intervention, a pattern is identified in the 
substitution of one option for another, where participants incorrectly specify substitutions 
with one behaviour for another. This connotation is important in habit theory in 
psychology, and under  computational assays, which both specify state specification (i.e 
the context in which a behaviour is executed) as being integral to habit formation. The 
implementation intention made by participants, in this case, may not coincide with the 
context in which participants are making the substitution. 35.71% of participants (N = 
35) had incorrectly specified their behavioural substitution; with four participants not 
putting a substitute, six participants choosing an option that is not applicable (e.g. Instead 
of ‘Wasting time at night’ in ‘the room’ I will buy ‘Learning to code in Python or 
exercising’). Of the remaining 30.95% (N = 26), all participants mentioned cooking at 
home or some variant instead of buying food out. For instance, instead of “Coffee” at 
“the morning” in “the coffee shop at Monash” I will “bring coffee from home”. Although 
this seems, at face value, an ideal substitution, the environmental triggers for buying 
coffee in the morning are separate and distinct from signals which code to bringing in 
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coffee from home in the morning. The intervention was designed purposively to swap 
choices within a set context of time and location, however, such an incorrectly specified 
substitution could have resulted in a lack of habitual uptake.  
 Consider the example of “cooking at home” as a substitute for “buying food out”;. 
This substitution would require the individual to prospectively remember to initially 
purchase the ingredients, prep and make the food ahead of time, in addition to bringing 
in the lunch. The only instance in which their card would be used when breaking this 
behaviour down is at the purchase stage, and by this point they would already be at the 
till.  
 Therefore the tool effects are dramatically reduced, as the credit-card sleeve 
would no longer provide effective prompts. Nor would it act as a feedback tool, as the 
act of tallying each substitution would require the individual to remember to take out 
their card sleeve and record each instance, when in fact, they would now not use their 
card when preparing food at home, bringing it into university or having it at lunchtime. 
 As such, the translation of intervention protocol to implementation is poor as this 
substitution of behaviour was not as the purpose of the intervention and as such, was not 
designed to enable such behaviour change.  
 Goal-Setting group 
Examining the data retrieved from the 111 total Goal-Setting participants on the web 
based expense tracker, the goal prices ranged from £40 to £11,666.82 (M = £1351.19, 
SD = £2108.32). Of the 111 participants only 105 participants entered any information 
regarding their goal. Six participants failed to name their goal, and another six 
participants failed to provide a price. The most common category of goal was a 
technological purchase (n = 38); whilst the most common goal was for a ‘holiday’ (n = 
19) whilst ‘trip’ was close behind (n = 18). Four participants chose to set a goal as a gift 
for another person, “flight ticket for sister”, “vacation for mum” or as presents. These 
individuals would have received an additional boost in effort due to the social desirability 
and commitment for another person as opposed to themselves (Headey, Muffels, & 
Wagner, 2010).  
 When examining the overall distance towards each participant’s goal, many 
individuals showed problems in reaching their goal as exhibited by the distribution of 
final distance in  
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Figure 21 below. On average, participants only ascertained 25.05% of their savings goal 
(SD = 17.29%). Only one participant fully reached their goal, with the next highest 
attaining 82.5% of their goal. Six participants failed to reach their goals at all and a further 
seven participants attained less than 10% of their savings goal, potentially demonstrating 
poor implementation. It should be noted that the data may only demonstrate part of the 
picture, and there are two potential issues that could factor into this. Firstly, participants 
may have documented spending but not documented any form of savings towards their 
goal. As such, there could be missing data regarding overall progress made towards 
saving goals. Secondly, participants may have set too high of a savings target, as 
suggested from the large range in goal prices (range = £11,626.82; min = £40, max = 
£11,666.82; Mean = £1351.19, SD = £2108.32), which was unattainable in the three 
months of the intervention. 
Figure 21;  Distance reached by participants in Goal-Setting group
 
 
 The average total amount saved was £437.20 (SD = 449.74), with a range of 
£3300.05; (min = £33.334; Max = £3333.38). These results would suggest that on 
average, participants did save, but they had aimed too high and as such poor progress was 
made towards their goals. This average saving of £437.20 as exhibited in the goal-setting 
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data, less than the measured raw change in savings (£503.50) but is in fact reasonably 
close in value. This would suggest perhaps that participants often, forgot to update these 
values.  
 Examination of saving-intentions was achieved through the contribution of 
‘potential savings’ (difference in income and consumption) toward the savings goal. This 
was calculated as the  
 BLURLUKPL	UP	NIJR = WIX	[NIJR] B −	@6  
 
Where, save, denotes the total saved that month. In this case, the maximal value is the 
furthest the participant could have reached, which is 100%. B, is the average of that 
month’s income and  @ is the average of that month’s consumption. Here, average values 
were taken as total consumption varied from month-to-month, making it difficult to 
calculate a single parameter to ascribe saving intentions. Eleven participants made either 
no intention-to-save, or demonstrated negative values (through over-consumption). A 
further 17 individuals over-pledged, contributing more than in potential savings possible, 
and these were excluded from the analysis. On average, participants put forward 36.76% 
of their possible savings (SD = 26.87%), with a range of 3.18% to 100%. Only 26 of the 
possible 83 remaining individuals showed an intention of higher than 50%. This suggests 
that the Goal-Setting group demonstrated significant differences despite only putting in 
limited effort.  
 This may highlight the high level of consumption typically displayed amongst 
university students, where minimal effort shows significant improvements. Secondly, 
further reinforcement mechanisms to bolster implementation of the Goal-Setting group 
could demonstrate even greater effects if implemented well to motivate users to log-on 
and track progress more frequently.  
6.14 Intervention feedback 
To understand how participants perceived the trial was of importance in understanding 
its effectiveness and acceptability. To this end, a feedback questionnaire was sent to all 
participants in the trial after submitting their transaction histories. Of the 224 participants 
that finished the study, only 49 participants completed the feedback questionnaire 
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(21.88%). Of the 49 participants who completed the questionnaires, only 37 were 
included in the intervention groups. The remaining twelve were of the Control group and 
did not respond to any questions about tools or intervention efficacy.  
 Of the 37 participants who were in the intervention, 27 stated they did not 
experience any unforeseen expenses, whilst ten individuals said they had. Examples of 
these included an £28 uber ride, meals and shopping of undisclosed amounts.  
Participants were asked to rate how difficult they found the intervention on a 1-
10 likert scale. This item was to understand the ease with which participants took to the 
intervention. Participants rated the difficulty of their interventions at an average of 4.67 
(SD = 2.30). This would suggest that participants did take to the intervention well, 
however, there were some difficulties experienced, and this needs to be refined in the 
intervention process to make it more streamlined. For instance, future research could look 
to partner with financial apps to utilise information much more seamlessly, rather than 
asking participants to self-report spending. This process could help to automate reminders 
and identify perhaps more efficient behavioural interventional methods. The difficulties 
were expressed by only fourteen participants who identified technological issues, where 
the automated emails were always sent to their junk inbox. Most of the responses (50%, 
6 responses) were towards the Habit-Based group’s credit card sleeve. One participants 
identified how the credit-card sleeve was easy to lose, or even simply forget to use: 
 
“I once forgot my wallet and paid with my phone, so temporarily lost the habit tool” 
Anonymous participant on the habit tool 
 
“Forgetting to use the habit tool, having unexpected expenses that I couldn’t use the 
habit tool for.” 
Anonymous participant on the habit tool 
 
“I always lose the habit tool” 
Anonymous participant on the habit tool 
 
Another participant mentioned that the act of developing the substitution was difficult 
and time consuming. 
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“It keep messing up my daily schedule and took up more time to do the habit.” 
Anonymous participant on behavioural substitution 
 
The effort required in the intervention was sometimes more than participants were 
willing to engage in, as given by the participant below. 
 
“Sometimes I just didn’t want to do the thing I was supposed to” 
Anonymous participant on the intervention implementation 
 
These quotes identify how the effortful implementation required by the Habit-Based 
intervention could have led to diminished effects observed in the intervention results. 
This finding was further reinforced from the instances of the tools being identified as 
difficult to use, where nine participants (25%) identified they had some uncomfortable 
instances with their behavioural tool. This could be addressed through a more automated 
procedure that helped participants through data collection in partnership with a bank or 
financial app. This could therefore allow for an algorithm to be utilised that sends prompts 
in response to cue-based triggers, such as their location and time. 
 When asked if they were embarrassed by the intervention, most participants said 
they were not (31 participants, 79.49%), however, five participants did identify that they 
were embarrassed to be part of the intervention. This may be a reflection of beliefs and 
perceptions about getting help or assistance in the form of support, for instance 
perceptions about therapy (Farrell, Deacon, Kemp, Dixon, & Sy, 2013). 
When asked about how interesting the intervention was through a 1-10 likert 
scale, participants on average scored the intervention at 5.81 (SD = 2.53), this 
demonstrates some active involvement by participants from the intervention design, 
however there may be a need to gamify this sort of behavioural approach in future 
endeavours to make it more entertaining. Participants felt that the trial was secure and 
safe, with an average safety rating of 7.09 (SD = 2.56).  
Participants felt on average they had learnt from the intervention on a 1-5 likert 
scale, an average rating of Mean = 2.31 (SD = .95), a positive finding suggesting that 
individuals were felt they had improved, this was reinforced from the positive effects 
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from the intervention which consistently described how the intervention made them 
second-guess their purchase decisions. As exhibited by the quotes below 
 
“It gave me motivation so rather than buying clothes I'd think "well, this top is one 
driving lesson!" And wouldn't buy the top!” 
Anonymous participant on the effects of the intervention 
 
“Whenever I used my card, the paper cover for my card I was given reminded me to 
buy cheaper version not only of a product I put on it but to look for other cheaper things 
too.” 
Anonymous participant on the use of the credit-card sleeve 
 
Sometimes, the motivational effort required negatively impacted implementation. 
 
“I would go for the alternative (cheaper) drinks most of the time and sometimes, I 
decide to not buy any altogether when I "must" choose the alternative.” 
Anonymous participant on the Habit-Based intervention 
 
Participants were more likely to suggest these learnt skills to others, where 
61.11% of participants stated they would be happy to recommend these skills to others. 
Participants identified that the Habit-Based intervention did produce the desired effect, 
through positive affective responses from tallying their substitution.  
 
“It was super easy to do and ticking the box from a swap felt good.” 
Anonymous participant on the Habit-Based intervention 
 
Another participant in the Habit-Based group described how the credit-card sleeve was 
able to remind and prompt them to substitute: 
 
“The sleeve was a good way to keep reminding me about the habit” 
Anonymous participant on the Habit-Based intervention 
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Participants who were allocated to the Goal-Setting intervention described how the use 
of the tool helped to reflect on and evaluate their spending. Participants stated that this 
level of detail can help to motivate them to reconsider their purchase decisions.  
  
“I’ve been keeping monthly records of my expenses for two years, but I’ve never really 
specified on what my expenses were on, to the details that was presented in the website 
that I was required to update weekly. I think it really helped me to classify my 
expenditures into categories, rather than just recording where (the name of the shops) I 
spent my money.” 
Anonymous participant on the Goal-Setting intervention 
 
“Forced me to think about what/where I could cut down my expenses and save on” 
Anonymous participant on the Goal-Setting intervention 
 
Some individuals wanted a more comprehensive list of consumption categories, where 
one participant had used up their list of ‘others’ and were left with the inability to 
categorise some of their expenses. They also expressed that the term ‘Income’ as given 
on the tool was misleading, despite attempts to ensure that income was given as a 
umbrella term.  
 
“1) More intuitive categories for the expenses record... I maxed out all of the "others" 
categories. 2) Clearer definitions. As my entire studies is funded by savings, and I am 
not drawing an income, I do not quite know how to define ‘savings’.” 
Anonymous participant on the Goal-Setting tool 
 
There was a more general idea of how the intervention helped participants to reflect on 
their savings. With participants talking about their reported perceived self-controlled 
went up with the intervention. 
 
“I think that I in general try to save money on a daily basis but this intervention helped 
me to actually control it.” 
Anonymous participant on the intervention outcomes 
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“It made me think about what I was buying which reduced impulse buys and made me 
more aware of my money situation!” 
Anonymous participant on the intervention outcomes 
 
“Forced me to think about what/where I could cut down my expenses and save on” 
Anonymous participant on the intervention outcomes 
 
When asked about their believed savings amounts, the average self-reported expected 
savings value provided from participants was £131.82 (SD = £207.47) for the 
intervention groups (combined Goal-Setting and Habit-Based group); whilst the Control 
group demonstrated an average believed savings of £87.82 (SD = £213.26). When asked 
about how happy they were with this outcome on a 1-5 likert scale, participants on 
average expressed an average of 3.63 (SD = 1.24), identifying a positive perception from 
participants. When comparing response ratings of intervention groups (Habit-Based and 
Goal-Setting collapsed into one) against Control group, this demonstrated a significant 
difference, t(26.630) = -2.458, p = .021; where the Control group identified a lower rating 
(M = 3.11, SD = 1.49) than the intervention groups (M = 4.04, SD = .84). This does show 
that the intervention groups do believe they saved more. However this may be an effect 
of desirability characteristics, where in asking individuals this question would exhibit a 
believed need to inflate their estimated savings.  
6.15 Conclusion 
These results suggest a positive perception of the intervention, which corroborated the 
results of the intervention. Participants noted how the intervention helps them to 
reconsider purchase decisions and to think critically. Participants felt the intervention was 
secure and interesting, and identified that the intervention did in fact help to give them 
more control and reflection on their purchase decisions.  
 Participants noted that the behavioural tools themselves had differential effects, 
the credit-card sleeve was shown to help prompt purchase substitutions, as its intended 
design function. However, some participants did state difficulties in using the tool where 
it was easy to forget to use, or difficulty in retrieving their card from the sleeve. 
The Goal-Setting tool was shown to help engage reflective mechanisms, however 
some individuals felt that the categories provided were not sufficient. Future work here 
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could be directed towards user experience research on what the most efficient and 
practical requirements would be for a web-based tool. 
 Participants’ feedback identified much effort was required to implement the 
interventions. This could represent the self-monitoring component of tracking the 
consumptions or substitution on the web-based expense tracker or credit-card sleeve 
respectively. This idea was corroborated by participants noting how the credit-card sleeve 
was easy to leave behind or even misplace. This behaviour characterised how difficult 
the Habit-Based intervention is, and how important the credit-card sleeve is to the 
intervention. This finding could also explain why, if participants chose to substitute 
behaviours rather than in-context purchases, there was a reduced effect. A more 
streamlined process which uses automated procedures to collect consumption data and 
feedback this to the participants would be ideal, to minimise the effort on behalf of 
participants and provide detailed feedback from finer grained data. This would be 
beneficial for both the Goal-Setting and Habit-Based interventions. 
 Overall the intervention was well received, on average participants did identify a 
positive belief from the results of the intervention and were happy with this outcome. 
There was some individuals who expressed difficulties in implementation, though this is 
expected, and future research, should aim to utilise more automated methods. This may 
be true of behaviour change, generally, when aimed at the individual level, to produce 
more cost-effective results by promoting the behaviour through decreased effort on 
behalf of participants.  
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 Individual differences in interventions 
  
SUMMARY 
• Endophenotyping represents the markers of intermediate measures 
between top-level behaviours and bottom-up biological contributions 
(Chaimberland, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins & Sahakian, 2005).  
• Individual differences were examined in the effectiveness of the 
intervention, the SAVINGS Trial. Individual differences were examined 
under the domain of goal-directedness, impulsivity and executive 
function. These markers were behaviourally analysed to compute 
parameters of variation within each construct. These were then used to 
predict intervention efficacy. 
• The results demonstrated that goal-directedness (or model-based 
reliance of control) was predictive of intervention efficacy in reducing 
monetary consumption and improving savings. Lower impulsivity rates 
also predicted reduction in monetary consumption and improving 
savings. Executive function observed significant prediction only for 
propensity to save.  
• These results highlight to potential value in endophenotyping before an 
intervention to identify and stratify the population into those who 
require further support and those who can maintain intervention fidelity. 
Then the intervention can focus on those who require further support 
through the best and most effective means.  
• Interventions could employ the use of additional goal-directed training 
such as using implementation intentions, specifying outcome and action 
goals; or through the use of pharmacological intervention using 
pharmacological agents shown to increase goal-directed behaviour. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Individuals can often differ in their ability to achieve their behavioural intentions within 
environments that offer tempting alternatives (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). For example, 
individuals may intend to save money, but fail to do so when tempted by options to 
engage in consumption activities that conflict with these goal, such as spending on an 
expensive holiday. This intention-behaviour gap is large, that is to say there is a large 
discrepancy between an individuals’ intentions to act and their actual behaviours. For 
instance, Webb and Sheeran (2005) found that intentions accounts for just 28% of the 
variance in behaviour. The gap between individuals’ intentions to change their behaviour 
and actual behaviour change is even larger (cohen’s d = .36; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
The difficulty individuals have in achieving their behavioural intentions have been 
explained by dual process theories (Daw et al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Osman, 2004; Wood & Rünger, 2016). Specifically, the reflective 
cognitive systems seem to underlie the formulation and maintenance of behavioural 
intentions, whilst the automatic cognitive systems often compete with these processes 
(Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Rouault et al., 2018; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Some 
individuals are more likely to maintain their behavioural intentions and achieve their 
goals than others, possessing greater goal-directedness and cognitive control (Huys & 
Dayan, 2009; Otto et al., 2015; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Selart et al., 1997). 
The fact that individuals differ in their ability to achieve their behavioural 
intentions is in part due to differences in cognitive control (Otto et al., 2015). Cognitive 
control has been conceptualized by different researchers to include, for example, 
behavioural automaticity, goal-directedness, impulsivity, and executive function (Barrett, 
Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Gardner, 2014; Gillan et al., 2015; Jonides et al., 1997; Lally & 
Gardner, 2013; Otto et al., 2015; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). For example, research 
suggests that targeting individuals with low levels of goal-directedness, through 
personalised interventions, such as pharmacological or behavioural, can more 
significantly improve their wellbeing. (Kulendran et al., 2013, 2016; Nederkoorn et al., 
2010). The first step in this process is identifying which measures can segregate the 
population and identify deficits in outcomes (Goldberg, 1993; Robbins et al., 2012). This 
technique is known as endophenotyping (Robbins et al., 2012). 
The current study aims to identify the moderating effects of individual differences 
in cognitive control in a RCT (SAVINGS Trial, see Chapter 6) to enhance university 
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students’ financial capabilities (see Section 0 for more information). Three measures of 
cognitive control are examined, including measures of goal-directedness, impulsivity, 
and executive function.  
7.2 Goal-directedness  
Goal directedness is conceptualized in the current study as in computational 
reinforcement learning theories  (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; 
Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 2015; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015). 
Reinforcement learning theories describe choice behaviours as being guided by the value 
of each options’ expected outcome (Daw et al., 2011b; Otto et al., 2015; Wan Lee, 
Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014). Under reinforcement learning habitual and goal-directed 
choices are predicted by different processes (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Habitual behaviour 
is predicated by a model-free process, where individuals learn to repeat actions followed 
by rewards according to ‘cached’ values (Dolan & Dayan, 2013), calculated from past 
utility and so are disassociated with the future outcomes they predict. Goal-directed 
behaviour is denoted by a model-based process, where individuals’ choices are calculated 
based upon their internal models (knowledge) about the structure of the environment and 
their motivations (Daw et al., 2011a).  
Notably, people differ in the degree to which their behaviour can be predicted by 
model-free and model-based processes. These processes have not been explored with 
regard to financial capability behaviours, but have been explored with other behaviours, 
predominantly for behaviours connected to psychiatric diagnoses. For instance, some 
researchers posit that substance abuse and addiction behaviours may stem from 
diminished goal-directedness (Sebold et al., 2014b), which leads to an over-reliance on 
habitual/model-free system (Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Kahneman, 2011; Voon et al., 
2014). This hypothesis was suggest by Gillan, Kosinski, Whelan, Phelps and Daw (2016), 
who examined the relationship of goal-directedness/reliance on model-based control 
across various psychiatric disorders. For example, people diagnosed with eating disorders 
are characterised as having high degree of psychological control (Vitousek & Manke, 
1994), as expected, Gillan and colleagues identified that eating-disorder patients exhibit 
a greater propensity for model-based choices. The researchers also found that people 
diagnosed with social anxiety who are anecdotally characterised as having low self-
control, as expected, exhibit a deficit in goal-directedness with a low propensity of 
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model-based choices. Gillan and colleagues suggest that levels of self-control map onto 
a linear degradation of model-based control, or put succinctly sub-optimal behaviours are 
characterised by deficits in goal-directedness (Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016). As such 
therefore the primary concern is the tendency towards model-based control, or deficits 
thereof, where those who demonstrate lower reliance on model-based control may exhibit 
poor intervention outcomes.  
With regard to the current study, individuals whose behaviours are better 
described by the model-based process, may be naturally more goal-directed and so more 
easily benefit from the goal-setting intervention. In contrast, individuals whose 
behaviours are better described by a model-free process may identify as poorer 
intervention effects, due to the deficits in goal-directedness. 
7.3 Impulsivity  
Impulsivity is conceptualised in the current paper as the degree to which people engage 
in a given behaviour for immediate satisfaction or meaningful reflective thought. For 
example, compulsive buyers have been shown to possess higher levels of impulsivity as 
measured through trait impulsivity scales such as Zuckerman’s sensation-seeking scale 
(Desarbo & Edwards, 1996; Lejoyeux, Arbaretaz, McLoughlin, & Ades, 2002), and the 
UPPS Impulsive Behaviour Scale (Billieux, Rochat, Rebetez and Van der Linden (2008).  
 Furthermore, research has also demonstrated that impulsive individuals are more 
likely to show hyper-consumption, in regards to food consumption (Nederkoorn, 
Guerrieri, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 2009; Nederkoorn et al., 2010); as well as 
addiction disorders (Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008; Dick et al., 2010; A. 
J. Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian, & Clark, 2009), OCD and compulsivity disorders 
(Samuel R Chamberlain et al., 2007; Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, Robbins, & 
Sahakian, 2006; Penades et al., 2007), and even to level of household debt (Ottaviani & 
Vandone, 2011) These comorbidities across sub-optimal behaviours identify 
commonalities in neuropsychological underpinnings (Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016; 
Trevor W Robbins et al., 2012). These insights are further extended to lifestyle 
behaviours such as obesity (Claes et al., 2006; Kulendran et al., 2013; Chantal 
Nederkoorn et al., 2010), where higher levels of impulsivity can even diagnose 
differences between clinical levels of obesity from healthy individuals (Kulendran et al., 
2016). Such findings suggest a common overlap in terms of impulsive behaviour where 
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greater levels of impulsivity increase the propensity to consume, conflicting against their 
own intentions and goals (Doñamayor, Strelchuk, Baek, Banca, & Voon, 2018; Voon, 
Reiter, Sebold, & Groman, 2017).  
This study seeks to examine how impulsivity can indicate propensities of goal-
directed deficits, in particular in poor intervention efficacy. Impulsivity is parameterised 
through the Stop Signal Task and the monetary choice questionnaire, which can derive 
measures of response inhibition and temporal discounting, respectively.  
7.4 Executive function  
Executive function is conceptualised in the current paper as a set of higher-order 
cognitive processes known to be involved in planning, initiation, sequencing and 
monitoring of complex goal-directed actions (Royall et al., 2002), where variation in 
efficacy of these higher-order processes can relate to the degree to which an individual 
can execute their intended actions.  
 Executive function has been shown to moderate the intention-behaviour gap; for 
instance, Hall, Fong, Epp and Elias (2008) found that executive function explained a 
significant proportion of variance in diet and exercise behaviour beyond intentions. Those 
with the strongest levels of executive function was shown to exhibit stronger intentions 
and yield the best translation of intentions to action. Executive function and interactive 
effects accounted for 59% of the variance in physical activity, and 61% of dietary 
behaviour which is almost twice that of intentions alone (Sheeran, 2002).  
 These results were further supported by Allan, Johnston and Campbell (2011) 
who found that individuals with poor cognitive flexibility (as measured through task 
switching, verbal fluency task and a tower task) were more likely to exhibit higher rates 
of intention-behaviour gap with respect to eating fewer portions of fruit and vegetables 
as intended. Put succinctly those with lower cognitive control, i.e. the ability to plan, 
process information and monitor behaviour, ate less fruit and vegetables and more snacks 
than intended.  
For instance, in one study examining executive function and savings behaviour, 
as measured through the ELSA (English Longitudinal Study of Aging), a British 
household panel survey. The researchers found that higher executive function predicted 
greater savings (Banks & Oldfield, 2007b). This finding is further supported by Cole and 
Shastry (2009), who examined cognitive ability through the Armed Services Vocational 
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Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The researchers identified greater executive function was 
predictive of higher financial capability, through the knowledge and use of specialised 
financial instruments.  
In a different study (Agarwal & Mazumder, 2010), researchers examined 
cognitive ability (again measured with the ASVAB) with household financial behaviour. 
The researchers find that cognitive ability protects from financial mistakes in credit-card 
behaviour, in addition to reducing error in property valuation for accurate loan and credit 
applications, resulting in lower annual percentage rates. The researchers highlight how 
greater executive function protects from sub-optimal financial decisions.  
 As such, executive function is an important facet in the intention-behaviour gap. 
Executive function seems to help prioritize and maintain higher order processes, which 
can have profound consequences behaviourally and in regards to the outcome of those 
behaviours. For instance, executive function has been shown to be diminished for addicts 
(Albein-Urios, Martinez-González, Lozano, Clark, & Verdejo-García, 2012; Verdejo-
García et al., 2006; Woicik et al., 2009). Considering the above evidence, executive 
function seems to play an important role in maintaining goal-directed actions. 
7.5 Aim 
The current study examines the moderating effects of individual differences in cognitive 
control in a RCT (SAVINGS Trial, see Chapter 6) to improve household financial 
behaviours, i.e., decrease consumption and increase savings. The study uses three 
individual difference domains related to participants’ cognitive control described above, 
and assesses the moderating effects of each individual difference measure on the 
intervention outcomes. 
7.6 Method  
In the current study, 397 participants were recruited through a multi-site RCT, with 
210 participants recruited at the University of Warwick (UK), and 187 recruited from 
Monash University (Australia). All participants self-confirmed having normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and not being colour blind. At the beginning of the meeting, 
participants agreed to provide the research team with anonymized bank statements from 
their main account to the researcher at the end of the 84 day period.  
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On the first day of the RCT, participants met with a researcher in at the Behavioural 
Science Lab at Warwick Business School or at the Monash Business Behavioural Lab at 
Monash University. At this meeting, participants completed the behavioural tasks in a 
fixed order, to assess their goal-directedness, impulsivity and finally executive function. 
All tasks were completed on a 22” LCD screens with 60Hz refresh rate. To index goal 
directedness, participants completed sequential decision task. To index impulsivity, 
participants completed a stop signal task and a monetary choice questionnaire. To index 
executive function, participants completed an N-Back task. Participants completed these 
tasks using methods described in 1.1.1.1.1Appendix E. 
After completing these tasks, participants were randomly allocated into three 
groups in a 1:1:1 fashion, including a Control group, a Goal-Setting group, and a Habit-
Based group. Participants in the Control group did not experience any intervention. 
Participants in the Goal-Setting group experienced the goal-setting intervention, and 
participants in the Habit-Based group experienced the habit-based intervention. The 
interventions were already described in Chapter 5 and the reader may refer to that chapter 
for greater details.  
As a brief reminder, the Goal-setting intervention participants were asked to set a 
financial goal to save enough money to purchase a desirable item. To assist them, 
participants received a behavioural tool (a web-based expense tracker) to help self-
monitor their progress to achieving that goal. In the Habit-setting intervention 
participants substituted a more expensive, impulsive purchase with a cheaper alternative, 
and were given a behavioural tool (a credit-card sleeve) to help self-monitor their 
progress to achieving that habitual change.  
At the end of the first meeting, all participants were reminded that they agreed to 
return their bank statements at the end of the 84 day period. Participants at Warwick 
Business School were paid a fixed amount of £5 with an additional bonus contingent on 
their decision-making performance (up to an additional £12), while participants at 
Monash University were provided with course credit units (one for participation in the 
trial, and an additional for submitting their transaction histories). 
 Data Analysis 
Below, the analysis plans for each behavioural task are described, then the outcome 
variables are specified, i.e., participants consumption and saving. Subsequently, the 
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model specification is detailed to assess the interventions’ effects and the moderating 
effects of the individual differences is described. 
7.6.1.1 Sequential decision-making task 
For the sequential decision-making task, a trial-by-trial analysis was conducted for 
each participant using a computational analysis to estimate the model parameters (Daw 
et al., 2011a; Gillan et al., 2015; Voon et al., 2014). This analysis produces seven 
parameters in total (for more information see 1.1.1.1.1Appendix E): however, this study 
is only interested in the perseverance (the degree to which a choice is repeated bounded 
between -1£ ps £ 1, a value of 1 indicates complete perseverance, whilst -1 denotes 
shifting behaviour) and weighting parameters (the weighting of reliance on model-based 
or model-free control, bounded between 0 £ w £ 1, where w = 1 indicates model-based 
control and 0 denotes model-free), as they have underlying psychological component 
related to goal-directedness. 
  An additional analysis was conducted on choice behaviour across 
participants to validate the choice behaviour of the present sample against the data 
obtained from past instances in which the task has been used (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2011b; Gillan et al., 2015; Otto, Skatova, Seth Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 
2015; Voon et al., 2014). This analysis uses a logistic regression to examine the 
probability of repeating a past top-level state choice given the previous trial’s outcome 
(reward and transition). The logistic regression uses qualitative ideas of model-free and 
model-based behaviour where purely model-free individuals would be solely fixated on 
repeated choices which were rewarded, whilst purely model-based individuals would be 
predicted by the interaction of a reward and common transition.  
7.6.1.2 Stop signal task 
For the Stop-Signal Task, Stop Signal Reaction Times (SSRT) were calculated for each 
participant using the integration method (see Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). The 
integration method was used because it is more robust to skewed data and strategic 
slowing of reaction times (Logan et al., 2014; A. Osman et al., 1986; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008). Generally, SSRTs are an indication of response inhibition where higher 
values denote higher levels of impulsivity.  
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7.6.1.3 Monetary choice Task 
For the Monetary Choice Task, a discounting parameter k was recorded as an index of 
the rate at which the individual discounts rewards as a function of time, as represented in 
the formula: 
 [(]) 	= 	 D(1 + _]) 
 
In the above formula, V(D) indicates the perceived value of a monetary reward, A 
indicates the actual monetary value of that reward, D indicates a delay’s duration, and k 
is a free discounting parameter (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). A greater k value is indicative 
of greater impulsivity, displaying a preference for immediate over delayed rewards. 
7.6.1.4 N-Back task 
For the N-back task, signal detection theory was utilised to compare the distributions of 
hit rates against false alarms. Signal detection theory compares z-scores for Hit rates (i.e. 
yes | correct response) against z-scores for False alarm rates (i.e. yes | incorrect response) 
to calculate a single value referred to as d-prime (d’). The d’ coefficient is often referred 
to as a sensitivity index corrected for response biases. A greater d’ is indicative more 
executive function. Participants whose Hit rates or False alarm rates equate to the upper 
or lower bounds were removed from the analysis because their d’ is incalculable. This is 
because the d’ is calculated as the difference between Hit rates and False alarm rates. In 
cases where participants Hit rates of False alarm rates hit the bound, the d’ value becomes 
incalculable as the difference of these rates becomes 1 or 0, computing a d’ of infinity or 
negative infinity, as such, these individuals were removed from the analysis. 
7.6.1.5 Consumption 
Consumption was given as monthly expenditure from the account; the outcome was taken 
as the difference in monthly expenditure of month one from month three. For more details 
please see Chapter 6. 
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7.6.1.6 Saving 
Savings were measured as the difference in income and consumption; this score was then 
used as monthly savings. Difference scores were calculated for monthly expenditure of 
month one from month three. For more details please see Chapter 6. 
7.6.1.7 Account balances 
As money may be stagnated in participant’s bank accounts, the account balance was 
analysed. The change in account balances was taken as the difference of monthly 
expenditure of month one from month three. For more details please see Chapter 6. 
7.6.1.8 Interventions’ effects and the effects of individual differences 
To assess the interventions’ effects along with the moderating effects of the individual 
difference measures the below linear fixed-effects mode was considered:  
 
Outcomei = b0,i + b1.Ci + b2.Ii + b3.Ti + b4I:Ti 
 
In this model, Outcomei indicates the outcome variable (Consumption, Savings, Account 
Balance), Ci is a vector of control variables (age, sex, site, statement length, change in 
the number of transactions and income), Ii is a vector of the individual difference 
parameters (Goal directedness, Implulsivity or Executive function), and Ti is a vector 
signifies the participants’ allocation (Group).  
The data was run through the model using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2018) 
in the R programming language (R Core Team, 2018). Parameters were tested for 
normality using Shapiro–Wilks test, with square root transformation, and an alpha 
value of for p < .05 to assess statical significance. Levene’s test was used to test for 
equality of variance across intervention groups. To account for heterogeneity, White’s 
estimates of robust standard errors (White, 1980) were calculated using the ‘HC1’ 
command in the vcovHC function under the sandwich package (Zeileis & Lumley, 2017).  
Due to the effects of transformation the coefficients do not yield a straightforward 
unit-for-unit interpretation, as such, the sign and significance of the effects are the more 
important characteristics. 
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7.7 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are listed below, with a specific hypothesis for each individual 
difference: goal directedness, impulsivity and executive function. As a reminder, there 
are three outcomes: consumption, savings and account balances. Below the effects are 
only discussed as significant, though note that we mean significant decreases in 
consumption and increases in savings.  
 
[i] Goal Directedness – weighting parameter, w, will predict interventional efficacy. At 
the consumption level, lower w-parameter values will predict greater change in monetary 
consumption, as such, a negative coefficient is observed.  whilst for savings (both in 
monetary terms and in account balances), greater w-parameter values would predict an 
increase in savings, as such, a positive coefficient is observed. 
 
[ii] Goal Directedness - perseverance parameter, ps, will predict interventional efficacy.  
At the consumption level, lower ps-parameter values will predict greater change in 
monetary consumption, as such, a negative coefficient is observed. whilst for savings 
(both in monetary terms and in account balances), greater ps-parameter values would 
predict an increase in savings, as such, a positive coefficient is observed. 
 
[iv] Impulsivity -  response inhibition parameter, SSRT, will predict interventional 
efficacy. At the consumption level, greater SSRT scores will predict greater change in 
monetary consumption, as such, a positive coefficient is observed. whilst for savings 
(both in monetary terms and in account balances), lower SSRT scores would predict an 
increase in savings, as such, a negative coefficient is observed. 
  
[v] Impulsivity -  discounting scores, k parameters, will predict interventional efficacy. 
At the consumption level, higher k-value scores will predict greater change in monetary 
consumption, as such, a positive coefficient is observed. for savings (both in monetary 
terms and in account balances), lower k-value scores would predict an increase in 
savings. 
  
[iii] Executive function, - executive function, d’ parameter, will predict interventional 
efficacy.  lower d’ values will predict greater change in monetary consumption, as such, 
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a negative coefficient is observed. Whilst for change in savings, positive d’ values will 
predict greater change in monetary savings and account balances, as such, a positive 
coefficient is observed. 
7.8 Results 
Of the 397 participants enrolled into the trial, 224 returned their bank statements after 84 
days. Of these 224 participants, seven submitted transaction histories with no account 
balance data, with a further 2 participants were removed from analysis due to missing 
data as a result of technical errors, from participants skipping tasks or not providing 
adequate data (such as not responding to any trials). Thus, the final sample contained 195 
participants, of which 67.18% Female (M = 20.989 years, SD = 2.694 years). Of these 
195 participants, 58 participants (29.74%) were allocated to the Goal-Setting group (38 
Female, Mean age = 21.638 years, SD = 3.562 years); 64 (32.83%) to the Habit-Based 
group (42 Female, Mean age = 20.781 years, SD = 2.207 years) and 73 participants 
(37.44%) to the Control group (48 Female, Mean age = 20.657 years, SD = 2.181 years). 
 
The following results first examine participants’ performance on the three behavioural 
tasks. Then the results for each hypothesis are reported.  
 SAVINGS Trial 
For discussion of the outcome measures of the SAVINGS Trial see Chapter 6. 
 Stop Signal Task 
Participants completed 128 trials each, with an average accuracy of 65.693% across both 
stimuli categories. Participants demonstrated non-significant differences in accuracy 
between stimuli categories (Square or Circle), t(13119) = 1.932, p = 0.053; or in response 
time, t(13119) = 0.653, p = .514. Participants demonstrated an average RT of 535.916ms 
(SD = 302.909ms), with an average reaction time of 473.356ms (SD = 343.214ms) on 
No Signal Trials. SSRT scores ranged from -256.25ms to 1051.94ms, with an average 
SSRT score of 627.75 ± 246.5m. The negative SSRT scores indicate a faster Stop signal 
than Go Signal.  
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 N-Back Task 
Participants completed 144 trials each, with an average accuracy rate of 74.051% and an 
average reaction time score of 627.087ms (SD = 311.259ms). Participants failed to 
respond on 10.437% of trials. Calculated d’ scores ranged from -0.19 to 2.87, with a mean 
of 1.58 (SD = 0.55). Negative d’ scores identify a propensity to respond to noise or false 
alarms over correct identification.  
 Markov Decision Task 
In the sequential decision-making task, participants made sequential choices in a series 
of two-alternate forced choice task. Participants made one choice at the first-state, which 
led to a probabilistic transition to one of two second-state options, finally the choice at 
the second-state led probabilistically to either a reward or null outcome. Thus there is a 
two-way design of transition probability and reward outcome that could drive choice 
behaviour within the remit of this task. Participants failed to complete only a small 
fraction of trials, .976% of all trials (± 0.265 SEM), participants received on average a 
reward on 46.992% of trials (± 0.448 SEM). 
 To ensure that participants engaged with the task correctly, choice behaviour can 
be analysed qualitatively, which then be compared against other studies to validate that 
choice behaviour is indicative and expected. Such practice ensures face-validity to the 
computational parameters.   
This is achieved by examining how second-state rewards impact subsequent first-
state choices to discern model-free and model-based choices. For instance, if a first-state 
choice led to a second-state reward in a rare transition, a purely model-free individual 
would repeat the first-state choice regardless of transition, which is a characteristic of 
habits within reinforcement learning (Daw et al., 2005). A pure model-based individual 
would construct a mental-map of the environment taking into account probabilistic 
transitions between states and their rewards, as such they would shift away from their 
previous first-state choice, as the other option would lead to a higher chance of that 
second-state option. Figure 22 below depicts the observed frequencies of staying with a 
first-state choice as a function of the previous trial’s reward and transition (averaged 
across the sample).  
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Figure 22; Observed stay probabilities of repeating first-state choice 
 
 As such, through the use of a logistic regression one can validate qualitative 
choice behaviour to corroborate similar findings as identified by previous research (Daw 
et al., 2011b; Otto et al., 2015; Skatova et al., 2013). Here, the choice to repeat or shift 
first-state choices can be predicted by reward only for model-free individuals, and reward 
and the interaction of reward and transition for model-based individuals. This was 
conducted through a mixed effects logistic regression ran using the lme4 package (Bates 
et al., 2018) on R (R Core Team, 2018). The model specification was ran as similar to 
Skatova et al. (2013):  
 
stay ~ trans*rew + (1+trans*rew | subjID) 
 
Where stay codes for whether participants repeated a first-state choice, calculated as the 
absolute difference of t+1 - t of first-state choices, producing values of 0 or 1, where 0 is 
a repeated choice. Trans is the transition probability which represents the high (common 
transition, 70%) probability and low (rare transition, 30%) probability, this is coded as 
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1,-1 respectively. The reward component, rew, codes for whether the previous trial’s 
second-state choice was rewarded or not, coded as 1,-1 respectively. This model included 
the interaction term as well as a random effect of the task parameters.  
All three main effects were highly significant, the coefficients reported are at the 
population level, as noted in Table 16. The intercept demonstrated the greatest effect in 
prediction of staying behaviour (i.e denoting baseline tendency of 79.5%), whilst reward 
demonstrated a 27% likelihood in staying for the next trial, compared to a 7.5% chance 
by a common transition. The interaction effect was also significant, with an 8.1% increase 
in staying if rewarded and common transitions both occurred in the previous trial. The 
main effect of reward ascribes model-free behaviour, whilst the interaction term denotes 
model-based control. The values obtained are consistent with previous studies (Otto et 
al., 2015; Skatova et al., 2013), as such, the choice pattern is also identical to those by 
other researchers, with the parameter values aligning closely with theirs. As such the 
exploratory analysis revealed consistent findings across studies of qualitative choice 
behaviour of model-based and model-free reliance of control, these validations identify 
that the task does indeed isolate model-free and model-based behaviour as explored by 
other researchers and the sample obtained here behaved consistent with other samples.  
Table 16; Population level coefficients of stay vs. switch behaviour 
Main effects Coefficient Standard Error 
Reward 0.271*** -0.016 
Transition 0.075*** -0.011 
Intercept (perseveration) 0.795*** -0.046 
Interaction effects    
Reward:Transition 0.081*** -0.013 
N 374 
Loglik -43728.9 
AIC 87485.7 
*, **, ***, significance at the 10% 5% and 1% level respectively 
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 Individual differences effects in trial outcomes 
To examine the effects of individual differences on the interventions’ effectiveness across 
the three outcomes (consumption, then savings and account balances). The model results 
are reviewed below separately. Firstly the raw differences were analysed across the three 
domains whilst controlling for income; followed by the savings ratio. 
7.8.5.1 Saving Rates - Monetary Consumption 
Individual difference parameters did predict changes in interventional outcomes, but not 
all parameters demonstrated significance. 
 
[i] Goal Directedness - Weighting parameter, w: 
The weighting parameter demonstrated significant effects in change in monetary 
consumption, the main effect of w demonstrated positive significant effect (b = 203.81, 
p (two-tailed) = .04). The interaction term of w with the Goal-Setting group exhibited a 
significant negative association, identifying that reduction in consumption was more 
likely to be associated with model-based reliance of control (b = -4342.50, p (one-tailed) 
= .004). The interaction of w with the Habit-Based group allocation also exhibited a 
significant negative coefficient, further identifying the role of model-based control in 
goal-directed outcomes (b = -4543.60, p (one-tailed) = .009) 
 
[ii] Goal Directedness - Perseverance parameter, ps: 
The perseverance parameter did demonstrate significance at the 10% level, for the main 
effect predictor (b = -1760.70, p (one-tailed) = .08). However the interaction term for ps 
and the Goal-Setting group allocation demonstrated a negative albeit insignificant effect 
(b = -487.61, p (one-tailed) = .41); as did the interaction of ps with the Habit-Based group 
(b = -1535.90, p (one-tailed) = .35). These effects are consistent with the hypothesis but 
lack significance across the three levels, which may be the result of large variability in 
the data and an inadequate statistical power to detect such differences. 
 
[iv] Impulsivity - SSRT: 
Response inhibition identified a negative effect on change in monetary consumption, (b 
= -148.14, p (two-tailed) = .047). The interaction of SSRT and Goal-Setting allocation 
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identified a positive but insignificant effect on change in monetary consumption (b = 
91.20, p (one-tailed) = .16). A similar finding is identified in the interaction of SSRT and 
Habit-Based group allocation, which reached significance (b = 174.650, p (one-tailed) = 
.037).  
 
[v] Impulsivity - k-parameter: 
The temporal discounting parameter did not demonstrate significance at the main level 
or interaction levels. At the main level, there is a positive, insignificant effect (b = 156.51, 
p (one-tailed) = .14). The interaction effect of k and Goal-Setting allocation identified a 
negative insignificant effect (b = -174.920, p (two-tailed) = .42). The interaction of k and 
Habit-Based group allocation yielded a significant negative effect at the 10% level (b = 
-412.81, p (two-tailed) = .082). 
  
[iii] Executive function parameter, d’: 
There was no effect of the executive function parameter as given by the d’ parameter 
values in the prediction of change in monetary consumption (b = -18.42, p (two-tailed) = 
.97). The interaction effect of d’ and Goal-Setting group allocation was positive in 
concordance with the hypothesis but was, however, insignificant (b = 46.07, p (one-
tailed) = .47). The same pattern was identified for the interaction of d’ and Habit-Based 
group allocation (b = 203.81, p (one-tailed) = .37). 
7.8.5.2 Saving Rates – Savings 
Individual difference parameters did predict changes in interventional outcomes but not 
all parameters demonstrated significance. 
 
[i] Goal Directedness - Weighting parameter, w: 
The weighting parameter was not a significant predictor of change in monetary savings 
(b = -267.43, p (two-tailed) = .80). The interaction effect demonstrated a positive albeit 
insignificant effect with Goal-Setting group allocation (b = 1279.30, p (one-tailed) = .17), 
and Habit-Based group allocation (b = 1172.60, p (one-tailed) = .17). Such findings 
suggest an association of model-based control and goal-directed outcomes, however this 
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relationship was not shown to be significant, which may be a result of lack of statistical 
power.  
 
[ii] Goal Directedness - Perseverance parameter, ps: 
The perseverance parameter was positive, indicative of more goal-directed behaviour, 
however the coefficient value was not significant (b = 473.90, p (one-tailed) = .34). The 
interaction effect of ps and group allocation demonstrated an insignificant, negative effect 
with Goal-Setting group (b = -329.55, p (one-tailed) = .83), and Habit-Based group (b 
=643.22, p (one-tailed) = .39). Such findings suggest an association between behavioural 
perseverance and goal-directed outcomes, however, this relationship was not shown to 
be significant, which may be a result of lack of statistical power. Given the sample size 
drop to 195, this would leave approximately 60 participants per cell of the intervention 
to make statistical inferences. In addition, the large variance exhibited in the small 
financial datasets regarding monetary consumption and spending could reduce the 
sensitivity of the analysis to detect a difference given one exists. 
 
[iv] Impulsivity - SSRT: 
SSRT scores demonstrated a significant albeit positive relationship with monetary 
savings (b = 122.340, p (one-tailed) = .089). However there is a negative relationship for 
treatment effects, which is significant at the 10% level for the Goal-Setting group (b =-
106.66, p (one-tailed) = .098); but not for the Habit-Based group (b =-60.69, p (one-
tailed) = .22). 
 
[v] Impulsivity - k-parameter: 
The main effect of the discounting parameters demonstrated a negative predictor of 
monetary savings as consistent with the hypothesis, however the coefficient did not reach 
significance (b = -29.84, p (one-tailed) = .42). The interaction with the Goal-Setting 
group and the k-parameter did identify a negative relationship (b = -112.99, p (one-tailed) 
= .29), although the result was insignificant. The interaction with the Habit-Based group 
and the k-parameter was insignificant (b = 29.60, p (one-tailed) = .43). 
 
[iii] Executive function - parameter, d’: 
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The d’ parameter was not indicative of increase in monetary savings, as the main effect 
term (b = -54.62, p (one-tailed) = .89); or in the interaction effect with the Goal-Setting 
group (b = -168.07, p (one-tailed) = .75) or the Habit-Based group (b = 5.78, p (one-
tailed) = .99).  
7.8.5.3 Saving Rates – Account Balances 
Individual differences were not wholly observed under account balances domain of 
monetary savings, with only one parameter establishing significance. 
 
[i] Goal Directedness - Weighting parameter, w: 
The weighting parameter displayed an insignificant main effect (b = 59.91, p (one-tailed
) = .47). The interaction of w with Goal-Setting group allocation was insignificant (b = -
189.33, p (two-tailed) = .87), as well as the interaction of w and Habit-Based group allo
cation (b = -24.90, p (two-tailed) = .98). 
 
[ii] Goal Directedness - Perseverance parameter, ps: 
The perseverance parameter displayed insignificance at the main effect level (b = -
144.49, p (two-tailed) = .85) and at the interaction levels for Goal-Setting group (b = -
208.39, p (two-tailed) = .83), as well as for the Habit-Based group allocation (b = 383.67, 
p (one-tailed) = .41). 
 
[iv] Impulsivity - SSRT: 
SSRT did not yield a significant coefficient at the main effect level (b = 35.54, p (two-
tailed) = .49); or at the interaction level despite both identifying a negative coefficient in 
Goal-Setting group (b = -36.29, p (one-tailed) = .29) or the Habit-Based group (b = -
37.06, p (one-tailed) = .27). 
 
[v] Impulsivity -, k-parameter: 
The main effect of k-parameter did exhibit a negative coefficient, in line with the 
hypothesis, however the size of the coefficient was not significant, (b = -28.42, p (one-
tailed) = .43). The interaction effects revealed insignificant effects for both Goal-Setting 
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group (b = 11.94, p (two-tailed) = .87); and the Habit-Based group (b = -34.60, p (one-
tailed) = .44). 
 
[iii] Executive function - parameter, d’: 
The main effect of d’ identified an insignificant predictor (b = -315.82, p (two-tailed) = 
.27). The interaction effect with the parameter and Goal-Setting allocation yielded a 
significant positive effect (at the 10% level), consistent with the hypothesis (b = 621.64, 
p (one-tailed) = .06). The interaction effect of d’ and Habit-Based group allocation 
yielded a positive coefficient which did not reach significance (b = 281.68, p (one-tailed) 
= .22). 
 Propensity to save 
The propensity to save was calculated as the proportion of income that was not consumed, 
with difference scores calculated for pre-post differences. This analysis was conducted 
only on two of the three domains; savings and account balances. The reason for this 
choice is due to the mathematical calculation of the outcome variable where consumption 
and savings produce reverse effects, where, 
 HIJKLMNKLOPQR = 	 KLOPQR − OPLNSQTUKPLKLOPQR = 1 −	OPLNSQTUKPLKLOPQR  
 
As specified in Section 6.11.2 the construction of the variable yielded extreme values, 
outside the expected lower and upper bounds of 0 and 1, as such a cube root 
transformation is used to transform the data to reduce variance and construct robust 
estimators. Cube root transformations have been used in literature for income 
transformations (Cox, 2011; Mirowsky & Hu, 1996), where research has demonstrated 
that the cube root transformation offers one of the best transformation of monetary data, 
particularly income (Schwartz, 1985). 
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7.8.6.1 Monetary Savings 
 [i] Weighting parameter, w: 
The weighting parameter did not display significance (b = - .25, p (two-tailed) = .78); 
whilst the interaction for w and Goal-Setting group allocation yielded a significant 
positive coefficient (b = 2.38, p (one -tailed) = .02), identifying that reliance of model-
based control was more indicative of increased propensity to save. The interaction of w 
and Habit-Based group allocation however did not demonstrate a similar outcome (b = 
.16, p (one-tailed) = .45).  
 
 [ii] Perseverance parameter, ps: 
The perseverance parameter did not yield significant coefficients at either the main effect 
level (b = 1.27, p (one-tailed) = .15), or the interaction effects with either Goal-Setting 
allocation (b = -2.63, p (two-tailed) = .15), or Habit-Based group (b = -1.41, p (two-
tailed) = .49). 
 
[iii] Executive function parameter, d’: 
Executive function as expressed through the d’ parameter did not identify a significant 
main effect, (b = 0.03, p (one-tailed) = .47); the interaction term with Goal-Setting group 
allocation did yield a significant interaction effect albeit negative (b = -1.22, p (two-
tailed) = .03). The interaction of d’ and Habit-Based group allocation yielded an 
insignificant coefficient (b = - .05, p (two-tailed) = .93).  
 
[iv] Impulsivity (a), SSRT: 
SSRT did not yield significance at the main effect level (b = .09, p (two-tailed) = .11), or 
for the interaction with either Goal-Setting (b = - .04, p (one-tailed) = .30), or for Habit-
Based group allocation (b = - .09, p (one-tailed) = .13). 
 
[v] Impulsivity (b), k-parameter: 
The discount parameter did not identify significance at the main effect level, (b = .02, p 
(two-tailed) = .94). The interaction with the Goal-Setting group did yield a negative albeit 
insignificant coefficient (b = - .05, p (one-tailed) = .44). The interaction with the Habit-
Based group yielded a negative significant coefficient (b = - .53, p (one-tailed) = .06), 
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identifying that lower discount rates were significantly predictive of higher propensity to 
save. 
7.8.6.2 Account Balances 
[i] Weighting parameter, w: 
The weighting parameter did yield a negative coefficient significant at the 10% 
significance level for the main effect (b = -2.69, p (one-tailed) = .09), with an insignificant 
interaction effect with either Goal-Setting (b = - .45, p (two-tailed) = .85), or for Habit-
Based group allocation (b = 1.90, p (one-tailed) = .17). 
 
 [ii] Perseverance parameter, ps: 
The perseverance parameter did not yield significance at the main effect level (b = .34, p 
(one-tailed) = .43), or for the interaction with either Goal-Setting (b =-1.31, p (one-tailed) 
= .63), or for Habit-Based group allocation (b = .22, p (one-tailed) = .47). 
 
[iii] Executive function parameter, d’: 
The executive function parameter identified a significant negative coefficient in 
predicting propensity to save (b = -1.29, p (two-tailed) = .06). The interaction within the 
Goal-Setting group demonstrated a significant positive effect consistent with the 
hypothesis (b = 2.53, p (one-tailed) = .01), this finding was also identified for the 
interaction with the Habit-Based group allocation (b = 1.81, p (one-tailed) = .03). 
 
[iv] Impulsivity (a), SSRT: 
SSRT did not yield significance at the main effect level (b = - .004, p (one-tailed) = .484), 
or for the interaction with either Goal-Setting (b = .004, p (two-tailed) = .814), or for 
Habit-Based group allocation (b = .015, p (one-tailed) = .127). 
 
[v] Impulsivity (b), k-parameter: 
Discounting rates did not yield significance at the main effect level (b = .13, p (two-
tailed) = .74), or for the interaction with either Goal-Setting (b = - .34, p (one-tailed) = 
.28), or for Habit-Based group allocation (b = .71, p (two-tailed) = .29). 
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7.9 Discussion 
Individual differences did demonstrate significant effects of psychological domains in 
intervention efficacy. Regarding goal-directedness, the weighting parameter devised 
from the Q-net model, demonstrated that significant reliance on model-based control 
moderated the impact on change in monetary consumption. This effect, however, was not 
found in either monetary savings or account balances. Monetary savings did yield a 
positive coefficient for the interaction effect for Goal-Setting and the Habit-Based group 
allocation, there was no effect in w, as either a main effect or interaction for predicting 
change in account balances. In regards to the propensity to save, the weighting parameter 
did identify model-based control in only the interaction with Goal-Setting group 
allocation for calculated monetary savings, but not for account balances. The weighting 
parameter did yield a negative significant coefficient for account balances with regards 
to saving propensity, however this was only at the 10% level. This may suggest that 
reliance on model-free control can increase savings in account balances, where account 
balance savings are the effect of a default bias in behaviour in which an individual makes 
no active decision to transfer funds towards any other account as the savings are 
stagnated. As such, the savings accumulate in the accounts, identified in the account 
balances. Negative coefficients were observed in the interaction of both treatment 
allocations with w-parameter in difference scores of monetary savings in account 
balances, which may corroborate this finding. 
 Regarding goal directedness, the analyses of perseverance demonstrated results 
consistent in the direction of the hypothesis for the interaction effects in both monetary 
consumption and savings, however the coefficients failed to reach significance. This 
identifies higher rates of perseverance were predictive of reduced consumption and 
increased savings respectively in both interventions. It is likely that the attrition rates 
reduced the statistical power within each cell of the intervention to make statistical 
inferences, especially considering the variance exhibited in the dataset regarding 
monetary consumption and spending; compounded with small financial datasets may 
have dramatically reduced the statistical power of the study. Again in account balances, 
perseverance displayed no effects consistent with the direction of the hypothesis, 
however this could be due to default bias as well, where individuals are making no active 
decision to move money out of their accounts, to retain and accumulate the funds as 
opposed to depositing these amounts into a separate savings account. 
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 Impulsivity demonstrated diminished results, across the three domains with both 
outcome variable specification, SSRT was shown to negatively predict change in 
monetary consumption, which would suggest that lower levels of impulsivity can aid in 
reduction of goal-directed outcomes. SSRT demonstrated a positive prediction in change 
of monetary savings, though these results are significant only at the 10% level of note 
and are likely a result of spurious association as opposed to any significance in effects. 
The interaction of SSRT with Habit-Based group allocation displayed significant positive 
effects for change in monetary consumption. The same result was in monetary savings 
for the interaction of SSRT and Goal-Setting group allocation; identifying better response 
inhibition were predictive of reduced consumption and improved savings respectively. 
This relationship does concur with the hypothesis. 
 The effects of discounting rates was shown to only demonstrate significance for 
the interaction effect of k-parameter with Habit-Based group allocation. The interaction 
identified a negative relationship for change monetary consumption as well as for change 
in savings ratio at the monetary savings levels. This would suggest that lower discounting 
rates (i.e. lower rates of impulsivity) were predictive of increased savings, consistent with 
the hypothesis. At the main effect level for monetary consumption, higher discounting 
rates were predictive of reduced monetary consumption, which would be contradicting 
to the hypothesis. One explanation of this finding may be due to the 10% significance 
level (where the beta value’s significance is at, p = 0.082), this significance may not be 
attributed to the intervention and may be a chance finding.  
Executive function did not significantly predict change as a main effect in 
monetary consumption, savings or account balances, however the interaction of d’ and 
treatment allocation did corroborate with Hypothesis iii, but failed to reach significance 
in monetary consumption and for the Habit-Based group in the domain of account 
balances. This would suggest that a higher executive function, in this case parameterised 
by the d’ value, is associated with an increase in goal-directed behaviour, however the 
effect is not consistent across domains which may be attributed to insufficient statistical 
power from small financial dataset and from a limited sample population from high 
attrition rates 
 175 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
These results highlight the extent to which individual differences can moderate the 
efficacy of an intervention. These findings align with the role that individual difference 
plays in other domains such as in health, where higher impulsivity levels are associated 
with obesity (Kulendran et al., 2016), and relapse rates (Kulendran et al., 2017); in 
addition to goal-directedness and its predictive ability in outcomes (Andrew Prestwich, 
Paschal Sheeran, 1900; Deserno et al., 2015; Sheeran, 2005). Furthermore these findings 
also corroborate with research in compulsive shopping behaviour where the underlying 
behavioural constructs of diminished goal-directedness and heightened impulsivity 
predict higher rates of monetary consumption (Billieux et al., 2008; Black et al., 2000; 
Derbyshire et al., 2014). These results do demonstrate generalisable trends that do cross 
other domains of research and therefore highlight the validity to the findings. 
The results demonstrate that parameters denoting goal-directed phenotypes are 
predictive of interventional efficacy, goal-directed individuals are more likely to 
demonstrate better performances in interventions. This holds across interventions that 
seek to utilise automatic motivation through habit-based protocols and for reflective 
motivation based interventions through goal-setting. The goal-directedness was exhibited 
across measures and across domains of outcome variable specification, corroborating 
such an observation.  
 These results further extend towards Gillan’s hypothesis regarding sub-optimal 
behaviour is a result of deficits in goal-directedness (Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016), such 
findings identify commonalities across sub-optimal behaviour and interventional 
outcomes. Poor interventional outcomes can be regarded as sub-optimal behaviour, 
where the individual has a set goal, specified behaviourally, for instance in the Habit-
Based intervention, the behavioural goal is to, “save money by reducing expenditure 
through substituting purchase decisions of option X, for a cheaper alternative, option Y, 
at every opportunity in context, C”. Where individuals are unable to execute such 
behavioural actions bounded under the parameters of X, Y and C, whatever this may be 
for that individual, they are sub-optimal and executing diminished goal-directedness. 
 These results allow for researchers to isolate and stratify the population, into those 
who may demonstrate the greatest change in the outcome of the intervention, whilst also 
identifying those who require further additional support. This technique may help to 
isolate those in-need and increase both intervention efficacy by focusing resources on 
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those whose needs are greater. This however does pose a fundamental question of 
whether these deficits in goal-directedness are inherent in the individual or whether they 
represent fluctuational changes in cognitive processing?  
 This is an integral question at the heart of the diagnosis of sub-optimal behaviour, 
where the deficits are the result of fluctuational changes in processing, where an 
individual has learnt to update their parameters based upon sampling of a specific 
information set. If this is true,  then additional support can be constructed to help update 
these parameters back to normal range. This can be delivered as part of the intervention 
itself through additional support and training. 
 However the alternative is that the deficits in goal-directedness are the result of 
specific neurological pathways. If true this does raise questions over to what extent can 
behavioural training and support aid to the reduction of these deficits? Indeed, in such 
case neuropharmacological interventions may be a more likely and effective means to 
improve goal-directedness (Wunderlich et al., 2012), as opposed to utilising behavioural 
training which may be costly in both terms of time and resources. Future work is required 
to further probe into the fundamental question, which has implications in the clinical 
realm, for psychiatric disorders. As well as for targeted interventions for 
endophenotyping and the policies that interventionists should be taking in future. 
  
 177 
 
 Discussion 
The discussion section first reviews the studies main findings, followed by its relation to 
previous studies, strengths and limitations; finally discussing the implications for future 
interventions to improve people’s financial capabilities.  
8.1 Main Findings 
The current thesis first explored reasons why financial education alone can be insufficient 
to improve people’s financial capability. This is plausibly because financial education 
only increases one component of people’s financial capability, i.e, their knowledge (also 
called Capability in the COM-B model). To more reliably improve people’s financial 
capability, interventionists should consider additional behavioural factors, i.e., 
motivation and opportunity, to more comprehensively diagnosis why people lack 
sufficient financial capability before intervening to improve it (see Chapter 2).  
 The current thesis then described secondary analyses of formative research into 
identifying the causal mechanisms behind sub-optimal financial capability. Although 
there is previous research that used behavioural science (De Meza et al., 2008) or that 
sought to identify the key barriers (Peñaloza & Barnhart, 2011), this formative research 
was the first to utilised behavioural change frameworks to understand and diagnose the 
enablers and facilitators behind financial capability. This formative research identified 
that while sub-optimal financial capability can be caused by issues related to people’s 
psychological capability, issues related to people’s motivations were also profound 
across three components of people’s financial capability: Keeping track of money, 
Making Ends Meet and Planning Ahead. Regarding keeping track, barriers included 
psychological capability, where numeracy and financial literacy were important factors 
in sub-optimal checking and understanding. However, another major factor was 
Pavlovian instrumental transfer, where individuals would opt not to check to avoid seeing 
confirmation of impulsive expenses, unforeseen expenses and negative or even low 
account balances. Barriers to making-ends-meet included people repeatedly purchasing 
products and services to would improve their social rank amongst their peers, which was 
reinforced through pleasurable affective responses. Barriers to planning ahead, included 
people’s beliefs about risk, their ability to make plans, their ability to set goals, and their 
ability to reflect and evaluate their current financial position relative to a plausible, future 
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financial position. The issues identified in the aforementioned formative research were 
then used to inform the interventions that sought to bolster facilitators of financial 
capability whilst counteracting the barriers described above. The interventions developed 
were then assessed through a feasibility study using the APEASE framework (Michie et 
al., 2014). To the author’s knowledge, this is the first feasibility trial to use the APEASE 
framework to assess an intervention for financial behaviour. The APEASE framework 
analysis helped to overcome issues with the implementation of the intervention tools, and 
the efficacy of those interventions (e.g. data collection). The feasibility study’s 
assessment illustrated that participants were familiar with the Goal-Setting intervention 
and showed a higher affinity towards this intervention than any of the others. In contrast, 
participants avoided the Habit-Based intervention as they believed it would highlight 
their current financial situation as their responsibility rather than situational. Participants 
also exhibited some hostility to a Checking intervention, which was focused on informing 
participants of their spending rather than motivating them to decrease consumption or 
save more. This information was then used to revise the interventions and implement a 
fully-powered, multi-site randomised-controlled trial. 
The randomised controlled trial was conducted with 397 student participants 
attending the University of Warwick and Monash University. The trial randomly 
allocated participants to one of three groups in a 1:1:1 fashion, including the Habit-Based 
intervention, the Goal-Setting intervention and the Control group. The trial sustained 
heavy attrition due to a number of factors, such as the type and level of payment, the 
effort required to engage in behaviour change, and even the participants’ prior experience 
with the experimenters. The trial identified significant differences between the 
participants in the intervention and control groups. Specifically participants in the Goal-
Setting group had lower monetary consumption, higher savings and higher account 
balances. Participants in the Habit-Based group only exhibited a higher account balances 
than participants in the Control group; other differences trended in the correct direction 
but were not significant.  
 The last set of analyses in the current thesis examined how individual differences 
can moderate the effects of these intervention. These analyses isolated how goal-
directedness was important in desired outcomes. The study identified that model-based 
control moderates the reduction in monetary consumption. In addition the response 
inhibition parameter was shown to moderate consumption and savings. These results 
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suggest that parameters of goal-directedness can predict intervention’s efficacy, and 
identify individuals who are more likely to engage in behaviour change.  
8.2 Relation to previous studies 
Previous policies to improve people’s financial capability and household finances have 
typically utilised education or examined the role of psychological capability. The 
literature has shown that education does play a role in financial behaviours (Bayer et al., 
2009; Bruhn et al., 2014; Gale & Levine, 2011; Gutter et al., 2010; Walstad et al., 2010) 
However, it also shows that education barely accounts for any variance in financial 
behaviours (Choi et al., 2011, 2002; Fernandes et al., 2014; Gartner & Todd, 2005; 
Mandell, 2008; Servon & Kaestner, 2008). This conflict suggests that there is more this 
story than a simple narrative of the deficiencies in knowledge.  
As such, researchers and policy-makers should be moving towards a behavioural 
science focus to understand and improve people’s financial capabilities and household 
finances. The first study that utilised a behavioural science framework in examining 
factors that could underlie sub-optimal financial capability was conducted in 2008 (De 
Meza et al., 2008), and since then, more work has followed (Atkinson et al., 2007; Dolan, 
Elliott, et al., 2012; Elliott et al., 2010; Vlaev & Elliott, 2017).  
 This formative study conceptualises how deficits in people’s psychological 
capability and motivational systems can lead to sub-optimal financial capability, which 
are two components of the COM-B model (Michie et al., 2014). This finding builds upon 
the research into implementation sciences and behaviour change where behaviours are 
often the result of more than one behavioural factor.  
 There is very little known about the psychological determinants of financial 
capability (for more information see Chapter 1). Evidence suggests that psychological 
constructs can play a major role in sub-optimal financial behaviours. The currents 
randomised controlled trial’s results agree with some previous findings. For instance, the 
Habit Tool resembles a behavioural contract. Previously one research team used a field 
experiment to test the use of a commitment savings financial product in the Philippines 
(Ashraf et al., 2006). The researchers designed a savings account akin to a locked piggy 
bank. Participants who used the savings account for 12 months saved 81% more than 
participants in a control group. The trial demonstrated how interventions designed based 
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on an understanding psychological motivation and processes can produce dramatic 
behaviour change. 
 Goal-directedness is another psychological construct utilized recognized as 
important for behaviour change and utilized in the current randomised controlled trial. 
For instance, Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman's (2010) research suggests 
text-message reminders can be used to promote goal-directedness. In their study, 
participants who received text messages demonstrated a 3% increase in likelihood of 
reaching savings goal and a 6% increase in total amount saved. The benefits of goal-
directedness have also been found in research on adolescents. For instance, Rodriguez 
and Saavedra (2016) showed participants who received monthly reminders had a greater 
propensity to save than participants who did not receive those reminders.  
These results identify how increasing goal-directedness is important to 
maintaining intentions and outcome goals. In the current randomised controlled trial, 
feedback was integrated into the Goal-Setting intervention. The current data suggests that 
through promoting goal-directedness helped participants save an additional £503.50,  i.e., 
a 4.4% increase in propensity to save.  
8.3 Strengths and Limitations 
One limitation of the formative research was the sole use of qualitative methods. It would 
be extremely helpful to be able to quantify and model the causes of sub-optimal financial 
capability, using the qualitative results to form computational models to compare and 
identify the best fitting models.  For example, this could be achieved through consumer 
or banking data. This quantitative process would help to prioritise behavioural 
mechanisms in the design of the intervention. This however, is extremely time 
consuming, and would require collaboration or partnership with a banking institution or 
regulatory body with a research amenable infrastructure.  
However, simply using formative research of any kind to develop an intervention 
is a strength. Conducting such formative research allows the diagnosis of the barriers and 
facilitators of financial capability. This diagnosis of the behavioural then affords a more 
efficient procedure to design and assess interventions (Atkins & Michie, 2015; Michie, 
Van Stralen, et al., 2011). Through this procedure, the most prominent barriers through 
qualitative and quantitative methods were identified. The process uses a design 
perspective (Niedderer et al., 2016), which takes a bottom-up approach, by using the 
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building blocks of such behavioural processes to understand and design the intervention. 
The design perspective takes more time and resources but can be highly effective when 
used in conjunction with the MRC approach (Campbell et al., 2000), as it affords an 
evidence base within the project to draw more targeted behavioural insights (Atkins & 
Michie, 2015).   
Although examining individual differences in the SAVINGS Trial did find strong 
associations between goal-directedness and improvements in financial behaviour, 
confounding variables may explain the effects. One potential confounding variable is 
intelligence. For instance, researchers have found that people’s mathematical ability 
predicts the likelihood of defaulting on their mortgage (Gerardi et al., 2013), and national 
average IQ predicts national economic growth  (Meisenberg, 2012). Another potential 
confound is affective processes, as these can mitigate and trigger sub-optimal behaviour 
in goal-directedness. For example, some research has demonstrated that social rejection 
can increased spending (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003). 
  Another limitation concerns the implementation of the current SAVINGS Trial. 
In the SAVINGS Trial, participants in the Habit-Based group exhibited a propensity to 
substitute entire behaviours rather than contextual bounded choices. For instance, many 
participants wanted to swap buying lunch on campus to bringing lunch from home. 
Although these substitutions are reasonable and may produce tangible results, the credit 
card sleeves are not designed for this particular purpose, and these swaps may not have 
been properly supported.  
In addition, one of the limitations of the SAVINGS Trial is the sample population, 
i.e., university students. University students were selected largely because they are 
convenient to recruit. However, whether the results found in the SAVINGS Trial will 
generalise to a broader population is an open question. Indeed, students have been shown 
to differentiate from unemployed young adults (Jackson, 1999), based upon levels of 
resilience compared to unemployed populations. There is research, however, that does 
suggest these differences at the population level do indeed vary in the same way between 
the student and general populations (Hanel & Vione, 2016).  
In addition, a study commissioned by Money Advice Service found that students 
do demonstrate sub-optimal levels of financial capability (Money Advice Service, 2018). 
Specifically, the Money Advice Service Study found that 20% of students find 
themselves frequently overdrawn, and 40% have gone past their overdraft limit or into 
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an unplanned overdraft. The study further found that while 77% of students had at least 
a saving account, many no savings at all (31%). However, future work should look to see 
the trial implemented in an adult population setting. This would require much more 
thought and consideration into the exact strategy of implementation and whether future 
research may be needed to delve deeper into savings behaviour and how consumers 
utilise banks. A field experiment of adult-population, whether employed or un-employed 
would be of great use to examine further intricacies of consumption and savings 
behaviour and to potentially provide low-cost interventions. 
Another strength of the current SAVINGS Trial was effects found in the Goal-
Setting group. Participants in the Goal-Setting group were able to save £503.50 on 
average whilst only putting 36.76% of potential savings towards their goal. This finding 
suggests that deficits in goal-directedness be addressed through behavioural 
interventions.  
8.4 Implications 
The financial markets are beginning to take stock of the findings and impact that 
behavioural science has to offer especially in regards to behaviour change (Elliott et al., 
2010). Recently, there is a growing use of the body of behavioural science literature being 
utilised in policy research and design in the current climate (Dolan, Elliott, et al., 2012). 
Financial behaviour has seen a growing interest in the last few years, with the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) setting up their own behavioural economics and data science 
unit. In this time the FCA has used behavioural science and behavioural economics as a 
theoretical tool to inform policy and research. For instance, in one randomised controlled 
trial, the FCA suggest that limited attention and a present bias could explain why 
consumers often leave savings stagnated in their savings accounts after the interest rate 
ends. Consumers leaving money in these accounts are losing out on interest due to the 
inability to actively switch. The FCA randomised a series of letters to consumers with 
some not receiving any letter, as a control group. The results demonstrated an 8% increase 
in switching behaviour.  
Future work could see the FCA and other institutions doing more to provide a 
behavioural diagnosis of the problem behaviour. For the above example, how well does 
the present bias and a limited attention explain the current lack of switching? Expressed 
as a formative model this could be used to provide a diagnosis of the inability to switch, 
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which could be compared to alternative models. Through this approach then the 
utilisation of a randomised controlled trial would be cost-effective. As such, the financial 
sector should make full use of not only behavioural science literature but also of 
implementation science, such as the MRC guidelines (Campbell et al., 2000; Craig et al., 
2008). Although the MRC guidelines are an iterative time-consuming process, however, 
even a simple policy guide framework would be extensively useful, as conducted as part 
of the current study, in reducing unnecessary waste of time and resources through sub-
optimal policies. This could be perhaps be a sequential three-part process: in which a 
conceptual review is initiated, then to a behavioural diagnosis using qualitative or 
quantitative methods, and finally to implement some experimental work to design and 
test interventions. This may be through lab-based or natural experiments or even as 
randomised-controlled trials. For instance designing a lab-based mechanistic paradigm 
could be used to provide a cost-effective demonstration of potential interventions and 
their corresponding effects. The most effective intervention could therefore be 
implemented. The cost of a lab-based experiment would only be a fraction of the 
randomised-controlled trial and could even be implemented online, saving time and 
resources. Take the FCA research into consumer switching behaviour, here the 
researchers made no attempt of behavioural diagnosis and therefore the link between the 
interventions ran and the behaviour is made through top-down, goal-orientated 
assumptions. However, these assumptions may be valid, but not explain the behaviour as 
would an alternative model or hypothesis. This falls into the ISLAGIATT problem, where 
policy-makers often run interventions or policies test their assumptions rather than testing 
interventions to combat the most powerful explanation of the problem (Atkins & Michie, 
2015; Michie et al., 2014). 
This methodology offers an investigative, procedural format to maximize 
efficiency in reaching the optimal policy. Policy-makers and regulatory bodies such as 
the FCA should look to utilising a behavioural diagnosis, then towards experimentation. 
This could be done through quantitative modelling and then analysing natural 
experiments. For instance, using regression discontinuity designs where randomised 
controlled trials are not practical or even lab-based experiments. For example, stripping 
behaviour down to potential mechanisms, such as looking at individuals willingness to 
repay based upon an exemplar credit-card statement (Stewart, 2009) in which an 
experimental group were shown minimum payment required. The research matched the 
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real-world behaviours for those who saw the minimum payment information, where this 
minimum payment amount predicted partial payments; furthermore the distribution of 
partial payments matched the real-world distribution. This behavioural paradigm allows 
policy-makers and researchers to make a behavioural diagnosis, and target interventions 
or policies based upon such outcomes. For instance, in the credit-card repayment 
example, removing the minimum payment information raised mean payments by 70% 
demonstrating a staggering effect size (d = .51) from a simple intervention which is 
highly-cost effective. This also reduces the chances of faulty assumptions or anecdotal 
evidence. This may produce an effect, but implementing a behavioural diagnosis and 
identifying the causal mechanisms allows policy-makers and researchers to implement 
more cost-effective based upon accurate and detailed evidence of causal factors.  
In investigating individual differences in intervention efficacy this was able to 
identify how deficits in goal-directedness, as through constructs such as impulsivity, can 
often hinder savings behaviour. This approach could be of use within the personal finance 
and banking sector, where research can be used to segregate the populations more 
efficiently through psychological insights of behaviour. This could be done, for example, 
to reduce consumption in impulsive individuals by designing specific products to 
counteract such impulsivity. Furthermore regulatory institutions may seek to optimise 
policy by taking these constructs into account, in how to reduce delinquency rates of 
defaulting on credit-cards or loans. By segregating the population, this also offers an 
additional component by identifying the goal-directed fraction of the population, who 
would provide desirable outcomes.  
8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis used the MRC framework (Campbell et al., 2000; Craig et al., 2008) to 
diagnose and identify sub-optimal financial capability behaviours. These behavioural 
mechanisms were used to design interventions (under a bottom-up, design perspective) 
(Niedderer et al., 2016). These interventions were piloted and then tested in a fully-
powered randomised controlled trial, which identified significant intervention effects for 
the Goal-Setting intervention, whilst diminished effects for the Habit-Based intervention. 
Furthermore, investigations of moderating effects of individual differences, identified 
deficits in goal-direction predicted poorer intervention efficacy.  
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These results demonstrate how the MRC approach in conjunction with a design 
process can optimise the design and implementation of interventions or policy. This 
process can increase efficiency in policy design by highlighting causal factors to target 
and intervene (Atkins & Michie, 2015). This is the first time that such a process has been 
utilised in the financial sector, and demonstrates success in improving savings behaviour 
amongst a university population. Intervention efficacy was predicted by the degree to 
which an individual was goal-directed, producing greater savings the more goal-directed 
they were. 
 The formative research identified how behavioural motivation was a major 
component of financial capability, across all three areas of Keeping track, Making ends 
meet and Planning ahead. This finding is of paramount importance in development of 
household financial policy, for policies regarding financial education and financial 
literacy. These insights correspond to psychological theories of motivation of impulsive 
and compulsive behaviours (Black, 2007b). These insights, in addition to the results of 
the RCT and endophenotyping study, demonstrated a consistent finding that goal-
directedness translates into better intervention outcomes. These results support the ideas 
from computational neuroscience and psychiatry which demonstrates how goal-
directedness is a causal factor of sub-optimal behaviour (Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016; 
Huys et al., 2015; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012; Rouault et al., 2018), which 
this thesis demonstrated was responsible for sub-optimal savings. In these studies, I 
demonstrate how goal-directedness can offer a buffer in the maintenance of financial 
goals in the example of savings behaviour through an intervention. These insights map 
to fundamental behavioural constructs that are causally related to sub-optimal financial 
behaviours, and stem further across contexts (Rouault et al., 2018). 
   
 
 
 
  
 186 
 
 References 
Abler, B., Walter, H., Erk, S., Kammerer, H., & Spitzer, M. (2006). Prediction error as 
a linear function of reward probability is coded in human nucleus accumbens. 
NeuroImage, 31(2), 790–795. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.01.001 
Abraham, C., & Michie, S. (2008). A taxonomy of behavior change techniques used in 
interventions. Health Psychology, 27(3), 379. 
Adams, G. A., & Rau, B. L. (2011). Putting off tomorrow to do what you want today: 
planning for retirement. American Psychologist, 66(3), 180. 
Agarwal, S., & Mazumder, B. (2010). Cognitive abilities and household financial 
decision making (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago No. 2010–16). Chicago. 
Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In Action 
control (pp. 11–39). Springer. 
Albein-Urios, N., Martinez-González, J. M., Lozano, Ó., Clark, L., & Verdejo-García, 
A. (2012). Comparison of impulsivity and working memory in cocaine addiction and 
pathological gambling: implications for cocaine-induced neurotoxicity. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 126(1–2), 1–6. 
Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. The Self in Social 
Judgment, 1, 85–106. 
Allan, J. L., Johnston, M., & Campbell, N. (2011). Missed by an inch or a mile? 
Predicting the size of intention–behaviour gap from measures of executive control. 
Psychology & Health, 26(6), 635–650. https://doi.org/10.1080/08870441003681307 
Andrew Prestwich, Paschal Sheeran, T. L. W. and P. M. G. (1900). Implementation 
intentions. Notes, (January), 1–2. https://doi.org/10.1127/zfg/2014/0164 
 187 
 
Armel, K. C., Beaumel, A., & Rangel, A. (2008). Biasing simple choices by 
manipulating relative visual attention. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(5), 396–403. 
Arnold, J., & Rhyne, E. (2016). A Change in Behavior: Innovations in Financial 
Capability. 
Aron, A. R., Fletcher, P. C., Bullmore, E. T., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2003). 
Stop-signal inhibition disrupted by damage to right inferior frontal gyrus in humans. 
Nature Neuroscience, 6(2), 115–116. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1003 
Aron, A. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Cortical and Subcortical Contributions to Stop 
Signal Response Inhibition: Role of the Subthalamic Nucleus. Journal of Neuroscience, 
26(9), 2424–2433. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4682-05.2006 
Ashraf, N., Karlan, D., & Yin, W. (2006). Tying Odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a 
commitment savings product in the Philippines. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
121(2), 635–672. 
Atalay, S., Bodur, H., & Rasolofoarison, D. (2013). Shining in the Center: Central Gaze 
Cascade Effect on Product Choice. Ssrn. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2258531 
Atkins, L., & Michie, S. (2015). Designing interventions to change eating behaviours. 
Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 74(2), 164–170. 
Atkinson, A., McKay, S., Collard, S., & Kempson, E. (2007). Levels of financial 
capability in the UK. Public Money and Management, 27(1), 29–36. 
Aunger, R., & Curtis, V. (2016). Behaviour centred design: towards an applied science 
of behaviour change. Health Psychology Review, 10(4), 425–446. 
Aviva. (2017). Family Finances Report 2017. 
 188 
 
Baca-Motes, K., Brown, A., Gneezy, A., Keenan, E. A., & Nelson, L. D. (2012). 
Commitment and behavior change: Evidence from the field. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 39(5), 1070–1084. 
Balleine, B. W., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies in action 
control: Corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 48–69. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2009.131 
Banks, J., & Oldfield, Z. (2007a). Understanding pensions: Cognitive function, 
numerical ability and retirement saving. Fiscal Studies, 28(2), 143–170. 
Banks, J., & Oldfield, Z. (2007b). Understanding pensions: Cognitive function, 
numerical ability and retirement saving. Fiscal Studies, 28(2), 143–170. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2007.00052.x 
Bargh, J. A. (2002). Losing consciousness: Automatic influences on consumer 
judgment, behavior, and motivation. Journal of Consumer Research, 29(2), 280–285. 
Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Individual differences in working 
memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 
553. 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2018). lme4: Linear Mixed-Effects 
Models using “Eigen” and S4. Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/package=lme4 
Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Ego depletion and self-control failure: An energy model of 
the self’s executive function. Self and Identity, 1(2), 129–136. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2003). Self-regulation and the executive function of 
the self. Handbook of Self and Identity, 1, 197–217. 
Bayer, P. J., Bernheim, B. D., & Scholz, J. K. (2009). The effects of financial education 
 189 
 
in the workplace: Evidence from a survey of employers. Economic Inquiry, 47(4), 605–
624. 
Behavioural Insights Team. (2014). EAST: Four simple ways to apply behavioural 
insights. London: Behavioural Insights. 
Belin, D., Mar, A. C., Dalley, J. W., Robbins, T. W., & Everitt, B. J. (2008). High 
impulsivity predicts the switch to compulsive cocaine-taking. Science, 320(5881), 
1352–1355. 
Bernheim, B. D., & Garrett, D. M. (2003). The effects of financial education in the 
workplace: evidence from a survey of households. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 
1487–1519. 
Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). Dissecting components of 
reward:‘liking’,‘wanting’, and learning. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 9(1), 65–73. 
Bertrand, M., & Morse, A. (2011). Information disclosure, cognitive biases, and payday 
borrowing. The Journal of Finance, 66(6), 1865–1893. 
Bhutta, N. (2014). Payday loans and consumer financial health. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 47, 230–242. 
Bickel, W. K., Koffarnus, M. N., Moody, L., & Wilson, A. G. (2014). The behavioral-
and neuro-economic process of temporal discounting: A candidate behavioral marker of 
addiction. Neuropharmacology, 76, 518–527. 
Bickel, W. K., Miller, M. L., Yi, R., Kowal, B. P., Lindquist, D. M., & Pitcock, J. A. 
(2007). Behavioral and Neuroeconomics of Drug Addiction: Competing Neural 
Systems and Temporal Discounting Processes. Drug Alcohol Depend., 90(1), 573–579. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMI.2012.2196707.Separate 
 190 
 
Billieux, J., Rochat, L., Rebetez, M. M. L., & Van der Linden, M. (2008). Are all facets 
of impulsivity related to self-reported compulsive buying behavior? Personality and 
Individual Differences, 44(6), 1432–1442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.12.011 
Bisin, A., & Verdier, T. (2005). Cultural transmission. The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics. 
Black, D. W. (2007a). A review of compulsive buying disorder. World Psychiatry, 6(1), 
14. 
Black, D. W. (2007b). Compulsive buying disorder: a review of the evidence. CNS 
Spectrums, 12(2), 124–132. 
Black, D. W., Gabel, J., Hansen, J., & Schlosser, S. (2000). A double-blind comparison 
of fluvoxamine versus placebo in the treatment of compulsive buying disorder. Annals 
of Clinical Psychiatry, 12(4), 205–211. 
Blum, K., Cshen, A. L. C., Giordano, J., Borsten, J., Chen, T. J. H., Hauser, M., … 
Barh, D. (2012). The addictive brain: All roads lead to dopamine. Journal of 
Psychoactive Drugs, 44(2), 134–143. https://doi.org/10.1080/02791072.2012.685407 
Boyce, C. J., Brown, G. D. A., & Moore, S. C. (2010). Money and happiness: Rank of 
income, not income, affects life satisfaction. Psychological Science, 21(4), 471–475. 
Braver, T. S., Krug, M. K., Chiew, K. S., Kool, W., Westbrook, J. A., Clement, N. J., 
… Somerville, L. H. (2014). Mechanisms of motivation-cognition interaction: 
challenges and opportunities. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 
443–472. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0300-0 
Brown, M., van der Klaauw, W., Wen, J., & Zafar, B. (2013). Financial education and 
the debt behavior of the young. New York. Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93586 
 191 
 
Browning, M., Holmes, E. A., Charles, M., Cowen, P. J., & Harmer, C. J. (2012a). 
Using attentional bias modification as a cognitive vaccine against depression. 
Biological Psychiatry, 72(7), 572–579. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.04.014 
Browning, M., Holmes, E. A., Charles, M., Cowen, P. J., & Harmer, C. J. (2012b). 
Using attentional bias modification as a cognitive vaccine against depression. 
Biological Psychiatry, 72(7), 572–579. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.04.014 
Bruhn, M., Legovini, A., Zia, B., Leão, L. de S., & Marchetti, R. (2014). The Impact of 
High School Financial Education: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence from Brazil, 
(6723). Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/19601210/impact-high-school-
financial-education-large-scale-experimental-evidence-brazil%5Cnhttp://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/06/02/000333
037_20140602132056/Render 
Buchan, J., Charlesworth, A., Gershlick, B., & Seccombe, I. (2017). Rising pressure: 
the NHS workforce challenge. Health Foundation. Http://Www. Health. Org. 
Uk/Publication/Risingpressure-Nhs-Workforce-Challenge. 
Büchel, C., Peters, J., Banaschewski, T., Bokde, A. L. W., Bromberg, U., Conrod, P. J., 
… Ziesch, V. (2017). Blunted ventral striatal responses to anticipated rewards 
foreshadow problematic drug use in novelty-seeking adolescents. Nature 
Communications, 8, 14140. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms14140 
Calnan, M., & Rutter, D. R. (1986a). Do health beliefs predict health behaviour? A 
follow-up analysis of breast self-examination. Social Science & Medicine (1982), 
26(4), 463–465. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3363396 
Calnan, M., & Rutter, D. R. (1986b). Do health beliefs predict health behaviour? An 
analysis of breast self-examination. Social Science & Medicine, 22(6), 673–678. 
 192 
 
Campbell, M., Fitzpatrick, R., Haines, A., Kinmonth, A. L., Sandercock, P., 
Spiegelhalter, D., & Tyrer, P. (2000). Framework for design and evaluation of complex 
interventions to improve health. Bmj, 321(7262), 694–696. 
Caplan, M., & Sherraden, M. (2018). Financial Capability as Social Investment, 45(4). 
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., & Feldman, M. W. (1981). Cultural transmission and evolution: a 
quantitative approach. Princeton University Press. 
Cesarini, D., Johannesson, M., Lichtenstein, P., Sandewall, Ö., & Wallace, B. (2009). 
Genetic Variation in Financial Decision Making. Journal of Finance, 65(5), 1725–1754. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01592.x 
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. 
J. (2005). The neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive disorder: The importance of 
failures in cognitive and behavioural inhibition as candidate endophenotypic markers. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(3), 399–419. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.11.006 
Chamberlain, S. R., Fineberg, N. A., Blackwell, A. D., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. 
J. (2006). Motor inhibition and cognitive flexibility in obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and trichotillomania. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163(7), 1282–1284. 
Chamberlain, S. R., Fineberg, N. A., Menzies, L. A., Blackwell, A. D., Bullmore, E. T., 
Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. J. (2007). Impaired cognitive flexibility and motor 
inhibition in unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164(2), 335–338. 
Chambers, C. D., Bellgrove, M. A., Gould, I. C., English, T., Garavan, H., McNaught, 
E., … Mattingley, J. B. (2007). Dissociable Mechanisms of Cognitive Control in 
Prefrontal and Premotor Cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98(6), 3638–3647. 
https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00685.2007 
 193 
 
Charles, K. K., & Hurst, E. (2003). The Correlation of Wealth across Generations. 
Journal of Political Economy, 111(6), 1155–1182. https://doi.org/10.1086/378526 
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. C. (2011). $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: 
Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans*. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3), 
748–763. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST 
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., & Metrick, A. (2002). Defined Contribution 
Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance. NBER/Tax 
Policy and the Economy (Vol. 16). https://doi.org/10.1162/089286402760173467 
Chu, B. (2018). UK household saving ratio hit record low in 2017, says Office for 
National Statistics. Retrieved from 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/uk-household-saving-ratio-2017-
ons-inflation-income-expenditure-a8279016.html 
Ciesielski, K. T., Lesnik, P. G., Savoy, R. L., Grant, E. P., & Ahlfors, S. P. (2006). 
Developmental neural networks in children performing a Categorical N-Back Task. 
Neuroimage, 33(3), 980–990. 
Claes, L., Nederkoorn, C., Vandereycken, W., Guerrieri, R., & Vertommen, H. (2006). 
Impulsiveness and lack of inhibitory control in eating disorders. Eating Behaviors, 7(3), 
196–203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eatbeh.2006.05.001 
Cohen, J. D., Perlstein, W. M., Braver, T. S., Nystrom, L. E., Noll, D. C., Jonides, J., & 
Smith, E. E. (1997). Temporal dynamics of brain activation during a working memory 
task. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/386604a0 
Cole, S., & Shastry, G. (2010). Is High School the Right Time to Teach Savings 
Behavior? The Effect of Financial Education and Mathematics Courses on Savings, 
(December). 
 194 
 
Cole, S., & Shastry, G. K. (2009). Smart money: The effect of education, cognitive 
ability, and financial literacy on financial market participation. Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School, (February), 09–071. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1317298 
Collins, M. J. (2013). The impacts of mandatory financial education: Evidence from a 
randomized field study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 95, 146–158. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.08.011 
Collins, M. J., & O’Rourke, C. M. (2010). Financial Education and Counseling — Still 
Holding Promise Author ( s ) Source. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 44(3), 483–
498. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2010.01179.x 
Conway, A. R. A., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M. F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., & 
Engle, R. W. (2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user’s 
guide. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12(5), 769–786. 
Corace, K., & Garber, G. (2014). When knowledge is not enough: Changing behavior 
to change vaccination results. Human Vaccines & Immunotherapeutics, 10(9), 2623–
2624. 
Coskunpinar, A., Dir, A. L., & Cyders, M. A. (2013). Multidimensionality in 
impulsivity and alcohol use: A meta-analysis using the UPPS model of impulsivity. 
Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(9), 1441–1450. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12131 
Cox, N. (2011). Stata tip 96: Cube roots. The Stata Journal, 11(1), 149–154. 
https://doi.org/The Stata Journal 
Craig, P., Dieppe, P., Macintyre, S., Michie, S., Nazareth, I., & Petticrew, M. (2008). 
Developing and evaluating complex interventions: the new Medical Research Council 
guidance. Bmj, 337, a1655. 
 195 
 
Cronqvist, H., & Siegel, S. (2015). The Origins of Savings Behavior. Journal of 
Political Economy, 123(1), 123–169. https://doi.org/10.1086/679284 
Dalley, J. W., Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2011). Impulsivity, Compulsivity, and 
Top-Down Cognitive Control. Neuron, 69(4), 680–694. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.01.020 
Davis, K. K., & Hustvedt, G. (2012). It’s a Matter of Control: Saving for Retirement. 
International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(2), 248–261. 
Daw, N. D., Gershman, S. J., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2011a). Model-
based influences on humans’ choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron, 69(6), 
1204–1215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.027 
Daw, N. D., Gershman, S. J., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2011b). Model-
based influences on humans’ choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron, 69(6), 
1204–1215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.027 
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based competition between 
prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nature Neuroscience, 
8(12), 1704–1711. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1560 
Daw, N. D., & Tobler, P. N. (2013). Value Learning through Reinforcement: The 
Basics of Dopamine and Reinforcement Learning. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making 
and the Brain: Second Edition. Elsevier Inc. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-416008-
8.00015-2 
Dayan, P., & Abbott, L. F. (2001). Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and 
Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems. Computational and Mathematical Modeling 
of Neural …, 480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.019 
De Meza, D., Irlenbusch, B., & Reyniers, D. (2008). Financial capability: A 
 196 
 
behavioural economics perspective. Consumer Research, 69, 192–193. 
Derbyshire, K. L., Chamberlain, S. R., Odlaug, B. L., Schreiber, L., & Grant, J. E. 
(2014). Neurocognitive functioning in compulsive buying disorder. Annals of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 26(1), 57–63. 
Desarbo, W. S., & Edwards, E. A. (1996). Typologies of compulsive buying behavior: 
A constrained clusterwise regression approach. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5(3), 
231–262. 
Deserno, L., Wilbertz, T., Reiter, A., Horstmann, A., Neumann, J., Villringer, A., … 
Schlagenhauf, F. (2015). Lateral prefrontal model-based signatures are reduced in 
healthy individuals with high trait impulsivity. Translational Psychiatry, 5(10), e659. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2015.139 
Diamond, A., & Lee, K. (2011). Interventions shown to aid executive function 
development in children 4 to 12 years old. Science, 333(6045), 959–964. 
Dick, D. M., Smith, G., Olausson, P., Mitchell, S. H., Leeman, R. F., O’malley, S. S., & 
Sher, K. (2010). Understanding the construct of impulsivity and its relationship to 
alcohol use disorders. Addiction Biology, 15(2), 217–226. 
Doi, Y., McKenzie, D., & Zia, B. (2013). The Impact of Financial Literacy Training for 
Migrants and their Families (No. WPS6157). Finance & PSD Impact. 
Dolan, P., Elliott, A., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2012). Influencing financial behavior: 
From changing minds to changing contexts. Journal of Behavioral Finance, 13(2), 126–
142. 
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2012). 
Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(1), 
264–277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.009 
 197 
 
Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2013). Goals and habits in the brain. Neuron, 80(2), 312–
325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.09.007 
Doñamayor, N., Strelchuk, D., Baek, K., Banca, P., & Voon, V. (2018). The 
involuntary nature of binge drinking: goal directedness and awareness of intention. 
Addiction Biology, 23(1), 515–526. 
Drăgulescu, A., & Yakovenko, V. M. (2001). Exponential and power-law probability 
distributions of wealth and income in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 299(1–2), 213–221. 
Drever, A. I., Odders-White, E., Kalish, C. W., Else-Quest, N. M., Hoagland, E. M., & 
Nelms, E. N. (2015). Foundations of financial well-being: Insights into the role of 
executive function, financial socialization, and experience-based learning in childhood 
and youth. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 49(1), 13–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joca.12068 
Dumville, J. C., Torgerson, D. J., & Hewitt, C. E. (2006). Reporting attrition in 
randomised controlled trials. Bmj, 332(7547), 969–971. 
Elliot, A. J., & Thrash, T. M. (2002). Approach-avoidance motivation in personality: 
Approach and avoidance temperaments and goals. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82(5), 804–818. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.5.804 
Elliott, A., Dolan, P., Vlaev, I., Adriaenssens, C., & Metcalfe, R. (2010). Transforming 
Financial Behaviour: developing interventions that build financial capability. Published 
by The Consumer Financial Education Body. 
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Tess Garton, M., Ballard, K., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., & 
Knutson, B. (2009). Don’t stop thinking about tomorrow: Individual differences in 
future self-continuity account for saving Hal. Judgement and Decision Making, 4(4), 
280–286. https://doi.org/10.3851/IMP2701.Changes 
 198 
 
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Wimmer, G. E., & Knutson, B. (2009). Saving for the future self: 
Neural measures of future self-continuity predict temporal discounting. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 4(1), 85–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn042 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 59, 255–278. 
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-Process Theories of Higher 
Cognition: Advancing the Debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–
241. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612460685 
Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug 
addiction: From actions to habits to compulsion. Nature Neuroscience, 8(11), 1481–
1489. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1579 
Farrell, N. R., Deacon, B. J., Kemp, J. J., Dixon, L. J., & Sy, J. T. (2013). Do negative 
beliefs about exposure therapy cause its suboptimal delivery? An experimental 
investigation. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 27(8), 763–771. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 175–191. 
Feldman, D. B., & Sills, J. R. (2013). Hope and cardiovascular health-promoting 
behaviour: Education alone is not enough. Psychology & Health, 28(7), 727–745. 
Fernandes, D., Lynch, J. G., & Netemeyer, R. G. (2014). Financial Literacy, Financial 
Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors. Management Science, 60(8), 1861–
1883. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1849 
Filomensky, T. Z., & Tavares, H. (2015). Compulsive buying disorder. In Textbook of 
 199 
 
Addiction Treatment: International Perspectives (pp. 1527–1542). Springer. 
Financial Conduct Authority. (2015). Arrears and Forbearance in High-Cost Short-
Term Credit. London. Retrieved from https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-
reviews/tr15-3.pdf 
Fishbein, M. (1975). i Ajzen, I.(1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behaviour: An 
Introduction to Theory and Research. Addison-Wesley. 
Fishbein, M. (1979). A theory of reasoned action: Some applications and implications. 
Fishbein, M., Triandis, H. C., Kanfer, F. H., Becker, M., & Middlestadt, S. E. (2001). 
Factors influencing behavior and behavior change. In A. Baum, T. Revenson, & J. 
Singer (Eds.), Handbook of Health Psychology (pp. 3–17). New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum 2000. 
Fox, J., Weisberg, S., & Price, B. (2018). car: Companion to Applied Regression. 
Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/package=car 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The Relations Among Inhibition and 
Interference Control Functions: A Latent-Variable Analysis. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 133(1), 101–135. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.101 
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Corley, R. P., Young, S. E., DeFries, J. C., & Hewitt, J. K. 
(2006). Not all executive functions are related to intelligence. Psychological Science, 
17(2), 172–179. 
Gale, W. G., & Levine, R. (2011). Financial Literacy: What Works? How Could it Be 
More Effective? SSRN Electronic Journal, (October), 1–31. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2316933 
Gardner, B. (2014). A review and analysis of the use of “habit” in understanding, 
 200 
 
predicting and influencing health-related behaviour. Health Psychology Review, 9(3), 
277–295. https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2013.876238 
Gardner, B., Lally, P., & Wardle, J. (2012). Making health habitual: the psychology of 
“habit formation” and general practice. British Journal of General Practice, 62(605), 
664–666. https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp12X659466 
Garg, N., Wansink, B., & Inman, J. J. (2007). The influence of incidental affect on 
consumers’ food intake. Journal of Marketing, 71(1), 194–206. 
Gartner, K., & Todd, R. M. (2005). Effectiveness of online early intervention financial 
education programs for credit-card holders. In Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Proceedings. 
Gathergood, J., Mahoney, N., Stewart, N., & Weber, J. (2017). How Do Individuals 
Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic. National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Gathergood, J., Stewart, N., & Weber, J. (2018). How Do Consumers Avoid Penalty 
Fees ? Evidence From Credit Cards, 1–72. 
Gerardi, K., Goette, L., & Meier, S. (2013). Numerical ability predicts mortgage 
default. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(28), 11267–11271. 
Gillan, C. M., Kosinski, M., Whelan, R., Phelps, E. A., & Daw, N. D. (2016). 
Characterizing a psychiatric symptom dimension related to deficits in goaldirected 
control. ELife, 5(MARCH2016), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.11305 
Gillan, C. M., Otto, A. R., Phelps, E. A., & Daw, N. D. (2015). Model-based learning 
protects against forming habits. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 
15(3), 523–536. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-015-0347-6 
 201 
 
Gillan, C. M., Robbins, T. W., Sahakian, B. J., van den Heuvel, O. A., & van Wingen, 
G. (2016). The role of habit in compulsivity. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 
26(5), 828–840. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroneuro.2015.12.033 
Giné, X., Karlan, D., & Zinman, J. (2010). Put your money where your butt is: a 
commitment contract for smoking cessation. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 2(4), 213–235. 
Gittelsohn, J., Evans, M., Story, M., Davis, S. M., Metcalfe, L., Helitzer, D. L., & Clay, 
T. E. (1999). Multisite formative assessment for the Pathways study to prevent obesity 
in American Indian schoolchildren. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 69(4), 
767S–772S. 
Gittelsohn, J., Steckler, A., Johnson, C. C., Pratt, C., Grieser, M., Pickrel, J., … Staten, 
L. K. (2006). Formative research in school and community-based health programs and 
studies: “State of the art” and the TAAG approach. Health Education and Behavior, 
33(1), 25–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198105282412 
Glimcher, P. W., Fehr, E., Daw, N. D., & Tobler, P. N. (2014). Value Learning through 
Reinforcement. Neuroeconomics, 283–298. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-416008-
8.00015-2 
Goldberg, L. R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. American 
Psychologist, 48(1), 26. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans. 
American Psychologist, 54(7), 493–503. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.493 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Brandstätter, V. (1997). Implementation intentions and effective 
goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(1), 186. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal 
 202 
 
achievement: A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 38, 69–119. 
Gordon, B., Shelton, J., & Bugg, J. (2011). Structural correlates of prospective memory. 
Neuropsychologia, 49(14), 3795–3800. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.09.035.Structural 
Grant, J. E., & Chamberlain, S. R. (2014). Impulsive action and impulsive choice across 
substance and behavioral addictions: cause or consequence? Addictive Behaviors, 
39(11), 1632–1639. 
Guiso, L., & Sodini, P. (2013). Household finance: An emerging field. In Handbook of 
the Economics of Finance (Vol. 2, pp. 1397–1532). Elsevier. 
Guitart-Masip, M., Duzel, E., Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2014). Action versus valence 
in decision making. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 194–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.003 
Gutter, M. S., Garrison, S., & Copur, Z. (2010). Social learning opportunities and the 
financial behaviors of college students. Family and Consumer Sciences Research 
Journal, 38(4), 387–404. 
Hall, P. A., Fong, G. T., Epp, L. J., & Elias, L. J. (2008). Executive function moderates 
the intention-behavior link for physical activity and dietary behavior. Psychology & 
Health, 23(3), 309–326. 
Hanel, P. H. P., & Vione, K. C. (2016). Do student samples provide an accurate 
estimate of the general public? PloS One, 11(12), e0168354. 
Hare, T. A., Hakimi, S., & Rangel, A. (2014). Activity in dlPFC and its effective 
connectivity to vmPFC are associated with temporal discounting. Frontiers in 
Neuroscience, 8(8 MAR), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2014.00050 
 203 
 
Hart, W., Albarracín, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M. J., & Merrill, L. 
(2009). Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to 
information. Psychological Bulletin, 135(4), 555. 
Harter, C. L., & Harter, J. F. (2007). Assessing the effectiveness of financial fitness for 
life in eastern Kentucky. In Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
Baltimore, Md (pp. 7–11). 
Hastings, J. S., Madrian, B., & Skimmyhorn, W. (2013). Financial Literacy, Financial 
Education and Economic Outcomes. Annu Rev Econom, 347–373. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082312-125807.FINANCIAL 
Headey, B., Muffels, R., & Wagner, G. G. (2010). Long-running German panel survey 
shows that personal and economic choices, not just genes, matter for happiness. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(42), 17922–17926. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1008612107 
Heath, C., & Soll, J. B. (1996). Mental budgeting and consumer decisions. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 23(1), 40–52. 
Hershey, D. A., Jacobs-Lawson, J. M., McArdle, J. J., & Hamagami, F. (2007). 
Psychological foundations of financial planning for retirement. Journal of Adult 
Development, 14(1–2), 26–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-007-9028-1 
Hilgert, M. A., Hogarth, J. M., & Beverly, S. G. (2003). Household financial 
management: The connection between knowledge and behavior. Fed. Res. Bull., 89, 
309. 
Hinson, J. M., Jameson, T. L., & Whitney, P. (2002). Somatic markers, working 
memory, and decision making. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 2(4), 
341–353. https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.2.4.341 
 204 
 
Hira, T. (2010). The NEFE quarter century project: Implications for researchers, 
educators, and policy makers from a quarter century of financial education. Denver: 
National Endowment for Financial Education. 
Hirsh, J. B. (2014). Extraverted populations have lower savings rates. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 81, 162–168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.08.020 
Howlett, E., Kees, J., & Kemp, E. (2008). The Role of Self Regulation, Future 
Orientation, and Financial Knowledge in Long Term Financial Decisions. Journal of 
Consumer Affairs, 42(2), 223–242. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2008.00106.x 
Huston, S. J. (2010). Measuring Financial Literacy. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 
44(2), 296–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2010.01170.x 
Huys, Q. J. M., & Dayan, P. (2009). A Bayesian formulation of behavioral control. 
Cognition, 113(3), 314–328. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.008 
Huys, Q. J. M., Guitart-Masip, M., Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2015). Decision-
Theoretic Psychiatry. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(3), 400–421. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702614562040 
Insel, K. C., Einstein, G. O., Morrow, D. G., Koerner, K. M., & Hepworth, J. T. (2016). 
Multifaceted Prospective Memory Intervention to Improve Medication Adherence. 
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 64(3), 561–568. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jgs.14032 
Insel, K. C. K. C., Einstein, G. O., Morrow, D. G., & Hepworth, J. T. (2013). A 
multifaceted prospective memory intervention to improve medication adherence: design 
of a randomized control trial. Contemporary Clinical Trials, 34(1), 45–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cct.2012.09.005 
Jackson, T. (1999). Differences in psychosocial experiences of employed, unemployed, 
 205 
 
and student samples of young adults. Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and 
Applied, 133(1), 49–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223989909599721 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Perrig, W. J., & Meier, B. (2010). The concurrent 
validity of the N-back task as a working memory measure. Memory, 18(4), 394–412. 
Jonides, J., Schumacher, E. H., Smith, E. E., Lauber, E. J., Awh, E., Minoshima, S., & 
Koeppe, R. A. (1997). Verbal Working Memory Load Affects Regional Brain 
Activation as Measured by PET. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.1997.9.4.462 
Judah, G., Gardner, B., & Aunger, R. (2013). Forming a flossing habit: An exploratory 
study of the psychological determinants of habit formation. British Journal of Health 
Psychology, 18(2), 338–353. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8287.2012.02086.x 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar: Straus and 
Girou. 
Kalivas, P. W. (2008). Addiction as a pathology in prefrontal cortical regulation of 
corticostriatal habit circuitry. Neurotoxicity Research, 14(2–3), 185–189. 
Kane, M. J., Conway, A. R. A., Miura, T. K., & Colflesh, G. J. H. (2007). Working 
memory, attention control, and the N-back task: a question of construct validity. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(3), 615. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2002). The role of prefrontal cortex in working-memry 
capacity, executive attention, and general fluid intelligence: An individual-differences 
perspective. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 637–671. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working-Memory Capacity and the Control of 
Attention: The Contributions of Goal Neglect, Response Competition, and Task Set to 
Stroop Interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(1), 47–70. 
 206 
 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.132.1.47 
Kaplan, B. A., Lemley, S. M., Reed, D. D., & Jarmolowicz, D. P. (2014). 21- and 27-
Item Monetary Choice Questionnaire Automated Scorers. Center for Applied 
Neuroeconomics, University of Kansas. 
Karlan, D., McConnell, M., Mullainathan, S., & Zinman, J. (2010). Getting to the Top 
of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving (No. 998). Economic Growth Center. New 
Haven. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2296 
Karlsson, N., Gärling, T., & Selart, M. (1997). Effects of mental accounting on 
intertemporal choices. Goteborg Psychological Reports, 27(5), 1–17. Retrieved from 
http://www.kultur.gu.se/digitalAssets/1286/1286083_gpr97_nr5.pdf 
Kearney-Ramos, T. E., Fausett, J. S., Gess, J. L., Reno, A., Peraza, J., Kilts, C. D., & 
James, G. A. (2014). Merging clinical neuropsychology and functional neuroimaging to 
evaluate the construct validity and neural network engagement of the n-back task. 
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 20(7), 736–750. 
Kelly, M. P., & Barker, M. (2016). Why is changing health-related behaviour so 
difficult? Public Health, 136, 109–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2016.03.030 
Kim, S. H., Baik, S.-H., Park, C. S., Kim, S. J., Choi, S. W., & Kim, S. E. (2011). 
Reduced striatal dopamine D2 receptors in people with Internet addiction. 
NeuroReport, 22(8), 407–411. https://doi.org/10.1097/WNR.0b013e328346e16e 
Koehler, D. J., Langstaff, J., & Liu, W.-Q. (2015). A simulated financial savings task 
for studying consumption and retirement decision making. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 46, 89–97. 
Kollmuss, A., & Agyeman, J. (2002). Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally 
and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behavior? Environmental Education 
 207 
 
Research, 8(3), 239–260. 
Koshy, E., Car, J., & Majeed, A. (2008). Effectiveness of mobile-phone short message 
service (SMS) reminders for ophthalmology outpatient appointments: observational 
study. BMC Ophthalmology, 8, 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2415-8-9 
Krajbich, I., Armel, C., & Rangel, A. (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and 
comparison of value in simple choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13(10), 1292. 
Kulendran, M., Borovoi, L., Purkayastha, S., Darzi, A., & Vlaev, I. (2017). Impulsivity 
predicts weight loss after obesity surgery. Surgery for Obesity and Related Diseases, 
13(6), 1033–1040. 
Kulendran, M., Patel, K., Darzi, A., & Vlaev, I. (2016). Diagnostic validity of 
behavioural and psychometric impulsivity measures: An assessment in adolescent and 
adult populations. Personality and Individual Differences, 90, 347–352. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.11.026 
Kulendran, M., Vlaev, I., Sugden, C., King, D., Ashrafian, H., Gately, P., & Darzi, A. 
(2013). Neuropsychological assessment as a predictor of weight loss in obese 
adolescents. International journal of obesity (2005) (Vol. 38). 
https://doi.org/10.1038/ijo.2013.198 
Lachman, M. E., & Weaver, S. L. (1998). The sense of control as a moderator of social 
class differences in health and well-being. Jounral of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(3), 763–773. 
Lally, P., & Gardner, B. (2013). Promoting habit formation. Health Psychol Rev, 
7(Supplement 1), 137–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2011.603640 
Lally, P., & Gardner, B. (2013). Promoting habit formation. Health Psychology 
Review, 7(sup1), S137–S158. 
 208 
 
Lally, P., van Jaarsveld, C., Potts, H., & Wardle, J. (2010). How are habits formed: 
Modelling habit formation in the real world. European Journal of Social Psychology 
Eur., 40, 998–1009. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp 
Lawrence, A. D., & Brooks, D. J. (2014). Ventral striatal dopamine synthesis capacity 
is associated with individual differences in behavioral disinhibition. Frontiers in 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 8(March), 86. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00086 
Lawrence, A. J., Luty, J., Bogdan, N. A., Sahakian, B. J., & Clark, L. (2009). 
Impulsivity and response inhibition in alcohol dependence and problem gambling. 
Psychopharmacology, 207(1), 163–172. 
Lee, J. M., & Hanna, S. D. (2015). Savings goals and saving behavior from a 
perspective of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Journal of Financial Counseling and 
Planning, 26(2), 129–147. 
Leff, N. H. (1969). Dependency rates and savings rates. The American Economic 
Review, 59(5), 886–896. 
Lejoyeux, M., Arbaretaz, M., McLoughlin, M., & Ades, J. (2002). Impulse control 
disorders and depression. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 190(5), 310–
314. 
Livingstone, S. M., & Lunt, P. K. (1992). Predicting personal debt and debt repayment: 
Psychological, social and economic determinants. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
13(1), 111–134. 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal 
setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist, 57(9), 705–
717. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.57.9.705 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2006). New directions in goal-setting theory. Current 
 209 
 
Directions in Psychological Science, 15(5), 265–268. 
Logan, G. D., Schachar, R. J., & Tannock, R. (1997). Impulsivity and inhibitory 
control. Psychological Science, 8(1), 60–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1997.tb00545.x 
Logan, G. D., Zandt, T. Van, Exeter, F. V., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2014). On the 
ability to inhibit thought and action: General and special theories of an act of control. 
Psychological Review, 121(1), 66–95. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035230.This 
Logie, R. H., Cocchini, G., Della Sala, S., & Baddeley, A. D. (2004). Is there a specific 
executive capacity for dual task coordination? Evidence from Alzheimer’s disease. 
Neuropsychology, 18(3), 504–513. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.18.3.504 
Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., Grob, A., Suh, E. M., & Shao, L. (2000). Cross-cultural 
evidence for the fundamental features of extraversion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. US: American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.79.3.452 
Lusardi, A. (2002). Preparing for retirement: The importance of planning costs. In 
Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National 
Tax Association (pp. 148–154). Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
venezuela-mercosur-brazil-idUSKBN13Q4CC 
Lusardi, A. (2008). Household saving behavior: the role financial literacy, information 
and financial education programs. NBER Working Paper Series, (February), 13824. 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w13824 
Lyubomirsky, S. (2001). Why are some people happier than others? The role of 
cognitive and motivational processes in well-being. American Psychologist, 56(3), 239. 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Tucker, K. L. (1998). Implications of individual differences in 
 210 
 
subjective happiness for perceiving, interpreting, and thinking about life events. 
Motivation and Emotion, 22(2), 155–186. 
MacKillop, J., Amlung, M. T., Few, L. R., Ray, L. A., Sweet, L. H., & Munafò, M. R. 
(2011). Delayed reward discounting and addictive behavior: a meta-analysis. 
Psychopharmacology, 216(3), 305–321. 
Mader, P. (2018). Contesting Financial Inclusion. Development and Chang, 49(2), 1–
24. 
Magendans, J., Gutteling, J. M., & Zebel, S. (2017). Psychological determinants of 
financial buffer saving: the influence of financial risk tolerance and regulatory focus. 
Journal of Risk Research, 20(8), 1076–1093. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1147491 
Mandelbrot, B. (1960). The Pareto-Levy law and the distribution of income. 
International Economic Review, 1(2), 79–106. 
Mandell, L. (2008). Financial Literacy of High School Students BT  - Handbook of 
Consumer Finance Research. In J. J. Xiao (Ed.) (pp. 163–183). New York, NY: 
Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-75734-6_10 
Martin, P., & Kraemer, H. C. (1987). Individual differences in behaviour and their 
statistical consequences. Animal Behaviour, 35(5), 1366–1375. 
Mason, C. L. J., & Wilson, R. (2000). Conceptualising financial literacy. © 
Loughborough University. 
McCarney, R., Warner, J., Iliffe, S., Van Haselen, R., Griffin, M., & Fisher, P. (2007). 
The Hawthorne Effect: a randomised, controlled trial. BMC Medical Research 
Methodology, 7(1), 30. 
 211 
 
McClure, J., Wills, C., Johnston, D., & Recker, C. (2011). How the 2010 Canterbury 
(Darfield) earthquake affected earthquake risk perception: Comparing citizens inside 
and outside the earthquake region. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 
2011(2), 3–10. 
McCluskey, A., & Lovarini, M. (2005). Providing education on evidence-based practice 
improved knowledge but did not change behaviour: a before and after study. BMC 
Medical Education, 5(1), 40. 
McDaniel, M. A., Howard, D. C., & Butler, K. M. (2008). Implementation intentions 
facilitate prospective memory under high attention demands. Memory and Cognition, 
36(4), 716–724. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.36.4.716 
McQuillin, B., & Sugden, R. (2012). Reconciling normative and behavioural 
economics: the problems to be solved. Social Choice and Welfare, 38(4), 553–567. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0627-1 
Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. (2008). Charging Myopically Ahead : Evidence on Present-
Biased Preferences and Credit. Business, 1–46. 
Meisenberg, G. (2012). National IQ and economic outcomes. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 53(2), 103–107. 
Mellanby, A., Phelps, F., & Tripp, J. (1992). Sex education: more is not enough. 
Journal of Adolescence, 15(4), 449–466. 
Melrose, K. L., Brown, G. D. A., & Wood, A. M. (2013). Am I Abnormal? Relative 
Rank and Social Norm Effects in Judgments of Anxiety and Depression Symptom 
Severity. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(2), 174–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1754 
Michie, S., Atkins, L., & West, R. (2014). The behaviour change wheel. A Guide to 
 212 
 
Designing Interventions. 1st Ed. Great Britain: Silverback Publishing. 
Michie, S., Carey, R., Johnston, M., Rothman, A., Kelly, M., Davidson, K., & de Bruin, 
M. (2016). From theory-inspired to theory-based interventions: linking behaviour 
change techniques to their mechanisms of action. Euro Health Psychol, 18, 395. 
Michie, S., Johnston, M., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., & Eccles, M. (2008). From theory 
to intervention: mapping theoretically derived behavioural determinants to behaviour 
change techniques. Applied Psychology, 57(4), 660–680. 
Michie, S., & Prestwich, A. (2010). Are interventions theory-based? Development of a 
theory coding scheme. Health Psychology, 29(1), 1. 
Michie, S., Richardson, M., Johnston, M., Abraham, C., Francis, J., Hardeman, W., … 
Wood, C. E. (2013). The behavior change technique taxonomy (v1) of 93 hierarchically 
clustered techniques: Building an international consensus for the reporting of behavior 
change interventions. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 46(1), 81–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12160-013-9486-6 
Michie, S., Stralen, M. M. Van, & West, R. (2011). The behaviour change wheel : A 
new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions The 
behaviour change wheel : A new method for characterising and designing behaviour 
change interventions, 42(April). 
Michie, S., Van Stralen, M. M., & West, R. (2011). The behaviour change wheel: a new 
method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. 
Implementation Science, 6(1), 42. 
Miller, D. J., Derefinko, K. J., Lynam, D. R., Milich, R., & Fillmore, M. T. (2010). 
Impulsivity and Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder: Subtype Classification Using 
the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale. J Psychopathol Behav Assess, 32(3), 323–332. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-009-9155-z.Impulsivity 
 213 
 
Miller, K. M., Price, C. C., Okun, M. S., Montijo, H., & Bowers, D. (2009). Is the n-
back task a valid neuropsychological measure for assessing working memory? Archives 
of Clinical Neuropsychology, 24(7), 711–717. 
Miller, K., Shenhav, A., & Ludvig, E. (2016). Habits without Values. BioRxiv, 067603. 
https://doi.org/10.1101/067603 
Mirowsky, J., & Hu, P. N. (1996). Physical impairment and the diminishing effects of 
income. Social Forces, 74(3), 1073–1096. 
Money Advice Service. (2014). Money Lives. Retrieved from 
https://masassets.blob.core.windows.net/cms/files/000/000/757/original/MAS_MONEY
_LIVES_BROCHURE_ONLINE.PDF 
Money Advice Service. (2016). The Squeezed Segment. 
Money Advice Service. (2018). Higher education students and money. London. 
Montague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J., & Dayan, P. (2012). Computational 
Psychiatry (2016), 16(1), 72–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.018. 
Computational 
Moore, G. F., Audrey, S., Barker, M., Bond, L., Bonell, C., Hardeman, W., … Wight, 
D. (2015). Process evaluation of complex interventions: Medical Research Council 
guidance. Bmj, 350, h1258. 
Morein-Zamir, S., Papmeyer, M., Gillan, C. M., Crockett, M. J., Fineberg, N. a., 
Sahakian, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2012). Punishment promotes response control 
deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder: evidence from a motivational go/no-go task. 
Psychological Medicine, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291712001018 
Murray, J. E., Dilleen, R., Pelloux, Y., Economidou, D., Dalley, J. W., Belin, D., & 
 214 
 
Everitt, B. J. (2014). Increased impulsivity retards the transition to dorsolateral striatal 
dopamine control of cocaine seeking. Biological Psychiatry, 76(1), 15–22. 
National Council on Economic Education. (2007). Survey of the states: Economic and 
personal finance education in our nation’s schools in 2007. New York. Retrieved from 
http://www.cfed.org/imageManager/_docu- ments/NCEESurvey2007.pdf 
Nederkoorn, C., Guerrieri, R., Havermans, R. C., Roefs, A., & Jansen, A. (2009). The 
interactive effect of hunger and impulsivity on food intake and purchase in a virtual 
supermarket. International Journal of Obesity, 33(8), 905. 
Nederkoorn, C., Houben, K., Hofmann, W., Roefs, A., & Jansen, A. (2010). Control 
yourself or just eat what you like? weight gain over a year is predicted by an interactive 
effect of response inhibition and implicit preference for snack foods. Health 
Psychology, 29(4), 389–393. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019921 
Neubert, M. J. (1998). The value of feedback and goal setting over goal setting alone 
and potential moderators of this effect: A meta-analysis. Human Performance, 11(4), 
321–335. 
Nichols, A. L., & Maner, J. K. (2008). The good-subject effect: Investigating 
participant demand characteristics. The Journal of General Psychology, 135(2), 151–
166. 
Nichols, J. (1994). Changing Public Behavior for Better Health: Is Education Enough? 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine., 10(3), 19–22. 
Niedderer, K., Ludden, G., Clune, S., Lockton, D., Mackrill, J., Morris, A., … 
Gutteridge, R. (2016). Design for behaviour change as a driver for sustainable 
innovation: Challenges and opportunities for implementation in the private and public 
sectors. International Journal of Design, 10(2), 67–85. 
 215 
 
O’Hare, J. K., Ade, K. K., Sukharnikova, T., Van Hooser, S. D., Palmeri, M. L., Yin, H. 
H., & Calakos, N. (2016). Pathway-Specific Striatal Substrates for Habitual Behavior. 
Neuron, 89(3), 472–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.032 
Olesen, P. J., Westerberg, H., & Klingberg, T. (2004). Increased prefrontal and parietal 
activity after training of working memory. Nature Neuroscience, 7(1), 75–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1165 
Ondo, W. G., & Lai, D. (2008). Predictors of impulsivity and reward seeking behavior 
with dopamine agonists. Parkinsonism & Related Disorders, 14(1), 28–32. 
Osman, A., Kornblum, S., & Meyer, D. E. (1986). The Point of No Return in Choice 
Reaction Time. Controlled and Ballistic Stages of Response Preparation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 12(3), 243–258. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.12.3.243 
Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 11(6), 988–1010. 
Ottaviani, C., & Vandone, D. (2011). Impulsivity and household indebtedness: 
Evidence from real life. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 754–761. 
Otto, A. R., Skatova, A., Seth Madlon-Kay, & Daw, N. D. (2015). Cognitive Control 
Predicts Use of Model-Based Reinforcement- Learning. J Cogn Neurosci, 27(2), 319–
333. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00709. 
Owen, A. M., McMillan, K. M., Laird, A. R., & Bullmore, E. (2005). N-back working 
memory paradigm: A meta-analysis of normative functional neuroimaging studies. 
Human Brain Mapping, 25(1), 46–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20131 
Parducci, A. (1965). Category judgment: a range-frequency model. Psychological 
Review, 72(6), 407. 
 216 
 
Parker, B., Michael, P., & Wilcox, N. T. (2003). Precautionary saving and social 
learning across generations: an experiment*. The Economic Journal, 113(490), 920–
947. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00158 
Pearson, E. S. (2012). Goal setting as a health behavior change strategy in overweight 
and obese adults: A systematic literature review examining intervention components. 
Patient Education and Counseling, 87(1), 32–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2011.07.018 
Peetz, J., & Buehler, R. (2009). Is there a budget fallacy? The role of savings goals in 
the prediction of personal spending. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
35(12), 1579–1591. 
Penades, R., Catalan, R., Rubia, K., Andres, S., Salamero, M., & Gasto, C. (2007). 
Impaired response inhibition in obsessive compulsive disorder. European Psychiatry, 
22(6), 404–410. 
Peñaloza, L., & Barnhart, M. (2011). Living U.S. Capitalism: The Normalization of 
Credit/Debt. Journal of Consumer Research, 38(4), 743–762. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/660116 
Popien, A., Frayn, M., von Ranson, K. M., & Sears, C. R. (2015). Eye gaze tracking 
reveals heightened attention to food in adults with binge eating when viewing images of 
real-world scenes. Appetite, 91, 233–240. 
Promberger, M., & Marteau, T. M. (2013). When do financial incentives reduce 
intrinsic motivation? Comparing behaviors studied in psychological and economic 
literatures. Health Psychology, 32(9), 950. 
Quispe-Torreblanca, E., Stewart, N., & Gathergood, J. (2017). The red , the black , and 
the plastic : Paying down credit card debt for hotels not sofas Preliminary Version 
August 2017 Abstract, 1–50. 
 217 
 
R Core Team. (2018). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. 
Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from 
https://www.r-project.org/ 
Rabinovich, A., & Webley, P. (2007). Filling the gap between planning and doing: 
Psychological factors involved in the successful implementation of saving intention. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(4), 444–461. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2006.09.002 
Racine, E., Kahn, T., & Hollander, E. (2014). Compulsive buying disorder. In 
Behavioral Addictions (pp. 285–315). Elsevier. 
Raghupathi, W., & Raghupathi, V. (2014). Big data analytics in healthcare: promise 
and potential. Health Information Science and Systems, 2(1), 3. 
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the 
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(7), 545. 
Reinholtz, N., Bartels, D. M., & Parker, J. R. (2015). On the mental accounting of 
restricted-use funds: How gift cards change what people purchase. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 42(4), 596–614. 
Revelle, W. (2018). psych: Procedures for Psychological, Psychometric, and 
Personality Research. Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/package=psych 
Rha, J.-Y., Montalto, C. P., & Hanna, S. D. (2006). The Effect of Self-Control 
Mechanisms on Household Saving Behavior. Journal of Financial Counseling and 
Planning, 17(614), 3. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:The+Effect+of+Self-
Control+Mechanisms+on+Household+Saving+Behavior#0 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2004). The role 
 218 
 
of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science, 306(5695), 443–447. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1100301 
Robbins, T. W., & Clark, L. (2015). Behavioral addictions. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 30, 66–72. 
Robbins, T. W., Gillan, C. M., Smith, D. G., de Wit, S., & Ersche, K. D. (2012). 
Neurocognitive endophenotypes of impulsivity and compulsivity: towards dimensional 
psychiatry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(1), 81–91. 
Rodriguez, C., & Saavedra, J. (2016). Nudging Youth to Develop Savings Habits: 
Experimental Evidence Using SMS Messages (No. Working Paper No. 2015-018). 
Rouault, M., Seow, T., Gillan, C. M., & Fleming, S. M. (2018). Psychiatric Symptom 
Dimensions Are Associated With Dissociable Shifts in Metacognition but Not Task 
Performance. Biological Psychiatry, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2017.12.017 
Rowell, A., & Bregant, J. (2012). Numeracy and Legal Decision Making. Ssrn, 17(5), 
407–413. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163645 
Royall, D. R., Lauterbach, E. C., Cummings, J. L., Reeve, A., Rummans, T. A., Kaufer, 
D. I., … Coffey, C. E. (2002). Executive control function: a review of its promise and 
challenges for clinical research. A report from the Committee on Research of the 
American Neuropsychiatric Association. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences, 14(4), 377–405. 
Rutledge, R. B., & Adams, R. A. (2015). Computational Psychiatry (2016), 16(1), 1–
19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.018.Computational 
Salthouse, T. A., Atkinson, T. M., & Berish, D. E. (2003). Executive Functioning as a 
Potential Mediator of Age-Related Cognitive Decline in Normal Adults. Journal of 
 219 
 
Experimental Psychology: General, 132(4), 566–594. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.132.4.566 
Schachar, R., Tannock, R., Marriott, M., & Logan, G. (1995). Deficient inhibitory 
control in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 23(4), 411–437. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01447206 
Schmiedek, F., Hildebrandt, A., Lövdén, M., Wilhelm, O., & Lindenberger, U. (2009). 
Complex Span Versus Updating Tasks of Working Memory: The Gap Is Not That 
Deep. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 35(4), 
1089–1096. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015730 
Schwartz, J. E. (1985). The Utility of the Cube Root of income. Journal of Official 
Statistics, 1(1), 5–19. 
Sebold, M., Deserno, L., Nebe, S., Schad, D. J., Garbusow, M., Hägele, C., … Huys, Q. 
J. M. (2014a). Model-based and model-free decisions in alcohol dependence. 
Neuropsychobiology, 70(2), 122–131. https://doi.org/10.1159/000362840 
Sebold, M., Deserno, L., Nebe, S., Schad, D. J., Garbusow, M., Hägele, C., … Huys, Q. 
J. M. (2014b). Model-based and model-free decisions in alcohol dependence. 
Neuropsychobiology, 70(2), 122–131. https://doi.org/10.1159/000362840 
Selart, M., Karlsson, N., & Gärling, T. (1997). Self-control and loss aversion in 
intertemporal choice. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(5), 513–524. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5357(97)90012-3 
Servon, L. J., & Kaestner, R. (2008). Consumer financial literacy and the impact of 
online banking on the financial behavior of lower-income bank customers. Journal of 
Consumer Affairs, 42(2), 271–305. 
Shamosh, N. A., DeYoung, C. G., Green, A. E., Reis, D. L., Johnson, M. R., Conway, 
 220 
 
A. R. A., … Gray, J. R. (2008). Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Relation 
to Intelligence, Working Memory, and Anterior Prefrontal Cortex. Psychological 
Science, 19(9), 904–911. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02175.x 
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention—behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 12(1), 1–36. 
Sheeran, P. (2005). Intention-Behavior Relations: A Conceptual and Empirical Review. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 12, 1–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/0470013478.ch1 
Shelton, J. T., Elliott, E. M., Hill, B. D., Calamia, M. R., & Gouvier, W. (2009). A 
comparison of laboratory and clinical working memory tests and their prediction of 
fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 37(3), 283–293. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2008.11.005.A 
Sherrill, M. (2007). Self-serving bias. Am Psychol, 41, 954–969. 
Singh, S. K., & Maddala, G. S. (2008). A function for size distribution of incomes. In 
Modeling income distributions and Lorenz curves (pp. 27–35). Springer. 
Skatova, A., Chan, P. A., & Daw, N. D. (2013). Extraversion differentiates between 
model-based and model-free strategies in a reinforcement learning task. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7(September), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00525 
Smith, G., Sala, S. Del, Logie, R. H., & Maylor, E. A. (2000). Prospective and 
retrospective memory in normal ageing and dementia: A questionnaire study. Memory, 
8(5), 311–321. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210050117735 
Sniehotta, F. F., Presseau, J., & Araújo-Soares, V. (2014). Time to retire the theory of 
planned behaviour. Health Psychology Review, 8(1), 1–7. 
 221 
 
Sniehotta, F. F., Scholz, U., & Schwarzer, R. (2005). Bridging the intention–behaviour 
gap: Planning, self-efficacy, and action control in the adoption and maintenance of 
physical exercise. Psychology & Health, 20(2), 143–160. 
Stanovich, K. E., & Toplak, M. E. (2012). Defining features versus incidental correlates 
of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Mind and Society, 11(1), 3–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-011-0093-6 
Stawski, R. S., Hershey, D. A., & Jacobs-Lawson, J. M. (2007). Goal Clarity and 
Financial Planning Activities as Determinants of Retirement Savings Contributions. 
The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 64(1), 13–32. 
https://doi.org/10.2190/13GK-5H72-H324-16P2 
Stegman, M. A., & Faris, R. (2003). Payday lending: A business model that encourages 
chronic borrowing. Economic Development Quarterly, 17(1), 8–32. 
Stewart, N. (2009). The cost of anchoring on credit-card minimum repayments. 
Psychological Science, 20(1), 39–41. 
Stewart, N., Chater, N., & Brown, G. D. A. (2006). Decision by sampling. Cognitive 
Psychology, 53(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3), 220–247. 
Strandbygaard, U., Thomsen, S. F., & Backer, V. (2010). A daily SMS reminder 
increases adherence to asthma treatment: A three-month follow-up study. Respiratory 
Medicine, 104(2), 166–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rmed.2009.10.003 
Sweeny, K., Melnyk, D., Miller, W., & Shepperd, J. A. (2010). Information avoidance: 
Who, what, when, and why. Review of General Psychology, 14(4), 340. 
 222 
 
Taubman, P. (1976). The Determinants of Earnings: Genetics, Family, and Other 
Environments; A Study of White Male Twins. American Economic Review, 66(5), 
858–870. https://doi.org/10.2307/1827497 
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science, 4(3), 
199–214. 
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.3.199 
Thaler, R. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
12(3), 183–206. 
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth and Happiness. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 
Tricomi, E., Balleine, B. W., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2009). A specific role for posterior 
dorsolateral striatum in human habit learning. European Journal of Neuroscience, 
29(11), 2225–2232. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2009.06796.x 
Tsuchida, A., & Fellows, L. K. (2009). Lesion evidence that two distinct regions within 
prefrontal cortex are critical for n-back performance in humans. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 21(12), 2263–2275. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2008.21172 
Tukey, J. W., & McLaughlin, D. H. (1963). Less vulnerable confidence and 
significance procedures for location based on a single sample: Trimming/Winsorization 
1. Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A, 331–352. 
Tversky, A. (1975). A critique of expected utility theory: Descriptive and normative 
considerations. Erkenntnis, 163–173. 
Van de Mortel, T. F. (2008). Faking it: social desirability response bias in self-report 
 223 
 
research. Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing, The, 25(4), 40. 
van den Bos, W., Rodriguez, C. A., Schweitzer, J. B., & McClure, S. M. (2014). 
Connectivity Strength of Dissociable Striatal Tracts Predict Individual Differences in 
Temporal Discounting. Journal of Neuroscience, 34(31), 10298–10310. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4105-13.2014 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. (2008). Response inhibition in the stop-signal pardigm. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(11), 418–424. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.005.Response 
Verdejo-García, A., Bechara, A., Recknor, E. C., & Perez-Garcia, M. (2006). Executive 
dysfunction in substance dependent individuals during drug use and abstinence: an 
examination of the behavioral, cognitive and emotional correlates of addiction. Journal 
of the International Neuropsychological Society, 12(3), 405–415. 
Vervloet, M., Linn, A. J., Weert, J. C. M. van, Bakker, D. H. de, Bouvy, M. L., Dijk, L. 
van, … Plauschinat, C. (2012). The effectiveness of interventions using electronic 
reminders to improve adherence to chronic medication: a systematic review of the 
literature. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 19(5), 200–209. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/amiajnl-2011-000748 
Vitousek, K., & Manke, F. (1994). Personality variables and disorders in anorexia 
nervosa and bulimia nervosa. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103(1), 137. 
Vlaev, I., & Darzi, A. (2012). Chapter 14 - Preferences and Their Implication for 
Policy, Health and Wellbeing. In R. J. Dolan & T. Sharot (Eds.), Neuroscience of 
Preference and Choice (pp. 305–336). San Diego: Academic Press. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-381431-9.00024-3 
Vlaev, I., & Dolan, P. (2015). Action Change Theory : A Reinforcement Learning 
Perspective on Behavior Change. Review of General Psychology, 19(1), 69–95. 
 224 
 
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000029 
Vlaev, I., & Elliott, A. (2017). Defining and Influencing Financial Capability. In R. 
Ranyard (Ed.), Economic Psychology (pp. 187–205). London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118926352 
Voon, V., Derbyshire, K., Rück, C., Irvine, M. a, Worbe, Y., Enander, J., … Bullmore, 
E. T. (2014). Disorders of compulsivity: a common bias towards learning habits. 
Molecular Psychiatry, (October 2013), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2014.44 
Voon, V., Hassan, K., Zurowski, M., De Souza, M., Thomsen, T., Fox, S., … Miyasaki, 
J. (2006). Prevalence of repetitive and reward-seeking behaviors in Parkinson disease. 
Neurology, 67(7), 1254–1257. 
Voon, V., Reiter, A., Sebold, M., & Groman, S. (2017). Model-based control in 
dimensional psychiatry. Biological Psychiatry, 82(6), 391–400. 
Vrijens, B., De Geest, S., Hughes, D. A., Przemyslaw, K., Demonceau, J., Ruppar, T., 
… Urquhart, J. (2012). A new taxonomy for describing and defining adherence to 
medications. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 73(5), 691–705. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2125.2012.04167.x 
Vrijens, B., Urquhart, J., & White, D. (2014). Electronically monitored dosing histories 
can be used to develop a medication-taking habit and manage patient adherence. Expert 
Review of Clinical Pharmacology, 7(5), 633–644. 
https://doi.org/10.1586/17512433.2014.940896 
Vuchinich, R. E., & Simpson, C. A. (1998). Hyperbolic temporal discounting in social 
drinkers and problem drinkers. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 6(3), 
292. 
Walstad, W. B., Rebeck, K., & MacDonald, R. A. (2010). The effects of financial 
 225 
 
education on the financial knowledge of high school students. Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 44(2), 336–357. 
Wan Lee, S., Shimojo, S., & O’Doherty, J. P. (2014). Neural Computations Underlying 
Arbitration between Model-Based and Model-free Learning. Neuron, 81(3), 687–699. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.11.028 
Wansink, B., & Kim, J. (2005). Bad popcorn in big buckets: portion size can influence 
intake as much as taste. Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior, 37(5), 242–245. 
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender 
behavior change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132(2), 249–268. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.249 
West, R., & Brown, J. (2013). Theory of addiction. John Wiley & Sons. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 
817–838. 
Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The five factor model and impulsivity: Using 
a structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 30(4), 669–689. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00064-7 
Willis, L. E. (2009). Evidence and ideology in assessing the effectiveness of financial 
literacy education. San Diego L. Rev., 46, 415. 
Woicik, P. A., Moeller, S. J., Alia-Klein, N., Maloney, T., Lukasik, T. M., Yeliosof, O., 
… Goldstein, R. Z. (2009). The neuropsychology of cocaine addiction: recent cocaine 
use masks impairment. Neuropsychopharmacology, 34(5), 1112. 
Wood, A. M., Brown, G. D. A., & Maltby, J. (2012). Social norm influences on 
 226 
 
evaluations of the risks associated with alcohol consumption: Applying the rank-based 
decision by sampling model to health judgments. Alcohol and Alcoholism, 47(1), 57–
62. https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agr146 
Wood, A. M., White, I. R., & Thompson, S. G. (2004). Are missing outcome data 
adequately handled? A review of published randomized controlled trials in major 
medical journals. Clinical Trials, 1(4), 368–376. 
Wood, W., & Rünger, D. (2016). Psychology of Habit. Annual Review of Psychology, 
67(1), 289–314. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033417 
Wunderlich, K., Smittenaar, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Dopamine Enhances Model-
Based over Model-Free Choice Behavior. Neuron, 75(3), 418–424. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.03.042 
Yin, H. H., & Knowlton, B. J. B. B. J. (2006). The role of the basal ganglia in habit 
formation. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 7(6), 464–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1919 
Zagorsky, J. L. (2007). Do you have to be smart to be rich? The impact of IQ on wealth, 
income and financial distress. Intelligence, 35(5), 489–501. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2007.02.003 
Zanakis, S. H., Solomon, A., Wishart, N., & Dublish, S. (1998). Multi-attribute decision 
making: a simulation comparison of select methods. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 107(3), 507–529. 
Zeileis, A., & Lumley, T. (2017). sandwich: Robust Covariance Matrix Estimators. 
Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/package=sandwich 
Zhu, X., Cortes, C. R., Mathur, K., Tomasi, D., & Momenan, R. (2015). Model-free 
functional connectivity and impulsivity correlates of alcohol dependence: a resting-state 
 227 
 
study. Addiction Biology, (2013), n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/adb.12272 
Zwosta, K., Ruge, H., & Wolfensteller, U. (2015). Neural mechanisms of goal-directed 
behavior: outcome-based response selection is associated with increased functional 
coupling of the angular gyrus. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9(April), 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00180 
Zygmunt, A., Olfson, M., Boyer, C. a., & Mechanic, D. (2002). Interventions to 
improve medication adherence in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
159(10), 1653–1664. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.159.10.1653 
 
  
 228 
 
Appendix A Visit One: discussion matrix 
 Background 
The Money Advice Service is a free, independent service which exists to help everyone 
manage their money better by giving clear, unbiased money advice to help people make 
informed choices. We have been commission to carry out longitudinal, ethnographic 
research in order to refine the definition of ‘financial capability’. The Money Advice 
Service already uses the FSA’s  skills-based definition of financial capability around the 
following three domains: 
• Making ends meet 
• Keeping track of money 
• Planning ahead 
 
While helpful, this definition doesn’t go far enough. As it’s a skills based definition, it 
doesn’t take account of how attitudes, emotions, motivations and opportunities affect 
financial capability. This research will help MAS understand how context, environment, 
culture, seasonal changes and aspirations influence and change peoples’ financial 
capability. It will also feed into the new index of financial capability for the UK (produced 
by the follow-up quant stage). 
 
 Aims and Objectives: 
The aim of the research is to understand the role that money plays in peoples’ lives in 
order to create a new definition of financial capability. Specific areas to explore are: 
• Life on a day-to-day, week-to-week basis and the role money plays. As part 
of this, we will also look at seasonality and how decisions and actions change 
over the course of a week, month or year. 
• How people cope with planned and unplanned events that require a money 
input. How people feel about these events as they occur and afterwards and 
the role that money plays in them. 
• The extent to which money is thought about (e.g. what reviewing and planning 
takes place), and when, including triggers. In line with this we will explore 
people’s awareness of the Money Advice Service and their interaction with it. 
• The interaction that takes place between family members regarding money 
e.g. how and where is money discussed and what outcomes this leads to. 
• People’s aspirations in life and the role money plays in these aspirations. As 
part of this, we will look at what the future means to people – is it next week 
or 30 years hence? 
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• How money affects people’s emotions, and the key determinants of this. 
As part of this we will also explore links to wellbeing, health and stress 
and examine how culture and context influences this. 
• How people relate to the current indicators of financial capabilility and 
what other key determinants could be included and measured. 
 
NB. Please note that a discussion matrix is different to a discussion guide in that the 
discussion takes place in a much more organic fashion. The questions/ areas of focus are 
embedded into the participant’s everyday life and are therefore led by the participant’s 
behaviour. Many of our observations are led by what they are discussing (“Can you 
show me…”). 
 Introduction 
• Inform participants about the purpose of the research – that we are here to talk 
with them about their lives, about the part money plays in it. 
• Stress there are no right or wrong answers - we’re just really interested in 
understanding 
• what life is like for them. 
• Also stress that we’ll fit around them; if they have things they need to be getting on 
with then they should do this – we’ll work round them. 
• Remind them that (where applicable) we’d like to talk to other members of the 
household too. 
• State that this is the first of four visits and is really just a session where we will 
get to know the participant. In between the visits we’ll be calling them once a 
month to see how they’re getting on. 
 
FOR THOSE COMPLETING DIARIES: Explain that we would like them to 
complete this either every fortnight or every month depending on what makes most 
sense for them and that we’ll collect these from them the next time we visit. 
Dates for following visits: Visit 2 – September – October (incentive £100) Visit 3 – 
December – January (incentive (£125) Visit 4 – March – April (Incentive £150) 
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  Understanding the participant and their life 
  Questions 
• How long have you lived here? Who lives here with you? Ask about family, 
social networks, relationship with partner, children 
• What about the area you live in, what’s it like? What’s good about it? What’s 
bad about it? Why did you choose to live in this area? 
• What facilities are there in the area? Which of these do you use regularly? 
How convenient are they for you? 
• How do you like to spend your time? Where do you like going? What else you 
do with your time…where do you go out? What do you do to enjoy yourself? 
• Who else do you spend time with that’s important to you?  
o Can you explain what relationship you have with this person?  
§ Probe: family member/friend/colleague etc. 
• How often do you see them?  
o What kind of things do you do together?  
o Where do you spend your time?  
o Why is this? 
• What about other people in the household – what do they do with their time? 
o Ask similar questions as above according to answer. 
• Do you rent your home, pay a mortgage or some other arrangement?  
o What are the advantages of this?  
o And the disadvantages?  
o How did you come to this arrangement? 
• Ask about employment –  
o what they do, skills levels, how long they have done this for?   
o Do you enjoy it? 
• If not in employment ask what they do instead – caring responsibilities (for 
children or other family members? 
• Is this what you always wanted to do? Ask as appropriate…. 
o How long have you wanted to do this for?  
o How did you got about making this happen? 
o What got in the way of you doing what you wanted to do 
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• Do you think you’ll always do what you do now? Why do you say this?  
o What do you think you’ll do instead?  
o What would need to happen for you to be able to do this? 
 Observations 
• Tour of the house – room to room, show me what you do in here 
• THROUGHOUT: Observe interactions between couples / children / friends 
• / others in household or visitors 
• If others are home, speak to them about this too 
  General Finances 
 Questions 
• Do you feel like you are where you should be at this stage in your life when it 
comes to finances? 
o Why / why not? 
o Where should you be at this stage?  
o Why do you think this?  
o Where do these messages come from? 
o Do you know many people at your stage in life who have this? Who? 
How have they achieved this? 
• Where do you think your attitudes / behaviours around finances stem from?  
o Did you learn them from anywhere / anyone? 
• What do you enjoy spending money on? What do you dislike spending 
money on? 
• Are there particular brands that you are loyal too? PROBE: Clothing, food, 
technology etc 
o Why / why not? 
o How would you feel if you couldn’t buy the brand/s that you like? 
o Are there any brands you would not buy? Why? 
• What would you describe as your financial priorities? 
 Observation 
• Look for interactions between members of a household – e.g. are children 
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learning from their parents? Look for examples of this 
• Look for brands around the house, does it seem as though material things are 
valued 
 Thinking to the future 
 Questions 
• Can you tell me about the last time you experienced a significant change in 
your life? By this we mean something like moving house, getting married, 
starting or leaving work etc? Tailor suggestions depending on participant and 
their life stage. 
• Tell me about what happened? Moderator to probe sensitively here – may be 
about to experience difficult changes. If more applicable, talk in terms of 
‘events’ rather than changes. 
o What was this change about – what kind of things did you 
experience?  
o Was this positive/negative? 
o When did the change happen? How long did the whole process take? 
o How prepared for this change were you? What kind of preparations did 
you make? How did these preparations help you? 
o If they didn’t make any preparations – how much of a surprise was 
this change? How did it affect you? How were you able to cope given 
you had not made any preparations for it? 
o How did you feel throughout this process? And how did it change 
you? 
o If you had to go through this again, what might you do differently? 
• What kind of changes do you expect you will experience in the next year or 
so? For each ask: 
o What their aspirations are, and the part money plays in these? 
o What do you think will happen? 
o Why do you say this? 
o How do you feel about this change? Probe for whether it is a positive 
or negative event. 
o When do you think this change will occur? 
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o How are you preparing for it – what kind of things are you doing?  
o How will this help?  
o Are saving anything for it, or making financial preparations for it? 
o If applicable – why are you not preparing for it? 
o How do you think your life will be different after this change has 
happened? Why do you say this? How do you feel about this? 
• What other changes would you like to happen over the next year or so? 
o Why do you say this? 
o What difference do you think this would make? To you? To other 
people in your household? To other people you know? 
o What would have to happen for you to be able to realise this? 
How likely do you think this? 
• Overall, how confident do you feel when you think about the future? 
o Why do you say this? 
o What would make you feel more confident? 
• Tell me about your expectations in life 
o What are your peers doing at the moment? 
o Where did you think you would be in life? 
o Where would you like to be in life? 
o What do your parents think? 
 Observations 
• Observe how people react when talking about these changes 
• See how others in the household feel about the changes – are they agreeing  or 
contradicting 
• Ask to see any documentation about how they are pulling together for this 
• Look at where and how do they store this 
o Where possible – ask them to show us what these changes might look 
like, what difference they might make etc. 
  Financial management 
 Questions 
• Tell me about your financial situation 
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o How do you feel about this? Why? 
o How would you describe the state of your finances? 
o How does this compare to this time last year? 
o And to five years ago? 
o What has changed in the intervening time? 
o COMPARE EVERYTHING ABOVE TO OTHER HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBERS 
 
• How well informed do you feel about financial matters more broadly? 
o What do you think the pressing issues facing people today are? And 
which are most relevant to you and your household? 
• Do you plan in advance for your outgoings? E.g. if you are going on holiday do 
you save up before booking or would you pay on a credit card and then pay it 
off? 
• Do you pay for things on credit? Why/ why not? 
o How often do you do this? 
o What kinds of things do you use your credit card for? Why? 
o How do you manage this debt? Do you make your payments each month? 
How much of it do you pay? All of it? The minimum payment? 
o Have you ever withdrawn money from a cashpoint with your credit 
card? Why/ why not? What was it for if so? 
• Do you have a bank overdraft? 
o How often do you use it? 
o Have you ever exceeded your overdraft limit? If yes – how often does that 
happen? In what circumstances? What happens as a result? 
• Do you ever borrow money from friends or family to pay for things? 
o Who? 
o What kind of support do they provide? 
o How do you feel about doing this? Has it affected your relationship 
with them? How? 
o Is there anyone outside of the household who you provide any kind of 
financial support for? 
o Who? 
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o What kind of support do you provide? 
o How do you feel about doing this? 
o Does this have any impact on the way you view your finances? 
How? 
• How do you manage your money? 
o Who in the household takes responsibility for making sure things get 
paid? 
o How did this arrangement come about? 
o How happy are you with this arrangement? Why do you say this? 
o How well does this arrangement work? What bits about it work less 
well? 
• Are there times of the year when you find it easier or more difficult to manage 
your money? Tell me about this. 
• If applicable ask – do you and your partner have separate income streams? 
o What items of spending are you responsible for? 
o And what is your partner responsible for? 
o Do you need to ask permission for certain purchases? Which ones 
would you run past your partner first? And which would you just buy 
for yourself? 
o Why do you say this? How do you feel about this? 
• How far do you plan ahead when it comes to money? 
o Probe to see whether they live day to day or whether they plan ahead 
for things. 
o Are you saving or planning financially for any particular event now? If 
so – could you tell me about what you’re doing, why and how you feel 
about this? 
o Do you have regular form of savings that you put aside? 
o If yes – how much do you save? What do you save for? Where do you 
save your money? How do you feel about this?  
o If something happened tomorrow – say your boiler broke – and you 
needed to get it fixed immediately, how easy would it be for you to find 
the funds to do this if it cost £1000? 
o Where would you get the money from? 
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o Would you be able to raise the money yourself, or would you need to 
borrow some? Who would you borrow it off? 
o What about if it cost £2000? Or £3000? What would happen then? 
PROBE to try and find the tipping point? 
• Thinking about all your outgoings… 
o Which of your outgoings would you class as a priority i.e. something 
you would try and cover no matter what? Why? 
o Are there any items you don’t think are essential? 
• Would you consider taking out a loan if something like this happened? 
o What kind? 
o Would you consider using a payday loan? Why? Why not? Have you 
ever done this in the past? 
• Have you ever used a pawn broker or a cash 
• converter service when you’ve needed money? 
o If yes – can you tell me about that? What circumstances were you in? 
What did you sell? Would you do this again? 
o If no – would you consider doing this? Why/ why not? 
• And what if received some money you weren’t expecting – say you won 
£1,000? What do you think you would do with this? 
o Would you spend it? What would you spend it on? Why? 
o Would you save any of it or pay off any debt with it? Why/ why not? 
• What will you use the £75 incentive which I’ll give you today for? Why? 
• If you were to hear the phrase ‘struggling financially’ 
• what do you think this would mean? 
o What kind of behaviours do you think someone would exhibit? 
o How would they feel? 
o What kind of money would they have coming in? 
o What kind of demands would they have on their income? 
o Have you ever felt that you have struggled financially? When? What 
happened? 
• Repeat above questions with regard to the phrases: ‘financially just getting by’; 
‘financially comfortable’ 
• Is there a difference between being financially comfortable and being well off? 
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o What is it? 
o Why do you say this? 
o Do you think you could be described as being well off? 
• What do you think it would take for you to be getting by/financially 
comfortable/well off? 
o What would need to change? 
o Would you just need extra money coming in, or would other changes 
need to happen? 
o How likely is it these changes will happen? 
 Observations 
• Observe how people react when talking about these changes 
• Ask participants to show us bills, receipts, things they have purchased etc. 
• Try to see the things they spent the money on 
• Ask to see examples of advertisements / messages 
• If they search for information, ask them to show us where they search – check 
the sources they use. 
• Ask to see documentation / card etc and 
• Observe any interaction between them and others in the house – any 
contradictions on who is responsible. 
• Ask them to show us any budgeting systems they have in place, any filing 
systems, how these are organised etc. 
• Ask to see purchases they make and purchases their partner / others in the 
household have control over. 
 Conclusion 
• Thinking about all the things we have discussed today what do you think the 
key message you would like me to take back is? 
o Why do you say this? 
• And is there anything else that we haven’t discussed that you think is important 
mention? 
o Why do you say this? 
• Thank them for their time, find out when works for a catch up call and inform 
them about visit 2. 
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Appendix B Visit two: discussion matrix 
 Introduction 
This visit aims to build on the discussions from visit one to develop a greater 
understanding of all the internal and external factors and influences which determine 
the participant’s financial behaviour including. We’ll be using the findings from this 
visit to develop interventions which we will test with some participants in visit three. 
Inform participants about the purpose of the research – that we are here to 
talk with them about their lives, about the part money plays in it. 
Stress there are no right or wrong answers - we’re just really interested in understanding 
what life is like for them. 
Also stress that we’ll fit around them; if they have things they need to be 
getting on with then they should do this – we’ll work round them. 
Remind them that (where applicable) we’d like to talk to other members of the 
household too. 
State that this is the second of four visits and is really just a session where we 
want to build on previous knowledge from wave 1. In between the visits we’ll be 
calling them once a month to see how they’re getting on. 
FOR THOSE COMPLETING DIARIES: Review diary since last visit 
 Catch up from last visit 
 Questions 
• What’s happened since my last visit? 
o Has anything changed? 
o Has this had an effect on your finances? 
• Have you made any major purchases since my last visit? 
• Did our conversations last time make you think at all? 
o Has anything if your behaviour changed since the last visit? 
o If yes, why do you think this? 
• For those completing diaries - review this with them and discuss anything that 
stands out such as increases or decreases in incomings or outgoings (especially 
food, clothing, toiletries, daily spending) or significant changes in scale 
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questions. 
• How have you found completing the diary each month? 
• How easy or difficult has it been to complete it? Was this what you expected 
– has it been easier/harder than you thought? 
• Is this the only record of incomings and outgoings that you use at the 
moment? 
• Have you been keeping track of spending to fill in the diary? Why/ why not? 
Is it harder to keep track of some items of spending than others? Which ones? 
Why is this? 
• How do you know how much you’ve spent on 
• things like food? 
• Are you surprised by how much you’re spending on certain things or not? 
What things are you spending more on than you thought? And what things 
are you spending less on than you thought? 
• Have you changed any of your spending habits since you started completing 
the diary? If yes in what way? 
•  If no – do you think this diary might change your spending habits in the 
future? why do you say this?  
• If yes – in what way?  
 Observations 
Look around the house to see if there are any new purchases since the last visit 
 How is money talked about? (keeping track) 
 Questions 
• Is money talked about in this house? 
o When? 
o In what sense? Is it all about the immediate everyday expenses or 
thinking of money in terms of the future? 
• Who is in control of the finances in this household? 
o How does this work? How are these decisions made? Are you 
consulted? 
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o Are they influencers on others in the home (kids, partners, spouses, 
others)? Are they recognised as influencers? Is this in a positive or 
negative sense? 
o How do they discuss the decisions they make with you? Do you always 
understand why these decisions have been made? What happens if you 
disagree with the decision that has been made? 
• Is money ever the source of disagreements in this house? 
o If yes, ask for an example? 
o Are the disagreements trivial or more serious? 
o What are the consequences of such disagreements? 
• Has money been the cause of stress for you / your family? 
o Do you have any examples of this? 
o How has this affected you/other people? 
• Have you ever fallen out with someone over money before? 
o If yes, ask for an example 
o What caused the argument? 
o Was it about something you had done or 
o someone else’s behaviour? 
o Is this a common occurrence or an exception? 
• Do you think people you know are generally comfortable or uncomfortable 
talking about money? 
o Talking specifically about the finances in their household? 
o Talking generally about money 
o Talking about investments and / or financial products 
o Why do you think this is? Probe fully around this. 
o What types of people do you think are more likely to talk about 
money? And who might be less likely? Why? 
• Do you discuss your earnings with other people? 
o Why / why not? 
o If yes, who? 
o How much detail do you go into? 
o Is there anyone you wouldn’t discuss this with? 
o Do your friends / family discuss their earnings with you? 
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 Observations 
• Are they open when speaking about money or does it feel like an intrusion on 
their privacy? 
• Listen out for any disagreements around money. 
• Try to ascertain whether they think behaviours around discussing money are 
based on need, knowledge or attitude/ culture. 
  Financial allocation / organisation (keeping track, making ends meet, living 
within means) 
 Questions 
• Do you have (or I noticed last time you have) a specific system in place for 
organising your money? 
o Can you show it to me in more detail? 
o How long have you had a system? 
o Why did you start organising your money in this way? 
• Have you ever broken your system since I last saw you? If yes, how & why? 
• Does having / not having a system impact your finances? 
o In what respect? 
o How would you be impacted if you didn’t have a system? 
• If you had more or less money than you currently do, would you still use a 
system? 
o Why / why not? 
o Would it be different to the one you use right now? Why do you say 
this? 
o What difference would this make? 
• Do you take any other specific 
steps to monitor your finances? 
o What are these? 
o What does cash flow mean 
to you? 
o Do you ever have ‘cash 
flow’ problems? 
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• For non-diary participants, use the template – for diary participants, review 
the latest entry. 
• Tell me about the money you have coming into the household at present. 
o Thinking about the last month, how much did you have coming in? 
o Where did this money come from? Probe for wages, benefits, savings, 
credit, loans, gifts etc. 
• And how have you spent your money over the last month? 
o Thinking about the last month, how much did you spend, roughly? Was 
this more or less than your incomings? 
o Where did your money go? What kind of things did you spend it on? 
How much did these things cost? 
o Was this a pretty typical month for you? If no how and why did it differ 
to usual? 
o Did you have to spend money on things you wouldn’t normally? Or vice 
versa? Why was this? 
• Has the recession had an impact on your finances? 
o In what respect? (Cost of living, rising prices etc) 
o Could you give an example of what has changed for you since the 
recession? 
o Is this something you discuss? Who with? When do you discuss it? 
What happens as a result? 
• Has the recession had an impact on the people around you? 
o What kind of an effect? 
o Is this something you discuss? When do you discuss it? What happens 
as a result? 
• Have you had a pay rise in the past few years? 
o Has this made a difference to you? What has the extra money 
been used for?  
o Do you know if this has been in line with inflation? 
• Can you give me your understanding of inflation? How does it affect people 
like you? 
• Do you feel as though your income has decreased since the recession in 
2009? 
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o Have your earnings fallen? 
o Has your spending power decreased? 
o Do you have examples of this? 
o Do you think this has been the case for other people? 
 Observations 
• Ask to see what these financial systems are. 
• Bring up this topic while they are with friends and observe the interaction – does 
it seem as if this is a subject they have discussed before? 
 Making money work for you (planning ahead) 
 Questions 
• Do you have plans for the next few years? 
o If yes: 
o What are they? 
o When would you like to achieve them? 
o How are you going to achieve them? 
o Do you think they are realistic to achieve?  
o If no: 
o Is there anything stopping you making plans? 
• Do you have the money to pursue these plans? 
o Do you need money? How much? 
o Do you think you will get the money? How? 
• Would you use a loan of some sort to help you achieve these plans? 
o Would you use a credit card? Why / why not? 
o Would you use an overdraft? Why / why not? 
o Would you use a bank loan? Why / why not? 
o Would you use a loan of some other kind? What kind of loan would 
it be? Why / why not? 
o Would you go to family or friends? Why / why not? 
o Is there a difference between 
the above ways of borrowing 
money? 
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o Which is best? Why? 
o And which is worst? Why? 
• If you wanted to get a credit card or a loan, how would you go about 
choosing one? 
o Would you look for information before hand or not? What would you 
be interested in finding out? 
o Where would you look for this information? Who do you trust to give 
advice about these sorts of things? 
o Which is more important to you, getting the money you need quickly 
and easily or getting the best deal possible? 
• Would you say you think long term or short term when it comes to money? 
o Do you plan your money for the next day, week, month or think longer 
term (next year, 5 years, 10 years?) 
o Why do you think of money within this time frame? (PROBE: is it 
because of the amount you have?) 
• If you know they already have a goal they’re working towards: 
• What progress have you made with your goal since I saw you last? 
o Have you been able to stick to your plan or not? 
o How easy or difficult has it been? 
o Do you think your plan to achieve your goal is achievable or is it 
ambitious? 
o Have you had to change your plan at all maybe by changing the end 
date or the amount you save? 
• Do you set yourself goals around money (saving for specific things, paying off 
debts etc) 
o Why / why not? 
• If yes: 
o Do you normally set short term or long term goals or both? Why? Can 
you give me some examples? 
o Do you tend to set an exact date for meeting a goal or are you more 
flexible about it? 
o Do you usually succeed in meeting these goals? Why? Why not? 
• Do you ‘shop around’ or look for the best bargains? 
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o If yes, how? 
o Online, in-store etc? 
o Do you do this for all purchases or only some? 
o What do you shop around for; insurance, household bills, food shopping 
anything else? 
o How long have you done this for? 
o How do you feel when you get a good deal? 
o How do you know the deal you are getting is good? 
• Do you leave bills to the last minute or do you like to pay things in advance? 
o Why is this? 
o What difference does this make to you? 
• Is it more important for you to have things now and get into debt, or to save for 
things and get them later? 
o Why? 
o How much control or choice do you feel you have over this? 
o What difference does it make? 
• Do you consider yourself to have a safety net when it comes to money? 
o Savings for a rainy day? 
o Parents, grandparents, other relatives? 
• If you won some money– say £1,000 - what do you think you would do with 
this? 
o Would you spend it? What would you spend it on? Why? 
o Would you save any of it? 
• What if this money was a tax rebate, would you use it the same way? Why/ why 
not? 
• Is there a difference between winning money and receiving a refund you 
weren’t expecting? 
• If I offered you £x (one weeks’ income) which I would give you in 3 day’s time 
or £x (two weeks’ income) which I would give you in 3 month’s time which 
would you take? 
o Why? Do you think that’s the most attractive offer? 
o What would you use the money for? 
o If you chose the other option do you think you would spend the money 
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on the same thing or something different? Why? 
o Would your answer be different if the second amount was three weeks’ 
income? Why do you say this? 
 Observations 
• How do people look when talking about their future plans – how important 
doe they seem for them? 
• What feeling do you get from people when they talk about borrowing money 
/ potentially getting into debt? 
 Being networked / creativity (making ends meet, living within means, planning 
ahead) 
 Questions 
• Do you think the people around you have an influence on how you deal 
with your finances? 
o Who? 
o In what sense? 
• Do you speak to people you know about your finances? 
o Who? 
o Why this person? 
o What do you speak about? 
o Do you ask their advice? 
o Do you trust their opinions? 
o How much detail do these people give you? 
• Do you go to specific people in your network for advice about finances or 
anything related to the money in your household? 
o Why / why not? 
o What do you ask for advice about? 
o Is the advice you get helpful? 
o Is there anything you wouldn’t ask about? 
o Why? 
o Can you give an example of some advice you followed with regard to 
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finances? 
• Do you have any ways of supplementing your income? 
o Can you tell me more about this? 
o How long have you been doing this for? 
o What difference does this make to you 
o What would it mean to your life if you didn’t have this extra income? 
o Is there any risk attached to this? 
• Have you or would you go outside of your own network to seek advice 
on your finances? 
o Why / why not? 
o Where would you go? Why would you go here? 
o How do you know about them? 
o Would you trust them? 
• Do you go to your bank and discuss your finances? 
o Why / why not? 
o Would you trust what your bank told you? 
o Are there some things you would be more likely to ask your bank 
advice on than others? If yes, what & why? 
• Do you feel confident when speaking to bank staff? 
o Which products are easiest to get to grips with? And which are 
hardest? 
o Do you understand the terms they use? 
o Do you know the difference between debit / credit? 
o Do you know what APR means? 
o How does APR work? Try to ascertain their extent of understanding 
here – i.e. that the quicker you pay it off the cheaper it is to borrow. 
o Is there a difference between APR and Interest rate? 
o Would you feel confident asking them to explain something if you didn’t 
understand? 
 Observations 
Try to see people interacting with family, friends, neighbours and observe whether 
you think they are influenced / influencers 
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 Moments of transition (planning ahead) 
 Questions 
• How would you describe your financial position today? 
o Has it changed in the past few months? Why? 
o Has it changed in the past year? Why? 
o Has it changed in the past 5 years? Why? 
• Would you say you have got better or worse when it comes to managing your 
finances? 
o Why do you think this is? 
• What do you think is the reason you have your current approach to your 
finances? 
o Has anything happened to make you approach them this way? What? 
o Have you been particularly influenced by anyone? 
• When (if at all) have you engaged in a ‘plan’? 
o What did you change? 
o What convinced you to do things in that way? 
o Did you make yourself any goals or commitments? 
o How long-term are those plans? 
• Do you think anything could happen that would make you change your 
approach to finances? 
o What would that be? 
• Would you like to change your behaviour around finances? 
o Why / why not? 
o In what respect? 
• What are your plans for Christmas? 
o Are you already preparing? 
o Have you been saving for it? 
o Do you have a budget in mind? 
o How much money do you think you will spend? 
o How are you feeling about it? 
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 Conclusion 
• Do you think anything will have changed for you by our next visit? 
o What? Why? 
• Do you think anything will have changed with regards to your finance by our 
next visit? 
o What? Why? 
• Thinking about all the things we have discussed today what do you think the 
key message you would like me to take back is? 
o Why do you say this? 
• And is there anything else that we haven’t discussed that you think is important 
mention? 
o Why do you say this? 
• Thank them for their time, find out when works for a catch up call and inform 
them about visit 2. 
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Appendix C Visit Measures 
How much money has come into the household in the last fortnight/month from the 
following sources? Please try and indicate the amount YOU receive, so if you are 
listing money from employment, then write what you get after tax and National 
Insurance deductions.  
 
Employment (Please indicate amount as far as possible)     
Family member __________ £ ____________  
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
 
Benefit (Please indicate type of benefit and amount -As far as possible)    
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
Family member __________ £ ____________ 
 
Other sources (Please indicate type and amount As far as possible) 
Type of source ___________ £ ____________  
Type of source ___________ £ ____________ 
 
How much money has been put towards the following things in the last 
month/fortnight?  
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Shopping  £___________  
Food and drink  £___________ 
Alcohol   £___________ 
Cleaning products  £___________ 
Toiletries/beauty  £___________ 
Tobacco  £___________ 
Daily expenditure £___________  
 
Housing, fuel and power  
Mortgage/rent  £___________ 
Water    £___________ 
Gas Electricity  £___________ 
Council tax   £___________ 
 
Home goods and services  
E.g. furniture repairs £___________ 
 
Getting Around 
Vehicle upkeep £___________ 
Fuel   £___________ 
Public transport £___________ 
 
Debt 
E.g. Credit cards £___________ 
Savings 
E.g. Pensions  £____________ 
 
Other things 
Item  £____________ 
Item  £____________ 
Health  
Item  £____________ 
E.g. prescriptions  
 
Clothing  
Item  £____________ 
Item  £____________ 
 
Communication   
Landline £____________ 
Internet  £____________ 
Mobile phone  £____________  
 
Recreation and culture  
Sports/gym £____________ 
Going out £____________ 
TV packages £____________ 
TV Licence £____________ 
 
Children (including adult children)  
Childcare   £____________ 
Pocket Money  £____________ 
Other (Specify) £____________ 
 
Pets 
Petfood £____________ 
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Vets bill £____________ 
 
Insurance 
Buildings £____________ 
Contents £____________ 
Car  £____________ 
Mobile  £____________ 
Pet  £____________ 
Life/Health £____________ 
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3. Have you paid for anything in the last fortnight/month using money which didn’t 
come from either employment or benefits?  
Please indicate what you spent your money on and the amount as far as possible.  
Savings     
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________
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Loan     
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
 
Credit cards    
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
 
 
Something else (e.g. gift from family)  
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________   
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
Item ____________________ £ _________________ 
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Appendix D Financial Diary 
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Appendix E Individual Differences 
This chapter discusses in more depth the most appropriate methods to investigate the 
research questions. A detailed overview of the measures used in this study are provided 
below, including the implementation and analysis.  
 Sample Populations 
 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom sample consisted of 208 students attending the University of 
Warwick in the United Kingdom, recruited via the University’s recruitment program. 
Ethics were granted through the University of Warwick Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee [02/15-16]. Measurements of participants’ individual 
differences were taken at the Warwick Business School during a two-hour session. Up to 
50 participants could be tested simultaneously during each session. After the participants 
completed the individual difference measures, they were then randomly allocated into 
one of the three groups for the 12-week intervention in a 1:1:1 allocation ratio, to one of 
three groups: Control, Habit-based intervention or Goal-Setting intervention. 
 Australia 
The Australian sample consisted of 189 students attending the Monash University in 
Melbourne, Australia recruited via the University’s recruitment program. Ethics were 
granted through the University of Warwick Humanities and Social Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee [02/15-16] and the Monash University’s Ethics Committee. 
Measurements of participants’ individual differences were taken at the Monash Business 
School during a two-hour session. Up to eight participants could be tested simultaneously 
during each session. After the participants completed the individual difference measures, 
they were then randomly allocated into one of the three groups for the 12-week 
intervention in a 1:1:1 allocation ratio, to one of three groups: Control, Habit-based 
intervention or Goal-Setting intervention. 
 Measures 
The current study aims to measure participants’ behavioural control, i.e. their ability to 
make sub-optimal financial decisions to reduce monetary consumption, increase financial 
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savings and increase account balances. This study looks to measure individual differences 
across two implementation methods; scales and behavioural tasks. In each context, trade-
offs were made between data-richness and ease of collection. For example, eye-tracking 
or fMRI data would yield extremely rich data but would have taken long to collect. I 
provide an-indepth overview of the measures used and the justifications for the chosen 
measure. 
 Impulsivity 
Impulsivity is a tendency to act without considering consequences (Steinberg, 2004). For 
example, an impulsive individual is more likely to choose unhealthy food over healthy 
food, even when expressing to lose weight. Impulsivity is likely related to goal-directed 
actions where impulsive actions can interfere with goal-directed formulations, for 
instance, consider an agent intending to lose weight, they are out for dinner at a restaurant 
and have the option of a burger or salad. If the agent is impulsive, they will often make 
rash choice with reward seeking behaviour for the burger as opposed to the salad, despite 
the salad being the optimal choice given the goal. Impulsivity is also related to habit 
formation where neurological structures and pathways that are responsible to impulsivity 
also function for habit formation (O’Hare et al., 2016; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). For 
instance, O’Hare and colleagues identified differences in the cell activity that denote GO-
signals (a signal to initiate an action) from the basal ganglia, those with greater GO 
signals were found to be able to break and form habits faster (O’Hare et al., 2016). 
As impulsivity is related to goal-directed actions and is linked to habit formation 
the current study aimed to measure this ability in each participant the Stop Signal task 
(Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997) was found to be the most reliable behavioural 
measure of impulsivity. The Stop Signal task is a task designed to measure short to 
intermediate control within the construct of response inhibition, that is, the ability to stop 
an action. The Stop Signal Task is described in more detail below (see Section E.3.1.1), 
in this version of the task, the task uses a Go/No-Go structure, in which an individual 
must make a Go response by identifying a shape shown on the display by responding 
with a given key response. In 25% of randomly selected trials however there are No-Go 
signals, in this task in the form of an auditory beep, the beep signals participants to not 
respond on that given trial. 
As the Stop Signal Tasks only deals with a closer temporal domain in regards to 
short and intermediate future, the current study also includes a temporal discounting task 
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to understand longer-term impulsivity, i.e., the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (Kirby et 
al., 1999). The Monetary Choice Questionnaire asks participants to choose between a 
smaller-sooner monetary amount or a larger-later monetary amount, e.g., £20 today or 
£55 in 7 days. The temporal discounting task had been shown to reliably recruit the 
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex (Bickel et al., 
2007; Hare, Hakimi, & Rangel, 2014; van den Bos, Rodriguez, Schweitzer, & McClure, 
2014), with the connectivity of the striatum to the limbic systems such as the bilateral-
amygdala has been reliably shown to correlate with impulsive behaviours (van den Bos 
et al., 2014).  
 Executive function 
Executive function is a term that encapsulates higher order processes, here the interest is 
primarily in the capacity of the system to process information, update the current space, 
and to compute the outcome of behaviour to align with the agent’s goal. For example, 
consider an individual needing to complete an assignment, the individual has a list of 
actions required, executive function requires this individual to retain this list of actions, 
process the importance of such actions and prioritise the important options. Executive 
function is related to goal-directed behaviours because these functions are a necessary 
underlying component of goal-directed behaviour, where goal-directed actions are 
instigated and maintained by executive functions that help to inhibit prepotent responses, 
resolve interference, co-ordinate behaviour and compute complex mapping (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004; Logie, Cocchini, Della Sala, & Baddeley, 2004; Salthouse, Atkinson, & 
Berish, 2003). Executive function may also be related to habit formation because poor 
deficits in executive function can lead to habitual behaviour and even addictions (Everitt 
& Robbins, 2005; Kalivas, 2008); deficits in executive function, as demonstrated in N-
Back task performance was predictive of performance in a response inhibition task 
(Stroop task) where those with poorer working memory and executive function displayed 
higher errors in the response inhibition task (Kane & Engle, 2003). As such where 
executive function can be diminished this can give rise to repeat past habitual choices 
despite these contradicting our own goals. 
As executive function is related to goal-directed actions and is linked to habit 
formation the current study aimed to measure this ability in each participant To measure 
executive function the N-back task was selected.The N-Back task is described below in 
more detail (see Section E.3.2). In the N-Back task, participants are shown a shown a 
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sequential series of letters, displayed one after another on the screen. Participants are 
tasked to making a Yes/No response to identify whether the letter on the screen matches 
a previously shown letter n-positions back in the list. For instance in a n = 1 task, 
individuals must compare the letter displayed on the screen and compare with the 
previously shown letter, when these letters are equivalent, i.e. when a letter repeats itself, 
participants respond “yes”, otherwise participants respond with the “no” key.  
The N-back task is the most commonly utilised method to measure executive 
function, arguably due to its robust and consistent neuroactivations by varying memory 
load demands (Cohen et al., 1997; Jonides et al., 1997; Kane & Engle, 2002). The N-
back task has been associated with a distributed network of the parietal, frontal and 
striatal sites which is reliably activated in executive functions (Olesen, Westerberg, & 
Klingberg, 2004; Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005; Tsuchida & Fellows, 2009) 
The face-validity of the N-back task demonstrates strong convergent validity with 
Working Memory related processes such as Working Memory capacity (Schmiedek, 
Hildebrandt, Lövdén, Wilhelm, & Lindenberger, 2009; Shamosh et al., 2008; Shelton, 
Elliott, Hill, Calamia, & Gouvier, 2009), various executive functions (Ciesielski, Lesnik, 
Savoy, Grant, & Ahlfors, 2006). Although research demonstrates weak correlations with 
Working Memory processes (Friedman et al., 2006; Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 
2010; Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007). The overall literature suggests that the 
N-back task is a proxy of Working Memory and executive function, with the behavioural 
level showing weak to moderate concurrent validity (Conway et al., 2005; K. M. Miller, 
Price, Okun, Montijo, & Bowers, 2009),whilst the neuroactivation established by the N-
back task demonstrates reliable activation of goal-directed regions (Kearney-Ramos et 
al., 2014). As such the N-back task was selected as a behavioural measure for a proxy of 
executive function.  
 Goal-Directed Behaviour 
While the previous measures captures elements of goal directed behaviours, the current 
study also measured goal-directed behaviours more directly. Specifically goal directed 
behaviours are representations of contingencies between states, actions and desired 
outcomes (Zwosta, Ruge, & Wolfensteller, 2015). Goal-directed behaviour is also 
dependent upon an agent’s motivation and desires, what the agent is motivated to fulfil, 
whether an innate drive, need or want primarily optimizes the search parameters of which 
actions are the optimal choices. Therefore goal-directed actions also require these 
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representations to be acquired to predict the outcomes of such given choices, or to 
construct predicted outcomes based upon a constructed model of the world.  
For instance, consider choosing between a bottle of water or a diamond. In most 
cases, the agent would opt for the diamond due to its considerable high monetary value. 
Suppose this agent is now dehydrated, does the diamond still seem as valuable? The 
motivation of the agent is driven by a basic desire to survive based upon water, the bottle 
of water in this context has a higher utility than the diamond. This is important as the 
actions selected here are constrained by one’s motivational drives, the goals are not fixed 
but instead flexible, based upon are ever changing and fluctuating motivations (Zwosta 
et al., 2015). 
Goal-directed behaviours are distinct from habitual behaviours because habitual 
behaviours are representations of action values within a given context, these are fixed, 
bounded within contextual parameters. This distinction is important as goal-directedness 
is flexible but is targeted on a given outcome, and can be considered as a top-down 
processing of behaviour to fit behaviour to a given orientation; whilst habit-based 
behaviour is more of bottom-up process, which bottom-up activation of contextual 
identifiers trigger set behavioural patterns rigid to the contextual parameters. 
Roughly, dual-process theories relate to this idea as goal-directed behaviours are 
denote in system 1 (a more reflective system); while habitual behaviours are denoted in 
system 2 (a more automatic set of systems) (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Daw et al., 
2005; R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). A 
popular computational refinement of dual-process theory refers to the goal-system as 
being model-based, and a habitual-system as being model-free ((R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 
2013). As the current study seeks to measure the model-based and model-free concepts, 
each are described more thoroughly below. 
Model-based refers to the computational assays in the requisition of modelling 
the environment to provide action values. These action values are based upon an agent’s 
motivation, current and future states, possible action spaces, and the outcome of those 
actions as vectors of rewards and probabilities of subsequent states. This complex set of 
processes therefore require larger computational resources (Daw et al., 2011a; Glimcher 
et al., 2014), where an agent seeks to derive the best policy, that is set of actions in each 
given state that will lead to the targeted outcome. Model-based algorithms essentially 
refer to learning states and transitions, i.e. how the world maps and the pathways along 
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states leading to a given motivational outcome. Through the use of this mapping, the 
agent can then compute potential routes to the desired outcome when confronted with 
barriers.  
Model-free on the other hand, refers to a relatively much simpler computational 
process, albeit still a simple model (K. Miller et al., 2016), that refers to a simplistic way 
of predicting future outcomes based upon the action utility of past choices. In other-words 
the model-free system uses cached values, these are values that have been learnt through 
repetitive training and are devoid of the outcomes that they predict (as based on past 
utility). The model-free system looks to essentially predict rewards, it takes into account 
past states and actions, the actions chosen at each given state and whether those actions 
led to a reward. This reward is then back-propogated through the sequence to denote 
smaller action values through the chain (Daw et al., 2011a; R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 2013; 
Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014; Vlaev & Dolan, 2015).    
Model-based and model-free calculations predict different patterns of behaviour. 
Purely model-based calculations lead to agents taking into account rewards and 
transitions, whilst the model-free calculations lead to agents being interested in purely 
maximising rewards given past choices.  
The present experiment aims to measure participants model-free and model-based 
behavioural tendencies using a  markov-decision task first implemented by Daw, 
Gershman, Seymour, Dayan and Dolan (2011b). This task itself is comprised of 201 
trials, each of which contain two states each of which is a two-alternate forced choice 
(2AFC). In the first state the participants is shown two coloured boxes, these are 
differentiated with some form of stilmuli (in this task version by Tibetan characters). 
Participants must choose one of the two options, in doing so they are then shown one of 
two sets of boxes at the second-state, one set is more likely (common transition), the other 
is less likely (a rare transition). Participants must then make another 2AFC decision, 
selecting one of the two boxes again, the outcome of this choice is demonstrated as either 
a monetary reward or a null outcome. The reward probabilities are independent of the 
choices made and fluctuate over time based on a random-walk. As such the optimal 
strategy is to sample the choices in one of the second-state options, if the sets of boxers 
yields poor outcomes, making note of the colour of the boxes and the reward likelihood. 
If the outcomes are poor then the optimal strategy is to change the first-state choice.  
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The task structure differentiates model-free behaviour from model-based due to 
the computational algorithms and their respected outcomes, model-free behaviour utilises 
only a vector of past rewards to predict future choice behaviour; whilst model-based 
utilises both transition probabilities and reward outcomes.  
 The Markov-decision task has been cited over 600 times, and has been 
implemented numerously within a research environment (Daw et al., 2011a; Otto et al., 
2015; Skatova et al., 2013; Wunderlich et al., 2012) and has diagnostic validity in clinical 
environments (Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Gillan, Kosinski, et al., 2016; Kahneman, 2011; 
Rouault et al., 2018; Voon et al., 2014).  
 Behavioural task parameters and analysis 
As many of our measurements required parameter and analysis decision that affect our 
results, these measures are discussed in greater length below.  
 Impulsivity 
 Stop Signal Task. 
The STOP-IT task (Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens, 2008) was used, a windows 
executable version of the Stop Signal Task constructed by Logan and colleagues (1996), 
was used to measure response inhibition. Response inhibition is characterised as the 
inhibition of a pre-potent response, where an action can be seen as a horse race model 
(Logan & Cowan, 1984) of two signals that compete against each other; a Go start signal 
that initiates an action, and a No-Go signal that stops a given action. If the Go signal 
finishes before the No-Go signal, then the agent initiates and completes the action. If the 
No-Go signal is completed before the Go process, then any such action initiated by the 
Go signal becomes inhibited. The horse race model has been demonstrated to describe 
empirical data (Logan, 1994).  
The experimental design of the stop start paradigm features a go/no-go response 
to stimuli displayed on a monitor. In the case of the STOP-IT task (Verbruggen, Logan 
& Stevens, 2008), participants would initially be shown a fixation cross for 250ms, 
followed by either a square or circle, to which participants responded by pressing either 
the ‘z’ and ‘m’ keys respectively, the stimuli were white shapes presented on a black 
background. On 25% of randomly selected trials, a stop signal was presented in the form 
of an audible beep after a preset delay of 250ms referred to as the Stop Signal Delay 
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(SSD). this is adjusted dynamically by 50ms after each response, with an additional 50ms 
to the SSD for each incorrect response, or a reduction of 50ms for each successful 
response. Participants were given 12 practice trials as the inclusion of other behavioural 
measures increased time pressures, such that fewer trials could be afforded. Participants 
completed 128 trials, split equally across two blocks. The outcome variable of interest 
was the Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), a computationally calculated variable that 
characterised the time required for an agent to cancel or inhibit a go response following 
an audible stop stimulus. Responses of greater than 1250ms were regarded as incorrect 
responses as given as the default parameter of the STOP-IT task.  
 Analysis 
For the Stop-Signal Task, a Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) was calculated for 
each participant, as given by the Horse Race Model (Logan et al., 1997). The horse-race 
model (Logan & Cowan, 1984), puts forward the notion of two parallel behavioural 
signals a Go and Stop signal that compete in a parallel fashion. Neurological evidence 
further supports the horse-race model with activation in dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex 
and the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (Chambers et al., 2007) whilst the anterio 
cingulate cortex and the inferior frontal gyrus is shown to be associated with the Stop 
signal (A. R. Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Adam R. Aron et al., 2003), demonstrating high 
validity with the horse race model of impulsivity. The SSRT parameter is a single value 
that describes impulsivity as the time required to cancel a Go response, with larger values 
denoting higher rates of impulsivity (given that longer is required to stop a prepotent 
action). SSRT scores have been validated as a measure of response inhibition (Adam R. 
Aron et al., 2003; Claes et al., 2006; Kulendran et al., 2013, 2016; Chantal Nederkoorn 
et al., 2010; Schachar, Tannock, Marriott, & Logan, 1995). Here the integration method 
is used, as this is more robust to skew and strategic slowing of reaction times (i.e. block 
differences) than the common mean method (Logan et al., 1997, 2014; Osman et al., 
1986; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). The common mean method involves subtracting the 
stop-signal delay from the mean reaction time on Go trials, however this requires the 
assumption that participants inhibit 50% and those outside of this assumption will no 
longer be applicable under this method. Therefore the integration method is a more 
favourable option.  
The integration method assumes that SSRT is a constant, such that any Go 
commands that finish before the stop-signal delay + SSRT will be executed, or if the Go 
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signal fails to finish are inhibited. The integration method uses the Go-RT distribution, 
stop-signal delay and the probability of responding given a signal. This involves taking 
the integral of the Go-RT distribution and shifting from left to right until the integral 
equates to the probability of responding given a signal. At that point: t = tD + SSRT, where 
t is reaction time and tD is the stop-signal delay, such that SSRT can be calculated by 
subtracting the stop-signal delay. In practice, this is implemented by rank-ordering Go-
RT’s, and then taking the Nth reaction time, where N = NGo-RT’s ´P(respond|signal), and 
subtracting the stop-signal delay from this reaction time (see Logan, 1994).  
 Temporal discounting task parameters 
One main outcome displayed in the ethnographic analysis under the COM-B framework 
isolated a lack of planning, or forethought for the future. Where people displayed a 
tendency for immediate gratification. Here the 27-item Monetary Choice Questionnaire 
(MCQ) (Kirby et al., 1999) is utilised to measure temporal discounting, the MCQ has 
been validated across numerous trials (Amlung & MacKillop, 2011; Büchel et al., 2017; 
Huddy et al., 2017; Kirby, 2009; Kirby & Finch, 2010; Ohmura, Takahashi & Kitamura, 
2005; Schimdt, Holroyd, Debener & Hewig, 2017; Takahashi, Sakaguchi & 
Hasegawa,2008; Takahashi et al., 2011) and has been demonstrated to hold a construct 
validity (a = 0.97) (Myerson, Baumann & Green, 2014). Participants were issued the 
questionnaire through Qualtrics, private software-based research company. The MCQ 
approach identified preferences through a Revealed Preferences method estimating 
intertemporal discounting parameters through choices. Participants were presented with 
a sooner and shorter monetary reward on one side (for example £20 today) or a larger 
and later monetary reward on the other side (for example £55 in 7 days). Participants 
completed all 27 items taking roughly two minutes. Participants were informed there was 
no time limit to the questionnaire, nor was there any correct answer. Choices were made 
for hypothetical options. 
 Analysis 
Through the choices, a discounting parameter k was recorded as an index of the rate of 
the individual discounts rewards as a function of time, which is given by the formula: 
 [(]) 	= 	 D(1 + _]) 
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V indicates the current value of the delayed monetary reward A, at delay D, where the 
free floating parameter k is the discount parameter (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). A greater 
k value is indicative of greater impulsivity, displaying a preference for immediate over 
delayed rewards. The automated analysis file developed by Kaplan, Lemley, Reed and 
Jarmolowicz (2014) was used to calculate the discounting parameter.   
 
 Executive function 
 N-Back Task 
The N-back task was used an indicative measure of executive function. The N-back task 
used in this thesis uses visual stimuli. The design of the N-back task features an 
identification process of a yes or no response to a sequence of 12 letter stimuli displayed 
on the screen one after another. Participants were initially shown a fixation cross for 
300ms, followed by the sequence of letters. Participants were required to respond to the 
stimuli identifying a correct trial, where the on-screen stimuli matched with what was 
presented ‘n’ positions back by pressing the ‘m’ key, or a rejection where the on-screen 
stimuli did not match the ‘n’ positions back. Participants completed 144 letters across 12 
blocks of 12 letters, with three different ‘n’ value parameters encapsulating three blocks 
of n=1, n=2 and n=3. Where for example in n=2, participants would identify a match 
between the on-screen stimuli and what was shown 2 trials before, should the stimuli 
match, the participant should respond by pressing the ‘m’ key; otherwise by identifying 
a rejection by pressing the ‘z’ key. Thus the larger the ‘n’ value parameter, the greater 
the cognitive load placed on the individual as they must consistently update their memory 
space by expelling older stimuli and encoding novel stimuli in the series, comparing the 
stimuli on-screen with their memory store. A larger ‘n’ value would then require a larger 
memory space, for instance n=2 would require a constant memory bank of the last two 
letters, whilst n=3 would then require the last three letters displayed.  
 The number of trials within each block for the different ‘n’ parameter values were 
kept constant at twelve trials per block, meaning for n=2 there were only ten potential 
trials and n=3 blocks would utilise only nine potential trials. The reasoning to maintain 
the total number of trials was due to time constraints as participants were completing a 
battery of tests and further trials may have drained participants’ concentration and 
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capacity to continue.  
 
The letters used within this task: 
‘q’, ‘w’, ‘r’, ‘k’, ‘f’ 
 
The trials were all presented in lower-case, in the centre of the screen in Arial font size 
30. These letters were selected as they lack any form of phonetic similarity that could 
invalidate encoding due to acoustic similarity (Camos, Mora, & Barrouillet, 2013; 
Salamé & Baddeley, 1986; Smith & Jarrold, 2014) or visual similarity (Carrasco-Ortiz, 
Midgley, Grainger & Holcomb, 2017; Logie, Del Sala, Wynn & Baddeley, 2000; Logie, 
Saito, Morita, Varma & Norris, 2016). Stimuli were white font colour presented on a 
black background. Participants were trained on a n=1 block of 12 letters, for which they 
must score at least 80% correct identification (note: a false rejection or Miss would be 
characterised as incorrect), to continue onwards to the study trials.  
 Analysis 
For the N-back task, to identify executive function, signal detection theory is utilised to 
compare the distributions of accuracy vs inaccuracy. Signal detection theory compares 
Hit rates (i.e. yes|correct response) against false alarm rates (i.e. yes|incorrect response) 
(REF). These are compared through inverse normal distribution to calculate and compare 
probabilities as a single value referred to as d’ (dee-prime), which is characterised as: 
 ab = 	c(dKU	eIURN) − 	c(fIgNR	DgIeQ	eIURN) 
The d’ is often referred to as a sensitivity index corrected for response biases. However 
if Hit rates or False alarm rates equate to the upper or lower bounds, the statistic is 
incalculable. As such any participants with such scores would be removed from analysis. 
The d’ coefficients were calculated across all N-back sizes for 1-, 2- and 3-back trials to 
average out block effects. 
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 Goal-Directed Behaviour 
 Markov-Decision Task Parameters 
A Markov-decision task (Daw, et al., 2011) was employed to characterise reliance of 
control on automatic and reflective systems. The task itself is comprised 201 trials, each 
which contain three states; the first-stage state sA, and two second-stage states sB and sc; 
at each stage participants have an action which is characterised as aA for the first state, 
or aB at the second states. The first and second stage states are comprised of a stimulus 
pair that the participant must select under a 2 Alternate Forced Choice paradigm. There 
is then a probabilistic transition to one of two possible second-state stimulus pair options. 
One via a common transitional probability (pcommon = 0.70), the other via a rare 
transitional probability (prare = 0.30). At the second state, the choice is followed by a 
reward or zero outcome, which is given by a slowly moving Gaussian random walk.  
 
 
 
 
 
The task lasts 15-20 minutes, where participants made choices by identifying their chosen 
box through either the ‘z’ or the ‘m’ key to identify the left or right boxes respectively 
for both the first and second step in each trial. Participants completed 30 practice trials to 
familiarise themselves with the complex nature of the task and the slowly changing 
reward. Participants completed 201 trials, using three differing sets of stimuli and box 
colour. The transition between the first and second stage of each trial was 1500ms, with 
the chosen stimulus of the first stage being left on screen for the second stage choices; 
Appendix Figure 1; Markov Decision Task (A- Task Structure; B - Task Sequence) 
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and the second stage choice remaining on screen in the feedback stage. Participants were 
displayed the stimuli on a black background with white text in font Arial, font size 28. 
Participants had 2000ms to select an option, with inter-stimulus and inter-trial intervals 
set at 500ms and 300ms respectively, with the monetary reward present for 500ms. The 
task was ran on MATLAB 2015b, here this version of the task retains the parameters of 
the version as used by Voon et al. (2015). 
  
 Analysis 
Weighted Model 
 
The automatic or habitual system is denoted through temporal difference learning, 
ascribed here as the SARSA (State Action Reward State Action) algorithm. The SARSA (h) temporal difference (TD) algorithm was used to model the habitual system of control. 
The SARSA model of temporal difference learning uses the predicted long-term cache 
stored value. This is denoted as QTD (s, a), which is the Q-value or utility ascribed to the 
state-action pairings of all actions and subsequent states within the markov-chain 
sequence. The algorithm uses the prediction error (i), the calculated difference between 
the expected and observed reward. The choice for each stage of the trial ai,, where the 
action at the first-stage state (s1,t) leads probabilistically to the second state (s2,t) via the 
choice (a1,t). The second state (s2,t) is the proceeded by an action (a2,t), and subsequently 
a reward r2,t (=1 or 0). Here a prediction error is used to update and learn how actions 
effect outcomes within each stage i (= 1, 2) for trail t. The update occurs at the end 
second-stage state and at the terminal reward. The update uses previous outcome based 
on the state-action pairings under a linear sequence of events, to back-propogate the 
reward signal to previous state-action pairings in the markov-chain. As given by: 
 
QTD (si,t,ai,t) = QTD (si,t,ai,t) +  αiδi,t 
 
Where, 
 
δi,t = ri,t + QTD (si+1,t,ai+1,t) - QTD (si,t,ai,t) 
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The algorithms initially update the Q-value of the first state through the resulting outcome 
value of the second state QTD (si,t,ai,t) (r1,t = 0 at this state); where the second state is then 
updated through the reward signal r2,t, here the current trial transitions then to an terminal 
end state QTD (s3,t,a3,t) = 0. Τhe learning parameter, α, is included for both the learning 
rate for s1 to s2 and for s2 to s3 (α1, α2).  
 In addition to the prediction error of s1 to s2 and for s2 to s3; the algorithm also 
back-propagates the prediction error of s2 to s1 through an eligibility trace decay or 
discounting parameter λ (constrained as 0<λ<1, where λ=0 indicates a highly impulsive 
agent and λ=1 denotes a fully patient individual). This update is added to the earlier one: 
 
QTD (si,t,ai,t) = QTD (si,t,ai,t) +  αi λ δ2,t 
 
The reflective or goal-setting system of control is denoted through a Model-based 
algorithm, which provides a more sophisticated, computationally taxing system which on 
a behavioural level is seen as more reflective, ‘mindful’. The model-based system creates 
a decision tree of possible prospective states and actions, based upon a learned internal 
model of the environment. Model-based works from the current state (seen as the initial 
starting point of the decision tree) and then searches for the policy (best set of actions 
given states leading to the highest utility) by navigating either forward from the initial 
state to the terminal points or backwards from the terminal point to the initial state. The 
model-based algorithm takes into account the probabilities of transitioning between 
states, then calculates the maximal Q-value of the action spaces within that subsequent, 
prospective state. Under model-based control, the problem of the learning immediate 
rewards becomes identical to TD learning as given above. This is because the Q-value of 
that state-action pairing becomes an estimate of the immediate, subsequent reward, with 
no further states to anticipate. As such the two approaches become identical at the 
immediately rewarded state, QMB = QTD. Therefore the algorithm for the model-based 
control can be expressed as: 
 
QMB(sA,aj) = P(sB| sA,aj) max QTD (sB,aj) + P(sC| sA,aj) max QTD (sC,aj) 
 
A net action value, of the combined model-based and model-free utilities for the first-
stage action was calculated by weighting the Q-values of the respective models: 
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QNET(sA,aj) = wQMB(sA,aj) + (1 - w)QTD(sA,aj) 
 
Where, w is the weighting parameter that characterises a complete reliance on model-
based (goal-directed strategies) control where w = 1; or reliance on model-free (habitual 
strategies) control where w = 0.  
 The probability of a given choice was computed using the softmax equatioin in 
QNET: 
 
P(ai,t = a|si,t) ∝exp (βi [QNET(si,t,aj) + p ∗ rep(aj)]) 
 
Where, βi denotes the inverse temperature parameter or the degree of randomness in 
choices at each stage (β1, β2), with a lower value identifying greater choice randomness. 
The parameter p denotes perseveration (p > 0) or switching (p < 0)  in the first-stage 
choices. The rep(aj) is a binary indicator variable as 1 for the first-stage action where 
a=ai,t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The computational model is one of three models which was fitted to each individual trial-
by-trial choices with the weighted net model, which produces seven parameters: The β 
softmax parameters for the first and second states, the learning rates for the first and 
second states, the weighting parameter, the perseverance parameter and the discounting 
parameter.  
Logistic Regression Model 
A simplistic logistic model was ran that predicted reliance on model-based or model-free 
control by investigating the effect of staying or switching first stage choices. Model-free 
and model-based control exhibit distinct patterns of behaviour that can be identified 
through about how second stage rewards impact subsequent first-stage choices. For 
instance, if a first-stage choice led to a second stage reward via a rare transition, a purely 
model-free individual would repeat the first stage choice, as it resulted in a reward. This 
behavioural pattern to repeat choices when rewarded is a characteristic of habits within 
the dual-system RL framework (Daw et al., 2005). A pure model-based individual would 
construct a map of the environment taking into account probabilistic transitions between 
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states and their rewards, as such they would shift away from the first stage choice, as the 
other first stage choice would lead to a higher chance of that second-stage option. Here 
rewards and transition were coded with effect coding (-1, 1); with a reward denoted as 1, 
null outcome as -1; common transition as 1, and rare as -1. The linear regression model 
to explain participant’s shift or stay behaviour can be determined by four coefficients, (1) 
the reward term, which would identify model-free individuals; (2) whether transition was 
rare or common; (3) interaction term of transition and reward, which would identify 
model-based learning; (4) the constant which denotes baseline tendency to shift or stay 
if unrewarded. The key aspects of each trial was whether the second-stage choice was 
rewarded and whether this occurred in a rare or common transition to the second-stage, 
given the first stage choice made. Thus stay vs switching behaviour was characterised by 
whether participants’ repeated first-stage choice behaviour on the current trial (n) 
compared to the next trial (n + 1). Mixed-effects models were ran in the R statistical 
environment (R Core Team, 2018) using the lme4 linear mixed effects package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2015).   
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